



**MALCONTENT NEWS
RUSSIA-UKRAINE
SITUATION REPORT**

November 17, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

11/17/23 23:59* PST

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SUMMARY – DAY 631

It has been 3,581 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 266 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

We are making changes to the sections within the SITREP to reflect the changing areas of activity along the line of conflict.

- Kharkiv and Luhansk will be combined into one section due to the continued limited activity in Luhansk
- Kherson will be moved ahead of the Black Sea due to the multiple bridgeheads established on the left bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers and the inability of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to operate freely

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

Summary:

- There are map updates
- Fighting continues in the Kupyansk AO

- Russian forces restarted offensive operations in the Soledar AO
- Fighting continued near Klishchiivka and Andriivka
- Ukraine has launched spoiling attacks southeast of Shumy in the area of Horlivka to try and relieve pressure on Avdiivka
- Russian forces continued attempts to advance in the direction of Keramik and Stepove from the Krasnohorivka Plateau
- Russian troops briefly reached the outer fence of the Avdiivka Coke Plant but were eliminated
- Russian forces made marginal gains southeast of Avdiivka near the Yasinuvata Two Station and the former H-20 Highway interchange
- Russian forces used a VBIED north of Vodyane, where they were unable to consolidate gains in the no man's land
- Ukrainian forces only have a toehold of Marinka falling back to the very western edge of the obliterated settlement
- Fighting continued near Novomykhailivka
- Fighting continued south of Orikhiv in Zaporizhzhia, near Verbove and Robotyne
- The IAEA provided an update on the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and reported problems with Reactors 5 and 6

- The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) and the Office of President Zelenskyy confirmed that Ukrainian forces have established "several" bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers
- Ukrainian forces have established the new bridgehead near Hola Prystan
- On November 10, Ukrainian caused dozens of casualties when it struck a Russian convoy in occupied Hladkivka
- A major ammunition depot in the Russian Volgograd region exploded, destroying rockets, artillery shells, and other munitions
- At least one drone struck an aircraft factory in the Russian Smolensk region, with only minor damage reported
- On November 16-17, Ukraine shot down nine out of ten Shahed-136 kamikaze drones
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that if Ukraine does not get increased ammunition shortages in the immediate future, Ukrainian troops will be forced to withdraw from key areas
- The Deputy Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine was dismissed with no reason given
- Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Finland announced new military aid packages for Ukraine

- Russian officials are blocking a planned protest by the family members of conscripts who were illegally deployed to Ukraine, citing COVID-19 regulations
- Funeral announcements and memorials have confirmed that three sailors from the Kilo-class submarine Rostov-on-Don were killed on September 13
- Funeral announcements also suggested that the entire crew of the large landing ship Minsk, 98 sailors and officers, were also killed in the same missile attack on occupied Sevastopol
- Ukrainian officials reported that 4,337 soldiers and civilians are being held as prisoners of war by Russia and also reported that Russia has ended prisoner-of-war exchanges
- In an open letter to the International Committee of the Red Cross, Ukraine accused the organization of taking a passive approach to enforcing international humanitarian law and its duty to provide basic protection and accountability of POWs
- Four more children were repatriated to free Ukraine from the occupied territories
- Armenia became the 124th country to ratify the Rome Statute
- Finland closed its border with Russia due to continued provocations and attempts to push undocumented migrants from Syria, Iran, and Iraq over its border

- Estonia installed antitank barriers at its closed borders with Russia
- Investigators from Finland and Estonia confirmed that the anchor from the Chinese-flagged container ship NewNew Polar Bear damaged the Balticconnector Pipeline on October 7-8
- Russia lifted its temporary ban on the export of gasoline almost two months after taking the measure to alleviate a national fuel crisis

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:


1. The statement by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that the delivery of artillery ammunition has decreased significantly aligns with our earlier assessment that the delay of a new military aid package from the United States would negatively impact Ukraine's capabilities was, regrettably, accurate.
2. We have grave concerns over the amount of military support Ukraine will receive in 2024, with the United States Congress in paralysis and the European Union not meeting their promised 2023 deliveries.
3. We maintain that Russian commanders have put mission objectives over all other considerations and remain committed to capturing the Avdiivka salient regardless of the cost and that the broader analyst community is underestimating Moscow's willingness to absorb losses that would otherwise be considered unsustainable.
4. We cannot assess the reasons behind Russia's continued terror campaign against civilians on the right bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson as the number of Ukrainian forces rapidly expands on the left

bank, with four distinct bridgeheads now formed, and Russian units continued complaints about a lack of close air support and suppressive artillery fire.

5. Russia is stockpiling missiles and drones for large-scale attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure as the weather continues to degrade, and the extended pause from large attacks is likely due to the near historically warm and dry fall.
6. We maintain that the continued drop in missile and drone strikes in Ukraine is meant to keep the Russia-Ukraine War out of the news cycle as global interest is fixated on the Israel-Hamas War supported by information warfare efforts launched by the Kremlin.
7. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.




TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV AND LUHANSK



Russian Objective New: Recapture all territory from Kupyansk to Pisky Radkivski and push Ukrainian forces west of the Oskil River, recapture all of the Luhansk Oblast, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective New: Hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna, Kupyansk, Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk Operational Areas and protect civilians and civilian infrastructure




In the Kupyansk AO of Kharkiv, Russian forces continued their attacks in the areas of [Synkivka](#), the forested regions northeast of [Petropavlivka](#), and to the southeast of [Ivanivka](#). Russian forces made marginal gains near [Kyslivka](#), but not enough to move the current line of conflict (LOC).¹


There wasn't any significant activity reported in the Luhansk Oblast, where positional fighting continues near [Raihorodka](#).

¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13671>

DONBAS REGION




NORTHEAST DONETSK




Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut AO, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk, stabilize more advantageous defensive lines on the north flank of Bakhmut for winter, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, and minimize civilian casualties




In the Soledar AO, Russian forces restarted offensive operations near [Vasyukivka](#). The attack was unsuccessful.²

² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13671>



In the Klishchiivka AO, mutual fighting continued north and east of [Klishchiivka](#) and east of [Andriivka](#). Russian forces may have made marginal gains north of Klishchiivka, but at the time of publication, it is unclear if they were able to hold the positions.³

³ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13671>



In the Toretzk-Niu York AO, multiple Ukrainian sources have confirmed that Ukrainian troops have made marginal gains southeast of [Shumy](#) and have turned part of the area east of the Minsk II border into a gray zone. One Ukrainian source wrote, “We are waiting for good news from Horlivka district. The guys there are doing important work for those who still stayed in Avdiivka.”

This provides some additional clarity on the mission objective, suggesting that it is a spoiling attack meant to




force Russian commanders to move resources from the Avdiivka AO.⁴

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
⁴ <https://t.me/odshbr46/1375>

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Capture the remainder of the Donetsk Oblast by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics




Heavy fighting continued in the Avdiivka AO, which remains the main focus for Russian forces. East of Novbakhmutivka, Russian forces continued attempts to advance in the direction of [Keramik](#) without success.⁵ It was a similar situation west of the Krasnohorivka Plateau, with Russian forces continuing their attempts to move beyond the railroad tracks in the direction of [Stepove](#).⁶ South of the hamlet of [Vesele](#), Ukrainian forces were pushed back, but it is unclear if Russian forces were able to move the LOC. We already had an extensive gray area south of the plateau, so no changes to the map were made.

⁵ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13671>

⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13671>

We did move the line of conflict northeast of the [Avdiivka Coke Plant](#) and believe that Russian forces have full control of the terrikon. A graphic video showed Russian troops had reached the berm just east of the coke plant fence but were wiped out. Based on the video, we made a small adjustment to the gray area but saw no evidence that Russian troops had entered the plant or were able to remain at the berm.



On the southern flank of Avdiivka, another graphic video showed a lone wounded Russian soldier had been abandoned in the Yasinuvata Two Station area at the interchange of the [former H-20 Highway and the road into](#)

[Avdiivka](#). Based on the information, we expanded the gray area and moved the line of conflict, although there is a degree of uncertainty about how much control Russian forces have in the area.


Russian milblogger Alexander Sladkov complained that Russian forces have only achieved parity in the Avdiivka AO and questioned Russian tactics. "I really want to see real relief from the lot of the Russian soldier. Not a reduction in the pace of movement, but a reduction in losses and a multiple increase in enemy losses."⁷

Despite the ongoing siege, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine reported that 1,431 civilians remained in the city that was once home to 35,000. There are no children, with the remainder of civilians comprised of the disabled and elderly who are too frail to be moved, the stubborn and pro-Russian components awaiting their "liberation."⁸ Ukrainian officials reported that evacuations were ongoing, and at least one journalist was able to enter the city recently, suggesting that the ground lines of communication (GLOC – supply lines) into the city have been stabilized.

⁷ https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/9105


⁸ <https://t.me/The3rdForceUA/21147>

ASSESSMENT: While some analysts have exhibited a degree of schadenfreude at the stalled Russian offensive, our team does not share in this optimism. We are seeing significant indications that ammunition shortages are becoming an issue for Ukrainian forces, and the Kremlin remains committed to capturing Avdiivka regardless of the cost. It is important to remember that while Russian troops and proxy forces, mostly the defunct Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group, advanced an average of 30 meters per day toward Bakhmut, the city was captured after nine months of relentless attacks. In our assessment, Russia is similarly committed and, despite misgivings from milbloggers like Sladkov, does not care about personnel losses.

We reduced the gray area south and southeast of [Sieverne](#) after better intelligence indicated that Russian forces have not been able to hold positions in the no man's land. Russian forces attempted to strike Ukrainian positions near Sieverne using a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), stuffing an MT-LB armored personnel carrier with T-62 landmines. The VBIED didn't reach its target,  [running over a landmine](#) and exploding.⁹ Russian attempts to bypass the village to

⁹ <https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1725226298170073210>

the west toward [Tonenke](#) continue to be unsuccessful.¹⁰ A prominent Russian milblogger reported that fighting was ongoing in the area of [Pervomaiske](#) with no change in the situation.¹¹




In the Marinka AO, it appears that Ukrainian commanders have decided to yield the remainder of the city. Ukrainian forces maintain a toehold in the last two blocks and a small part of [northwest Marinka](#) on the north bank of the fishing pond. The Russian siege is in its 631st day and has turned the settlement into nearly indistinguishable rubble. It is

¹⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13671>

¹¹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16486>


unlikely that Russia will be able to capitalize on the looming operational success.



In the Vuhledar AO, Russian forces continued their attacks east and south of [Novomykhailivka](#) with no change in the situation.¹² Russian troops also attempted to advance in the direction of the [Vuhledar Coal Mine](#) from Mykilske without success.¹³


¹² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13671>

¹³ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13671>




In the **Staromlynivka AO**, Russian forces were able to retake some defensive positions [east of Urozhaine](#). Based on the new intelligence, we updated the LOC and the gray area.

ZAPORIZHZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the continued Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Capitalize on the breakthrough of the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



South of Orikhiv, mutual fighting continued on the western edge of [Verbove](#) and west of [Robotyne](#). There continue to be reports of Ukrainian gains at Robotyne, but we have yet to see videos or pictures that we can geolocate and confirm the reports.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provided an update on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).¹⁴ Reactor 6, which is in cold shutdown, experienced

¹⁴ [International Atomic Energy Agency](#)

a 90-minute power loss, forcing the cooling and circulation systems to be powered by emergency diesel generators. Russian occupiers are unsure what caused the power loss, and IAEA inspectors are conducting their own investigation, according to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi. After the incident, parts of the reactor safety systems were shut down for maintenance.

“While this was not a total loss of off-site power, as we have seen seven times before during the conflict, it once again highlights the precarious nuclear safety and security situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,” Grossi said.

IAEA officials also reported that boron had been detected in the secondary cooling circuit for one of the steam generators in Unit 5, which is currently in hot shutdown. Boron is injected into the water in the primary cooling circuit, and the presence in the secondary system indicates there is a leak. Inspectors and Russian occupiers have increased testing and are monitoring the amount of boron detected in the secondary circuit. Radiation levels are normal. There is no plan to move Reactor 5 to cold shutdown at this time.


IAEA inspectors were able to do a walk-through and inspection of the control rooms of Reactors one through six, one after the other. A walk-through of Turbine Halls one through six, which has been requested since May, continues to be denied. A partial inspection of Turbine Hall 5 was permitted.

Work on the reactor vessel and cooling circuits on Reactor 3 continued, with testing of the primary cooling circuit completed.

KHERSON

Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the T-2206 Highway south of the Konka River, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Further expand existing bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers, lock Russian troops and reserves in place, continue a southern advance into eastern Kherson toward the Crimean Peninsula, minimize civilian casualties



In Kherson, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have confirmed that multiple bridgeheads have been established on the left bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers. "On the left bank of the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction, thanks to the courage and professionalism of the Ukrainian marines, in cooperation with other units of the Defense Forces, it was possible to gain a foothold on several bridgeheads. The defense forces continue to hold the occupied lines, have repelled six enemy attacks, and are conducting measures to expand the occupied bridgehead," GSAFU stated in their morning report.¹⁵

President Zelenskyy shared  [the first official photos](#) of Ukrainian forces on the left bank.¹⁶ Kyiv described the ongoing action as "sabotage, raiding and reconnaissance operations," but the number of Ukrainian troops, which may have swelled to 1,000, indicates there is a much larger operational goal.¹⁷


Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces had established a fourth bridgehead near [Hola Prystan](#).¹⁸ While

¹⁵ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13672>

¹⁶ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18085>

¹⁷ https://t.me/couch_iu/46814

¹⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16486>


propagandists who toe the Kremlin line made new claims that Ukrainian forces are already being pushed back, semi-reliable Russian sources reported that Russian troops lack the combat strength to push Ukrainian forces back. In our assessment, with four bridgeheads established, a withdrawal by Ukrainian forces will require the reallocation of Russian resources from Zaporizhzhia and a significant effort or a decision from Kyiv that mission objectives are or cannot be achieved. Fighting continues in and near [Krynky](#), [Poima](#), [Pishchanivka](#), and [Pidstepne](#). Russian forces brought a TOS-1A 220 mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) to within 3 kilometers of the known line of conflict south of Krynky. It lasted less than 24 hours,  [destroyed by a Ukrainian drone-delivered IED](#).¹⁹

Russian sources claimed that a new batch of 122 mm Grad rockets recently delivered did not operate as expected and destroyed the last remaining Russian electronic warfare station in the Krynky area.²⁰

Russian forces continued to savagely shell and bomb the right bank of Kherson, targeting the center of Kherson for over an hour on November 17, killing six.

¹⁹ <https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1725454400464839094>

²⁰ <https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1725608114152525891>

On November 10, in occupied Hladkivka, a Russian convoy on the Chulakivka-Radensk Road came to a stop in a tight cluster. A drone-directed strike using M31A1 rockets fired by HIMARS  [destroyed the convoy](#), with Russian and Ukrainian sources reporting dozens of casualties, rendering an understaffed light infantry battalion combat ineffective.²¹

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

There wasn't significant activity in this region.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

²¹ <https://t.me/uniannet/117616>

There wasn't significant activity in this region.

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale


Ukrainian Objective: Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives


There wasn't significant activity in this region.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

In the **Volgograd region**, a Russian military base near Kotluban experienced a  [catastrophic explosion of a large ammunition depot](#) that continued either air defense or Grad rockets, among other munitions.²² Some Russian sources claimed the explosion was due to a drone attack, while others stated it was an accident. An unknown number of Russian troops are reported as missing by relatives.

In the **Smolensk region**, an aircraft factory was hit by at least one Ukrainian drone, with two more shot down.²³ ²⁴Russian sources claim the drone penetrated the roof and exploded but added there was no damage to production facilities. A video showed at  [least one drone was intercepted](#).²⁵

²² <https://twitter.com/albafella1/status/1725116885425852864>

²³ <https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1725431993234575499>

²⁴ <https://t.me/bazabazon/23038>

²⁵ <https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1725436321571717242>

THEATERWIDE

On the night of November 16-17, Russia launched ten Shahed-136 kamikaze drones at Ukraine, with nine intercepted.²⁶ We could not account for the tenth drone.

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has instructed the Ministry of Defense to find a solution to end extended nationwide air raid warnings when Russia is operating Mig-31Ks, which is the launch platform for Kh-47 air-launched ballistic missiles. Because the missiles travel over Mach 5, they can reach their target in minutes, forcing nationwide air raid warnings, sometimes lasting for hours.²⁷

President Zelenskyy has also sounded the alarm on dwindling supplies of ammunition and ammunition shipments. We had assessed on September 30 that United States supply disruptions would start manifesting in Ukraine in roughly six weeks, which was accurate. "Their focus is shifting because of the Middle East and [for] other reasons," Zelenskyy warned, adding, "Without support, we will move backward."^{28 29}

²⁶ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/17/7429169/>

²⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/123723>

²⁸ https://t.me/couch_iu/46835

²⁹ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/7197

There is no chance that the U.S. Congress will consider the issue of military aid for Ukraine before early December, and it will likely be a contentious political fight.

President Zelenskyy dismissed Alexander Tarasovskiy, the deputy head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine. No reason was given for his removal.³⁰

Lithuania announced a new military aid package for Ukraine, which included generators, rations, and winter gear.³¹ The Netherlands announced they were committed to providing two billion euros in military aid in 2024 for the supply of ammunition, weapons, maintenance and technical support, and improvements in cybersecurity. Finland also announced a new military aid package but did not publicly share any details.

The table for equipment losses was **updated on October 28, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

³⁰ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/17/7429301/>

³¹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18093>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to October 28, 2023. 12,871 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,666 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2279	307	7.42:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	158	375	0.42:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	1024	333	3.07:1	↑
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2957	780	3.79:1	↑
Armored Personnel Carriers	368	360	1.02:1	—
MRAPs	49	175	0.28:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	223	388	0.57:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	254	18	14.11:1	↓
Engineering Vehicles	355	92	3.85:1	↓
Towed Artillery	328	165	1.99:1	↓
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	585	236	2.48:1	—
MLRS	299	50	5.98:1	—
SAMs	189	130	1.45:1	—
Mobile Radars	46	82	0.56:1	↓
EW/ECW	58	4	14.50:1	↑
Winged Aircraft	94	77	1.22:1	—
Helicopters	139	37	3.77:1	↑
Naval Vessels and Submarines	17	27	0.63:1	—

MOBIKS, MOBILIZATION, AND MIR

Relatives of up to 300 conscripts who planned to hold a rally in Moscow on November 25 to draw attention to their illegal deployment in Ukraine had their permit application denied. Moscow officials claimed that holding the rally would violate COVID-19 protocols.³²

Analysis of online funeral announcements and memorials revealed that three crew members of the Kilo-class submarine Rostov-on-Don, including a junior officer, were killed and one severely wounded in the September 13 Storm Shadow missile strike on Sevastopol.³³ Moscow has refused to label the deaths as combat-related, denying all assistance and survivor benefits to their relatives.

Two fatalities have also been confirmed from the Project 775 Large Landing Ship (LLS) Minsk, with the obituary for medic Artem Faizov claiming that the ship's complement of 98 sailors and officers were killed.³⁴ This aligns with earlier reports in late September that the Minsk was in the process of being refloated and was fully fueled.

³² <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/17/7429259/>

³³ https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1725069496988115076

³⁴ https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1725492874664386921

WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The Ministry of Reintegration of Ukraine reported that 4,337 Ukrainians are being held as prisoners by Russia, including 3,574 military personnel and 763 civilians. This does not include forced deportees. The Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War of Ukraine said that Russia ended prisoner-of-war exchanges in August. Russia has refused to follow International Humanitarian Law and create mixed medical boards for the continued exchange of seriously wounded POWs.³⁵ In an open letter, the CHTPOW wrote, "Today, Brigadier General Dmytro Usov, Secretary of the Coordinating Staff for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, initiated an appeal to the International Committee of the Red Cross in connection with Russia's violation of all reasonable deadlines for approving the candidacies of doctors from neutral countries to participate in the mixed medical commission."

The letter also restated that the ICRC promised to guarantee the safety of Ukrainian defenders who left the Azovstal steelworks in May 2022 but did not fulfill even the most obligations under IHL, such as documenting the

³⁵ <https://koordshtab.gov.ua/archive/2501>

names of all prisoners and the location of their confinement.³⁶ The Red Cross had also pledged it would ensure that Ukrainian prisoners of war could contact their families, which Russia continues to block.

Four more children from occupied Kherson and Donetsk were repatriated to free Ukraine.³⁷ ³⁸ The children have been reunited with family members and are in Kyiv to receive medical and psychological care.

GEOPOLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Armenia officially ratified its recognition of the Rome Statute, becoming the 124th nation to join the International Criminal Court. The measure will go into effect on February 1, 2024, and effectively blocks Russian President Vladimir Putin from traveling to the CSTO nation.³⁹

Responding to Russian aggression, Finland officially closed its border crossings.⁴⁰ As the closure loomed, Russia attempted to push undocumented migrants from Syria and

³⁶ <https://news.yahoo.com/russia-refuses-agree-mixed-medical-180019922.html>

³⁷ <https://t.me/uniannet/117657>

³⁸ <https://t.me/suspilnenews/26120>

³⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/123775>

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/123748>

Iraq into Finland at the Niirla Crossing, forcing border security to deploy teargas.⁴¹

Estonia deployed antitank half-height dragon teeth at its closed border crossing with Russia in response to continued provocations in the Baltic region.⁴²

Investigators have confirmed that the object that damaged the Balticconnector gas pipeline on October 7-8 was the anchor to the Chinese-flagged containership NewNew Polar Bear.⁴³ Sweden and Estonia are also investigating if the vessel damaged three telecommunication lines on the floor of the Baltic Sea. China is reportedly fully cooperating with Finnish, Estonian, and Swedish investigators.

The Ministry of Energy of Russia announced that it was lifting its ban on gasoline exports, which was implemented on September 21 to alleviate a national fuel crisis.⁴⁴ The ban continued for almost two months, far longer than Russian officials had planned. Energy prices have crashed in November, with the price for Urals crude falling 18% to \$63.10 a barrel. The drop comes as the rouble strengthened

⁴¹ <https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1725622215264084210>

⁴² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/123744>

⁴³ [Marine Insight](#)

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/115216>

to 90 for one dollar. The sharp increase in the value of the Russian currency is due to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decree that 43 companies convert their foreign holdings into roubles, creating artificial demand. While Russia is not experiencing hyperinflation, it took the drastic measure of increasing the prime lending rate from 8% to 15% in less than two months and the currency manipulation to keep annual inflation for 2023 under 8%.

RUMORS

Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.

- No rumors to report


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠ Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report: We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


🛡 Rybar: We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


⚠ War Gonzo: We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.