



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

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Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 601

It has been 3,522 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 237 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

Summary:

- There are map updates
- Could not complete

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. The soft response by Ukraine's allies after Russian aggression on Ukraine's border will eventually lead to a significant incident that could result in military intervention.
2. The limited introduction of ATACMS missiles into the theater of war has been highly effective, and their

continued deployment would likely force Russia to pull air assets and larger ammunition depots back into the Russian Federation, limiting loitering time for close air support and complicating logistics.


3. We maintain that the Ukrainian summer-fall counteroffensive is likely reaching its culmination point due to a number of factors, even though Ukraine still maintains significant combat potential and is maintaining the initiative in the Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia regions.
4. In our assessment, the Russian Federation's attempt to force Ukraine to utilize its reserve forces and accelerate the consumption of ammunition due to the United States military aid remaining in limbo has been unsuccessful. Russia continues to hold the initiative in three areas of operation (AO), but the poorly executed offensives have caused catastrophic losses of personnel and equipment.
5. We maintain that the new Russian offensive has exposed the degradation of their artillery capabilities due to a shortage of replacement barrels, a lack of powder charges, and the reluctance to use full charges for maximum range to preserve the life span of existing barrels.
6. The failure of the United States House to elect a new Speaker continues to put future Ukrainian military operations at risk. We further assess that the abrupt

ending of U.S. military aid will be catastrophic if a resolution is not reached within the next 8 to 15 days.

7. In our assessment, the promised deliveries of weapons, equipment, and munitions from Western partners appear to be catching up with the commitments made and may assist in extending the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
8. The Kremlin is using the Israel-Hamas War as a distraction in the information space to fracture support for Ukraine further and to paint the Hamas-Israeli War as an Arab-United States and NATO war.
9. We maintain that Russia is stockpiling missiles for large-scale attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure as the weather continues to degrade and the activity to destroy Ukraine's electrical system has started.
10. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.




TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



In the Kupyansk Operational Area (AO), Russian forces continued to employ human wave attacks with limited armor support. North of Kupyansk, mutual fighting continued near [Synkivka](#).^{1 2} East of Kupyansk, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near [Pershotravneve](#) and [Orlyanske](#).³ More intense fighting continued east of [Ivanivka](#) and further south near [Kyslivka](#).^{4 5}

¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13022>

² https://t.me/mod_russia/31607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

³ https://t.me/mod_russia/31607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13022>


⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/31607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

Kharkiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA) Oleg Syniegubov said that the industrial district in the city of Kharkiv was attacked by Russia, wounding one person and knocking out power to parts of the city.⁶

⁶ <https://t.me/suspilnenews/25250>


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, and capture the rest of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents



In the Svatove AO, Russian forces continued their attacks near [Serhiivka](#) and [Nadiya](#) with no change in the situation.⁷


⁸ Russian forces made three attempts to advance on [Makiivka](#) without success.^{9 10}

⁷ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13022>

⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/31607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13022>

¹⁰ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/14428>




South of Kreminna, the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMD) made its daily claim of a Ukrainian offensive in the area of [Dibrova](#).¹¹

In occupied Luhansk, [medium-resolution satellite images from Planet Labs](#) showed the extent of damage at the Russian helicopter base near the city of Luhansk.¹² The airfield was hit by two M140 M39 ATACMS missiles, with the images confirming five Russian helicopters were damaged.

¹¹ https://t.me/mod_russia/31607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹² https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1714797845457350817


NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut AO, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk, collapse the Russian flanks north of Bakhmut, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, liberate the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, advance to the administrative border of Luhansk, and minimize civilian casualties

In the Bakhmut AO, RMOD reported there was fighting near [Khromove](#). No other sources claimed there was fighting in the area.¹³



Mutual fighting was reported in the Klishchiivka AO east and northeast of [Klischiiivka](#), where Ukrainian forces have made marginal gains.^{14 1516} RMOD claimed Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the area of [Andriivka](#) and near

¹³ https://t.me/mod_russia/31607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13022>


¹⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/31607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹⁶ <https://t.me/wargonzo/15859>

[Kurdyumivka](#).¹⁷ We have additional information, but we can't share it at this time, and that's why the details in this AO have been light.


¹⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/31607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Capture the remainder of the Donetsk Oblast by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



In the Avdiivka AO, Russia launched  [another armored offensive](#), and it went about as well as all previous attempts of the last ten days.¹⁸ One tank and five infantry fighting (IFV) vehicles were destroyed before the column reached the forwardmost line of friendly troops (FLOT).

An analysis by the Ukrainian source DeepState determined that in the previous ten days, Russia lost 63 pieces of heavy military equipment just at the Krasnohorivka Plateau.¹⁹ Only six tanks, IFVs, and armored personnel carriers (APC) made it past the FLOT, with a single tank advancing 500 meters through open terrain before being destroyed. The


¹⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/31607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹⁹ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/10/18/7424677/>

rest of the equipment was destroyed within Krasnohorivka or in the area of the H-20 Highway. Russian armored losses on the eastern approach and the north and south flanks of Avdiivka are between 90 and 100 vehicles.

Russian milblogger Informant, who claims to be in the Avdiivka AO, described the situation for Russian forces. "There is no need to talk about successes on our part. The entire theater of military operations consists of four forest plantations. If they manage to knock the [Ukrainians] out of the line of defense, then they completely destroy all the trenches with artillery and tanks. After such shelling, the position becomes impossible to hold. All that has been achieved at the moment is moving the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces away from ours and increasing the gray zone. The current results of the offensive, which has been going on for almost ten days, are in no way worth the losses incurred. No one cared about counterbattery combat or the ultimate superiority in fired shells *[They are complaining about the lack of counterbattery and suppressive fire for Russian troops, which has been a consistent complaint in the Avdiivka AO – Ed.]* To put it quite frankly, the sector the most fortified by the


[Ukrainians] was chosen, and no other result should have been expected."²⁰



As previously noted, fighting continued near [Avdiivka](#), with Russian forces suffering heavy losses and returning to their defensive positions.²¹ Were you expecting more? That's it. We maintain that Russian forces are in an operational pause and will continue their attacks.

²⁰ https://t.me/romanov_92/41924

²¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13022>




In the Marinka AO, Russian forces continued their attacks in [Marinka](#) with no change in the situation.^{22 23}

In the Vuhledar AO, Russian forces did their Russian thing near [Novomykahilivka](#) and restarted their tradition of suffering losses and returning to their previous defensive positions.²⁴

²² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13022>

²³ https://t.me/mod_russia/31607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


²⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13022>



In the Staromlynivka AO, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported that Russian forces tried to advance out of [Novomaiorske](#) without success.²⁵

²⁵ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13022>


ZAPORIZHZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, prepare to launch a fall-winter offensive to capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks





Ukrainian Objective: Expand the breakthrough at the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians


In Zaporizhzhia, the Ukrainian commander of the operational-strategic group Tavia, Brigadier General Alexander Tarnavskiy, reported that Ukrainian forces conducted 1,412 fire missions against Russian troops. The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted 27 airstrikes and launched six missiles at the city of Zaporizhzhia.



South of Orikhiv, GSAFU reported that Russian forces launched a counteroffensive east of [Mala Tokmachka](#),

which was unsuccessful.²⁶ Russian forces continued their counteroffensive on the western edge of [Verbove](#) and remained unable to advance.²⁷ ²⁸ A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued their efforts to push Ukrainian forces back west of [Robotyne](#) and north of [Kopani](#). Fighting has been heavy, with both combatants trading control of defensive positions.²⁹

The death toll in the city of Zaporizhzhia from the overnight missile strike increased to five after an  [apartment building](#) was hit. The building is in danger of collapse, with a crane holding the topmost floor in place. Searchers found and rescued a cat that had been buried in debris for 11 hours. Another missile hit the   [Dynamo sports complex](#), causing heavy damage.³⁰ A third missile successfully  [demilitarized a professional soccer pitch](#).³¹

In occupied Berdyansk, additional medium-resolution satellite images from Planet Labs showed the extent of damage at the Russian airbase that was hit by ATACMS missiles.  [Five Ka-52 and four Mi-8 helicopters](#) (they

²⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13023>


²⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/31608 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

²⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/15859>

²⁹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/15859>

³⁰ <https://t.me/zaborzp/55563>

³¹ https://t.me/smolij_ukraine/45411

may be Mi-17s) were destroyed, and  [another four Mi-8s were likely damaged](#) to the point of not being airworthy.³²


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³² <https://t.me/ShrikeNews/10877>

³³ <https://t.me/ShrikeNews/10878>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Operational Command South (OCS) reported **the Black Sea Fleet** had six vessels on patrol. Director of Communications for OCS, Captain Nataliya Humenyuk, said that Russia has started dropping UMPK glide bombs into international shipping lanes and potentially deploying sea mines in an attempt to disrupt increasing traffic to Ukraine's Odesa seaports.³⁴

In occupied Crimea, RMOD claimed that they intercepted a Ukrainian missile at Sukharnaya Balka near Sevastopol. Video and  [pictures showed a large explosion had rocked](#) the Kara-Koba area and was geolocated to where the 3413 Engineering Missile Station, unit no. 13189 of the Russian Federation is located.³⁵ ³⁶ Local officials claim the missile was intercepted, and the intact warhead crashed into an empty field.

Insurgents shared pictures of a significant number of 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers (SPG)  [staged in](#)

³⁴ https://t.me/our_odessa/55704

³⁵ <https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1714673024731918380>

³⁶ https://t.me/shot_shot/58324

[occupied Crimea for transfer to Zaporizhzhia](#).³⁷ More than 10,000 of the MT-LB armored personnel carrier-based SPGs were built from 1971 to 1991. With a conventional firing range of 15 kilometers and a maximum rate of fire of 5 rounds per minute, the 2S1 will have to come uncomfortably close to the FLOT, making it a drone target.

Russia has transferred combat dolphins from Sevastopol to the westernmost coast of Crimea, with the pens near Novoozerny. It is believed that the dolphins have been moved to detect Ukrainian special forces units that have been conducting raids since the recapture of the Boyko Towers.³⁸

Russian President Vladimir Putin has deployed four Mig-31K multirole fighter jets to occupied Crimean airbases. The planes are capable of launching the Kh-47 Kinzhal air-to-surface ballistic missile, frequently misidentified as a hypersonic weapon.

ASSESSMENT: Our analyst team believes that these will be used as psychological warfare weapons, forcing Ukraine to issue nationwide air alerts anytime the aircraft are

³⁷ https://t.me/atesh_ua/2267

³⁸ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/45726>

airborne. Russia used the same technique last year, stationing Mig-31Ks in Belarus. The aircraft did launch a handful of Kinzhal missiles during their rotation, making it possible for Russia to use the ballistic cruise missiles to target port infrastructure in the Odesa region.

In the last month, more than 30 cargo ships have passed through Odesa's ports carrying more than one million tons of grain. This is equivalent to the first full month of the Black Sea Grain Initiative and highlights how much control Russia has lost of the Ukrainian coastline.³⁹ In addition to grain, iron ore has been exported.

The city of Mykolaiv was hit by at least one missile, destroying an abandoned warehouse and breaking windows in several nearby apartment buildings. No injuries were reported.⁴⁰


³⁹ <https://t.me/uniannet/114910>

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/6632>

KHERSON



Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



In Free Kherson, Kherson Oblast OVA Alexander Prokudin said Russia carried out 105 fire missions, firing 508 munitions, rockets, drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs,

striking the city of Kherson 23 times.⁴¹ Russian attacks targeted residential areas, the markets in the Dnipro District, and a park. Two people were killed and four wounded.

We have answers about Russian claims of Ukrainian forces crossing the Dnipro and Konka Rivers and reaching [Pishchanivka](#) and [Poima](#) on the left (east) bank. It's true. GSAFU reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes near Pishchanivka, revealing that Ukrainian forces are operating across the river.⁴² A Russian video showed the area near the damaged  [railway bridge over the Verkhnia Konka River](#) being repeatedly targeted.⁴³ Another Russian video showed a small group of  [Ukrainian forces on the edge of Pishchanivka](#).⁴⁴ We adjusted the map, mostly expanding the gray area. There is a lot we don't know at this time, including force strength, composition, and mission. Even if this is a small group of naval infantry, they've penetrated up to 11 kilometers and have met little resistance from Russian ground forces.

⁴¹ <https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/1692>

⁴² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13023>

⁴³ <https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1714588499423203343>

⁴⁴ <https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1714650085760323860>

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

There were several missile strikes, but at the time of publication, we had not completed our research.

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There was a drone strike in Sumy, but we have not completed our research to provide additional details.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

There was no significant activity in this region.


THEATERWIDE

Russian President Putin was asked about ATACMS missiles at a press conference and scoffed, claiming that they won't change the outcome of the war and Russia will be able to repel them. Where have we heard that before? He went on to say that if Russia loses the war, the United States can take their ATACMS home, and President Joe Biden can join

him for pancakes and tea. This is not snark, and we're not sure if the offer to have tea is actually a threat.⁴⁵

Ukrainian air defenses had a rough night.⁴⁶ Russia launched five Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles, one Kh-59 guided cruise missile, one undetermined cruise missile, and nine Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. Air defense shot down the Kh-59 and three Shaheds. There were hits in the Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia regions.

The President's representative in the Verkhovna Rada, People's Deputy Fedir Venislavskyi, said there was no need to expand, speed up, or increase the number of mobilization measures.⁴⁷

Ukraine shared a video of  [six more ATACMS missiles being launched](#), bringing the total used to 11.⁴⁸ Will Putin's words about being able to repel ATACMS age like room-temperature milk? Stay tuned.

⁴⁵ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/45407

⁴⁶ <https://t.me/AFUStratCom/20595>

⁴⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119604>

⁴⁸ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119564>

France announced it would be tripling 155 mm artillery shell production by the end of the year and will be able to send Ukraine 3,000 rounds per month starting in January.⁴⁹ While it may be tempting to dismiss 3,000 shells a month, which isn't enough to supply Ukraine for a single day, it does raise a question. Ukrainian forces have shown no signs of conserving ammunition, and dire predictions from March 2023, based on the leaked classified documents, did not come true. Numerous European countries have restarted ammunition production. What is unclear is how much additional production has quietly come online.

We should be back to a full report tomorrow with an updated table of losses.

The table for equipment losses was **updated on September 30, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

⁴⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119580>

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to September 30, 2023. 12,319 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,510 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2179*	292	7.55:1	—
Medium Duty Tanks	150	364*	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	985	327	3.00:1	—
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2817	765	3.68:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	354	347	1.02:1	↓
MRAPs	48	164	0.29:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	212	375	0.57:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	251	17	14.76:1	—
Engineering Vehicles	345	84	4.11:1	↑
Towed Artillery	310	160	1.94:1	—
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	538	222	2.42:1	↓
MLRS	278	50	5.57:1	↑
SAMs	182	129	1.41:1	—
Mobile Radars	45	79	0.57:1	—
EW/ECW	54	4	13.50:1	—
Winged Aircraft	93	73	1.27:1	—
Helicopters	113	37	3.05:1	↓
Naval Vessels and Submarines	17	27	0.63:1	—


RUMORS


Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.


- Will Jim Jordan (R-OH) become the next Speaker of the House tomorrow?
- Is Belarus and Russia planning a false-flag operation to blame Ukraine?
- Is President Biden going to request a one-and-done 2024 military aid package of up to \$100 billion for Ukraine? Appears likely.
- Have more than 280,000 Russian soldiers died in Ukraine since February 24, 2022?
- Were two Russian generals seriously wounded and one admiral killed in Sevastopol? We're still waiting to find out.


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.