

**MALCONTENT NEWS
RUSSIA-UKRAINE
SITUATION REPORT**

July 25, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 516

It has been 3,436 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 151 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. There was significant fog of war in multiple areas of operation (AO), which required extensive fact-checking. Today's report is condensed and combat only because right over first and the truth matters.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:


1. We maintain that Russian complaints of ammunition shortages, which have spread from Zaporizhzhia to the Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction, are likely caused by the disruption of Russian logistics and the targeted destruction of large ammunition depots.
2. We maintain Russian Federation's defacto blockade of the western Black Sea has put shipping in the territorial waters of Bulgaria and Romania at risk, and if the European Union, United Nations, and/or NATO do not respond with any action, preferably non-

- military, Russian aggression on the border nations of Ukraine will continue to expand and eventually lead to an international incident.
3. Ukrainian forces shifting to an artillery-centric war of attrition against Russian forces, leveraging an advantage in range, accuracy, and capacity, may be moving back to a period of increased ground operations in three operational areas supported by artillery.
 4. The current Ukrainian military activity is subordinate offensives and shaping operations, and the main operation has not started.
 5. We maintain that signals from Kyiv indicating the next phase of the summer offensive is being prepared are accurate.
 6. Despite Ukraine's plans to move to the next phase, we maintain that Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition dates, negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
 7. While public support for former FSB Colonel Igor Strelkov Girkin has rapidly faded, it still indicates that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been weakened after the failed Prigozhin Insurrection and continues to face a small but very real possibility of another insurrection or coup attempt.

8. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces.
9. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community is negatively impacting Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
10. Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
11. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)


TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the *Moskva* and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



Dvorichna Operational Area

There continue to be no specific or verifiable claims of Russian gains, Ukrainian counterattacks, or territorial changes in this area. We are hesitant to say that Russian offensive operations have ended with marginal gains, as it is unclear if they have entered into an operational pause or if Russian military leaders have moved their focus to the Svatove area of operation (AO).


The Mayor of Pervomaiske [Kharkiv], Mykola Baksheiev, reported that Iranian-sourced Shahed-136 kamikaze drones

struck an industrial facility in the hromada (administrative area and surrounding settlements of a larger city). There was no other information, and complicating our efforts to verify reports, NASA Fire Information for Resource Management Systems was experiencing a blackout.¹

¹ <https://t.me/MykolaBaksheev/4596>

DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents

Free Luhansk

Operational Command East (OKE) spokesperson, Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, reported that Russian forces fired 601 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad and Smerch rockets launched by multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), drone-delivered IEDs, and indirect tank fire. The Russian air force and army aviation (VKS) carried out 21 air strikes, concentrating their attacks in the direction of Borova [Kharkiv].²

² <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/12289>



Svatove Operational Area

Russian forces captured the village of [Novojehorivka](#), expanding the width and depth of their bridgehead over the Zherebets River.³ The Ukrainian defensive lines were understaffed with territorial guard units, who held the positions during troop rotation and the arrival of reserve units. Ukrainian troops in the villages of [Nadiya](#) and [Serhiivka](#), fearing encirclement after news of the capture of Novojehorivka spread, abandoned their positions without orders. Russian forces were able to advance through the

³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17205>

forested areas and secure both settlements and Ukrainian defensive positions.^{4 5}

ASSESSMENT: Russian forces are attempting to take the ridge at [Pershotravneve and Kopanky](#), opening up a path to Borova [Kharkiv] and the P-79 Highway ground line of communication (GLOC – supply line) for Ukraine. Borova is significant both as a strategic location and as one of the few towns in the region that escaped major damage to homes and infrastructure during Russian occupation and withdrawal. While many analysts dismiss these gains as mostly in marshy lowlands, the loss of control of Serhiivka is the biggest problem, with the hamlet almost at the top of the 150 to 170-meter ridge.

Ukrainian leadership has repeatedly reported a significant Russian troop build-up in this region. Why low-experienced and lightly armed territorial guard units were holding positions during a troop rotation, knowing there were experienced and fresh Russian units available, is something Kyiv is going to have to answer within its command structure. To be direct, someone made a mistake, and communication with frontline units broke down.

⁴ https://t.me/grey_zone/19678


⁵ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17205>

The loss of more rational voices in the Russian information space, including former FSB Colonel Igor Strelkov Girkin and Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group Telegram channels, has caused a dramatic increase in Russian disinformation that is harder to cross-check. We have other non-governmental information in this area, which we will only use to inform our analysis.

Ukrainian forces must stabilize this area and prevent the capture of Pershotravneve and Kopanky. If Russia continues to advance, we will rename this AO as the Borova Operational Direction.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) claimed that Ukrainian forces were attacking in the direction of [Novovodyane](#).⁶

⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/28607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



Kreminna Operational Area


RMOD also claimed Ukrainian forces were attacking from [Neveske](#).⁷ Russian forces attempted to advance south from [Dibrova](#) but failed while fighting continued in the [Serebryansky Woods](#).^{8 9}

⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/28607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁸ positions <https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2652>

⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/28607 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


NORTHEAST DONETSK




Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties

Bakhmut Operational Area

A drone video showed  [over 30 body bags, filled with Russian troops](#), lying on the side of the road [to the entrance of Dubovo-Vasylivka](#).¹⁰




Klishchiivka Operational Area

At the time of publication, there was conflicting information on the status of [Klishchiivka](#). In our assessment, Ukrainian forces have military control of the southern half of the settlement, the defensive positions, and high ground to the

¹⁰ <https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1684136445806800896>


west and northwest. Russian forces hold the northeastern part of the settlement but are under Ukrainian fire control, along with the Russian GLOCs that lead into the settlement.

A geolocated video from July 25 showed a squad of Russian soldiers  [walking in the village's streets](#) in the northeast corner toward the administrative boundary of the settlement.¹¹

Russian forces have fallen back to the railroad tracks on the eastern edge of the hamlet of [Andriivka](#), where in our assessment, we are only waiting for the official statement from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that the village has been liberated. Russian milblogger MultiXAM, shared by PMC Wagner aligned channel Reverse Side of the Medal, reported that Russian troops withdrew from Andriivka.¹² Previously we would have accepted this as a reliable report, but updates on territorial control from Wagner Group are politically charged now.

¹¹ <https://twitter.com/i/status/1684051937916747776>


¹² <https://t.me/rsotmdivision/9381>



Adding to the fog of war, GSAFU reported that Russian attacks east of [Stupochky](#) and “near” [Dyliivka](#) were repulsed.¹³ There are two [Dyliivkas](#) less than 10 kilometers apart, which adds to the fog of war. While a Russian push near Ozarianivka toward the northwest is possible, we see no way for a Russian attack west of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal in the direction of Stupochky. No other source, Russian or Ukrainian, claimed any activity in these regions.

¹³ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10650>


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,

destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics




Avdiivka Operational Area

Mutual fighting was reported near [Avdiivka](#), with no change in the situation.^{14 15}

¹⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10650>


¹⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13975>



Marinka Operational Area

Fighting became positional in [Marinka](#), with no change to the situation.¹⁶

¹⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10650>



Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

There was conflicting information on the status of [Staromaiorske](#) from multiple sources. In our assessment, reports that Ukraine liberated the settlement are premature, and Russian reports that Ukrainian forces were pushed out are also false. Videos and intelligence reports indicated that Ukrainian forces had reached the center of the settlement. We adjusted the map to reflect this change and believe Ukrainian forces now control the northwestern part of Staromaiorske.¹⁷ Armed Force of Ukraine spokesperson Valery Shershen reported that Ukrainian troops had advanced up to 750 meters in the area. Multiple

¹⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/107129>

Russian sources reported that a Russian counteroffensive near [Pryyutne](#) failed.^{18 19}

Ukrainian marines shot down a Russian Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter. The pictures shared by Ukraine were questionable, but Russian sources confirmed the loss of the airframe and both pilots.²⁰

Occupied Donetsk

Insurgents in Mariupol reported that Russian equipment and troop movements through the city had stopped, with most vehicles carrying basic materials, such as food, water, and generators, to support the Russian forces occupying the area.²¹


¹⁸ <https://t.me/rybar/50079>

¹⁹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/13975>

²⁰ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/25/7412787/>


²¹ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/11950>

ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



Orikhiv Operational Area

Fighting continued east of [Robotyne](#) in the direction of [Verbove](#).²² At the time of publication, there were numerous reports in the Russian information space of a battalion-sized attack by Ukrainian forces attempting to drive the wedge deeper. There have been numerous Russian reports since mid-June of large Ukrainian attacks that have turned out to be platoon or company sized, so we are very skeptical of these reports. Long-time readers and listeners will remember repeated false claims of large Ukrainian attacks in this for over a year. Sentinel Hub Sentinel-2 L2A satellite imaging suggests that Russian forces have been shelling the northern part of Robotyne, indicating that

²² <https://t.me/rybar/50079>

Ukrainian forces have entered the settlement in the last 48 to 72 hours.

Russian milblogger and semi-retired Colonel Andrei Morozov (Murz) is likely risking a second arrest with his latest writings, reporting that Russian troop shortages are becoming an issue. "The enemy [Ukraine] consistently and quite skillfully realizes the numerical advantage he has created. In all directions, more or less convenient for him to attack, [Ukraine] is actively rushing forward, forcing our troops to transfer reserves there. This forward movement of the enemy is facilitated by the remaining total advantage of the enemy both in the quantity and quality of the UAV and in the field of electronic warfare. As I already wrote, the enemy in counterbattery combat does not spare the HIMARS for our individual guns, realizing that a successful defense relies on artillery. While Moscow admits that the first wave of mobilization was incompetently screwed up, the troops need large replenishment...I think that the whole of August and the whole of September will be very difficult. And if the enemy manages to break through the front, then catastrophic. And what I already predicted will happen – untrained mobilized directly 'from the trains' will be thrown into battle with the corresponding results. Options other than slowly retreating, destroying as many dill [*derogatory term for Ukrainian troops* – **Ed.**] as possible, keeping as many of your people [*Russian troops* –

Ed.] as possible, and preventing the enemy from breaking through the front, somehow there is not much else to be done.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Reactor 4 was moved to a hot shutdown state, according to Energoatom, and the Ukraine national regulator, SNRIU.

The United States Department of State condemned the positioning of mines within the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) compound. Principal Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel said, "Such a violent and volatile type of activity near, in such close proximity to, a nuclear power plant, in this case, ZNPP, is incredibly unsafe. And so we continue to call for such activity so close to ZNPP to stop."²³

²³ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/26/7412894/>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Operational Command South (OKS) reported 11 vessels of the Black Sea Fleet were on patrol with one Kilo-class submarine capable of launching up to four Kalibr cruise missiles.²⁴

Russian sources claimed that two Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessels attacked the Black Sea Fleet patrol ship Sergey Kotov southwest of Sevastopol, with both USVs intercepted. There was no way to verify the claims independently.

Occupied Crimea

Russian occupiers reported that repairs for the Kerch (Crimean) Bridge won't be completed until December 31, 2023, indicating that the damage from the Ukrainian USV attack is worse than previously reported.²⁵

²⁴ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/37695>

²⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/107134>

Russia has pressed nine vessels into service to operate as ferries across the Kerch Strait, including two Russian large landing ships (LLS).²⁶ Russian operators are reportedly mixing civilians, military personnel, and cargo together, using civilians as human shields.

The nine vessels include,

- Eysk - 25 cars or 18 trucks
- Kerchensky 2 - 60 passengers, 33 cars or 21 trucks
- Lavrenty - 136 passengers and 20 trucks
- Composer Elsa Ibrahimova - 98 trucks or 32 road trains
- Maria - 151 passengers and 25 trucks
- Conro Trader - 32 railway cars
- Avangard - 45 railway cars
- Russian Navy LLS Olenegorsky Hornyak - 190 passengers and 20 trucks
- Russian Navy LLS Kaliningrad - 190 passengers and 20 trucks

²⁶ <https://t.me/krympartizans/1741>

Odesa

As a result of the Russian drone strikes on the Ukrainian grain terminal at Reni (Kiliia) and Izmail, a Romanian ship was damaged during the attack on the Ukrainian port of Reni, located just a few kilometers from Galati.²⁷ The vessel received light damage from shrapnel, and no crew members were injured.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.

²⁷ [Hot News - Romania](#)

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Lipetsk Region

Partisans attempted to sabotage railroad controls on the Sentsovo-Lipetsk line. The relay box was burned on the outside, with no internal damage.²⁸

Ryazan Region

At the railway station in Sasovo, four railroad cars carrying sulfur caught fire, with arson suspected. The local area has been evacuated.²⁹

Leningrad District

Partisans sabotaged railroad switches near the Lisiy Nos station near the Gulf of Finland. After control of the tracks was lost, engineers discovered the relay cabinet had been destroyed.³⁰

THEATERWIDE

Ukraine has started serial production of the Sirko reconnaissance drone.³¹ The drone has a range of up to 65

²⁸ https://t.me/shot_shot/54599

²⁹ https://t.me/shot_shot/54646

³⁰ https://t.me/shot_shot/54648

³¹ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5566

kilometers and can provide realtime HD video up to 25 kilometers away. Ukrainian officials report they can produce 800 to 1,000 drones a month.

Ukraine revealed the MAGURA USV, V5, at the international defense exhibition IDEF 2023 in Istanbul. The V5 is an updated version of the USV, first revealed in September 2022. The vessel sits only half a meter above the surface with a cruise speed of 22 knots, a maximum speed of 42 knots, and a range of 450 nautical miles. It can carry a payload of up to 320 kilograms.³²

Using Presidential drawdown authority, the United States announced its 43rd military aid package to Ukraine.³³ The latest package, valued at \$400 million, includes,

- Additional munitions for Patriot air defense systems and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS)
- Stinger anti-aircraft systems
- Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS)
- 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds

³² <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/37689>

³³ [United States Department of Defense](#) [United States Government Website]

- 120mm and 60mm mortar rounds
- 32 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers (APC)
- Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles (ATGM)
- Javelin and other antiarmor systems and rockets (ATGM)
- Black Hornet micro reconnaissance drones
- Hydra-70 aircraft rockets
- Unspecified tactical air navigation systems
- Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing
- Over 28 million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades
- Night vision devices and thermal imagery systems
- Spare parts, training munitions, and other field equipment

Ukraine shared photographs of Iranian-made 152mm artillery rounds they have in inventory. The shells were interdicted by NATO forces while in transit to Yemen to support the Houthis and were reallocated to Ukraine.³⁴

³⁴ <https://t.me/zloyodessit/19708>

The table for equipment losses was **updated on July 24, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

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RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to July 24, 2023. 11,373 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,018 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2024	244	8.30:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	140	344	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	928	301	3.08:1	↓
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2569	654	3.93:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	335	312	1.07:1	↓
MRAPs	46	128	0.36:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	199	342	0.58:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	244	16	15.25:1	—
Engineering Vehicles	326	73	4.47:1	↓
Towed Artillery	261	140	1.86:1	↓
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	463	186	2.49:1	↓
MLRS	246	50	4.92:1	↓
SAMs	133	117	1.14:1	↑
Mobile Radars	39	69	0.57:1	↑
EW/ECW	44	4	11.00:1	—
Winged Aircraft	84	69	1.22:1	↓
Helicopters	106	31	3.42:1	—
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	—


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.