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Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 636

It has been 3,586 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 271 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

It is snowing again in Ukraine, and rain and snow are forecasted for November 23. A major weather event is forecast for November 26 – 27, including 35 to 50 centimeters of snow in the west, north, and parts of the east.¹ In the southeast and the coastal areas of the Black Sea, heavy rain and winds up to 35 meters per second (hurricane force) will be possible. In the short term, weather is going to play a far more significant role on the battlefield than it did in the early winter of 2022.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

¹ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/48743

Summary:

- There are no map updates
- Fighting continued in the Kupyansk AO with Russia and Ukraine trading territorial gains
- The Russian Ministry of Defense reported fighting in the area of Dibrova (again)
- Ukrainian forces were back on the offensive at Klishchiivka
- Fighting continued on the edge of Horlivka and expanded to Mayorsk
- Russian forces continued attempts to expand their area of control north, west, and southwest of the Krasnohorivka Plateau near Avdiivka
- Heavy fighting continued on the southeastern edge of Avdiivka in the industrial zone
- Russian forces continued subordinate attacks on the southern flank of Avdiivka
- Russia launched 14 attacks on the western and northwestern edges of Marinka, trying to complete their capture
- Ukrainian forces went back on the offensive in the Orikhiv operational area, but fighting was positional in nature
- The first battlefield use of the new Mammoth one-way drone by Ukraine was revealed in Kherson

- Ukrainian forces continue to hold their positions on the left bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers
- Russian forces captured an intact Ukrainian Mk.5 SeaBaby uncrewed surface vessel (USV)
- Russian Kh-59 guided missiles struck the Myklolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts
- Ukrainian air defense shot down 14 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones
- Ukrainian air defenses have been 79% effective over the last ten weeks
- The 17th meeting of the Ramstein working ground was held, with over 50 nations attending
- Canada reaffirmed \$1 billion (USD) in military aid through 2026
- Lithuania and Germany announced new military aid packages for Ukraine
- Ukraine announced that Germany and France will lead a 20-nation coalition to provide arms and munitions to Ukraine
- Switzerland authorized the sale of 25 Leopard 2A4 tanks to German arms company Rheinmetall with conditions
- Czech President Petr Pavel said that Ukraine's military capabilities were being hobbled by insufficient and blocked military aid
- Private Military Company Wagner Group no longer exists

- The Russian VKS took delivery of new Su-24 multirole fighters, the third batch of 2023
- PMC Wagner's social media channels complained that their fighters are not receiving veteran's rights
- Former PMC Wagner penal mercenary Vladimir Borisenko was murdered in Rostov-on-Don
- Internationally infamous murderer and cannibal Nikolai Ogolobyak was pardoned by Russian President Vladimir Putin after meeting his obligations as a penal soldier
- Russia is accused of torturing a Ukrainian man to death during interrogation
- Three people were killed and eight wounded in a missile strike on the hospital in Selydove
- Far-right and Russian-aligned Polish protest leader Rafal Mekler vowed to block a fourth Ukrainian border crossing
- Russian "muharibs" are helping undocumented immigrants reach the Finnish-Russian border
- Finland left one border crossing open with Russia after announcing all crossings would be closed by November 22
- President Biden and President Xi did not attend the G20 Summit
- The Russian Foreign Ministry has finally figured out that Armenia is not happy

DAILY ASSESSMENT


We assess the following:

1. Attritional warfare that more closely resembles World War I versus 21st-century combined arms maneuver warfare will likely continue into 2024.
2. The rapid change in the weather has caused the arrival of bezdorizhzhia, and the operational tempo will be reduced for the foreseeable future.
3. While the combat potential for both combatants is significantly lower compared to November 2022, both Russia and Ukraine remain capable of achieving tactical successes through the winter.
4. Russian commanders have put mission objectives over all other considerations and remain committed to capturing the Avdiivka salient regardless of the cost. Unless military aid restarts in the immediate future, Ukraine lacks the medium-term resources to prevent the capture of the salient.
5. Due to degraded tractability and available combat potential, in our assessment, it is extremely unlikely that Russian forces will achieve their goal of the capture of the remainder of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblast by December 31.

6. We continue to have grave concerns over the amount of military support Ukraine will receive in 2024, with the United States Congress in paralysis and the European Union not meeting their promised 2023 deliveries.
7. We maintain that Russia is stockpiling missiles and drones for large-scale attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure as the weather continues to degrade.
8. The continued drop in missile and drone strikes in Ukraine is meant to keep the Russia-Ukraine War out of the news cycle as global interest is fixated on the Israel-Hamas War supported by information warfare efforts launched by the Kremlin.
9. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously. We remain troubled by the most recent International Atomic Energy Agency report, which indicates there are growing maintenance issues at Europe's largest nuclear power facility.




TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV AND LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Recapture all territory from Kupyansk to Pisky Radkivski and push Ukrainian forces west of the Oskil River, recapture all of the Luhansk Oblast, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna, Kupyansk, Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk Operational Areas and protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



In the Kupyansk AO of Kharkiv, fighting continues in the areas north of [Synkivka](#), south of [Lyman Pershyi](#), and northeast of [Petropavlivka](#), where Russian forces were pushed back.^{2 3 4} The situation is difficult for Ukrainian forces, but the fighting remains positional in nature. The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) struck Ukrainian positions in Synkivka.⁵ Russian forces made renewed attempts to advance into [Ivanivka](#) and were unsuccessful.⁶

² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13766>

³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18125>

⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/32740 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁵ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13766>

⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13766>




In the Kreminna AO, the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) claimed that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near [Dibrova](#).⁷

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
⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/32740 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

DONBAS REGION






NORTHEAST DONETSK




Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut AO, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk, stabilize more advantageous defensive lines on the north flank of Bakhmut for winter, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, and minimize civilian casualties



The only source to report any fighting in the Soledar, Bakhmut, and Klishchiivka AOs was WarGonzo, who reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near [Klishchiivka](#) and were having success.⁸

⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16598>




In the Toretzk-Niu York AO, Ukrainian forces have occupied the terrikons on the northwestern edge of [Horlivka](#) and are expanding their positions east of [Pivdenne](#). Russian sources reported there was fighting in the area of [Shumy](#) and near [Mayorsk](#).^{9 10} In our assessment, these are meant as a spoiling attack to divert resources from the Avdiivka salient.

⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/32740 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


¹⁰ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16598>



SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Capture the remainder of the Donetsk Oblast by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



Fighting reintensified in the Avdiivka AO, with Russian forces launching 12 attacks supported by the VKS despite  [the return of snow](#).^{11 12} On the northern flank, Russian forces continued their efforts to advance from [Novobakhmutivka](#) in the direction of Yurivka with no change to the situation.¹³ Russian claims that Ukrainian forces withdrew from [Stepove](#) are false, with the Ukrainian 47th Mechanized Infantry Brigade  [repulsing a Russian attack](#).^{14 15} The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported a Russian attack north of

¹¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/124430>


¹² <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/116357>

¹³ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13766>

¹⁴ <https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1727433157606351051>

¹⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16598>

Lastochkyne was repulsed. In our assessment, this was likely a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance unit (DRG) and not a large-scale offensive.




On the southern flank of Avdiivka, Russian forces, supported by the VKS, pushed through Ukrainian defense lines in the industrial area on the southeastern edge of the settlement but could not consolidate the gains.^{16 17 18} This is the toughest area in the AO for Ukrainian forces.

¹⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13766>

¹⁷ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18125>

¹⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16598>

Subordinate attacks by Russian forces continued in [Opytne](#), the no man's land between [Vodyane and Sieverne](#), and near [Pervomaiske](#).^{19 20}




In the Marinka AO, Russia put tremendous pressure on Ukrainian forces, launching 14 attacks on the [western and northwestern edge of the settlement](#) supported by the VKS. Despite the intensity of the attacks, Ukrainian forces held their defensive positions.^{21 22}

¹⁹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18125>

²⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13766>


²¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13766>

²² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/124430>



In the Vuhledar AO, Russian forces continued their attempts to advance on [Novomykhailivka](#) with no change in the situation.²³


²³ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13766>



In the **Staromlynivka AO**, Russian forces continued their attempts to retake lost positions west of [Staromaiorske](#) and continued to be unsuccessful.²⁴


²⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13766>

ZAPORIZHZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the continued Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Capitalize on the breakthrough of the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



South of Orikhiv, there was an increase in activity due to a lull in the weather and marginally improved tractability. Ukrainian forces were attacking on the western edge of [Verbove](#), north of [Novoprokopivka](#), and west of [Robotyne](#). The fighting was intense but positional in nature.^{25 26 27 28}

²⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16598>

²⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/32740 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


²⁷ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18125>

²⁸ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13767>


KHERSON

Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the T-2206 Highway south of the Konka River, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Further expand existing bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers, lock Russian troops and reserves in place, continue a southern advance into eastern Kherson toward the Crimean Peninsula, minimize civilian casualties



Fighting continues on the east bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers in Kherson. GSAFU repeated its statement for the fourth day in a row, only saying, "The forces will continue to hold positions on the left bank of the Dnipro in the Kherson region. They continue to inflict fire damage on the enemy."²⁹ This is the last day we will report this if there is no change to the language.

Fighting continued on the southern edge of [Krynyk](#) and in the areas of [Poima](#), [Pishchanivka](#), and [Pidstepne](#).³⁰ Ukrainian forces used a new, larger first-person view one-way (kamikaze) drone with a 4-kilogram warhead on Russian positions in the eastern part of Krynyk earlier in the week. While the video was already in the public domain, the information that this was the  [first strike of the new Mammoth FPV drone](#) was not.³¹

It is unlikely that Ukrainian forces will be able to take advantage of the upcoming weather system and move forces across the Dnipro. Although a low ceiling, fog, and heavy rain are forecasted on the 25 to 27, winds will be from 40 to 80 kph. Heavy rains will also reduce tractability through the marshes on the river bank.

²⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13767>

³⁰ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16598>

³¹ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/7235

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

An intact Ukrainian Mk.5 SeaBaby uncrewed surface vessel (USV) washed up on the shore in western Crimea.³² In our assessment, unlike September 2022, Russia has likely gotten smarter and will not blow up the USV in place.

In Mykolaiv, a Russian Kh-59 guided missile struck Voznesensk. There was no other information available.³³

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

³² https://t.me/couch_iu/47046

³³ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/48759

In Dnipropetrovsk, a Russian Kh-59 guided missile struck Kryvyi Rih. Local officials stated they would not release any information about the attack.³⁴

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.

³⁴ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/48757

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

A transformer exploded in a suburb of Moscow, knocking out power to parts of the city. There were no indications this was related to a drone strike.

THEATERWIDE

It has been 61 days since Russia last launched Kh-101/Kh-55/Kh-555 cruise missiles at Ukraine and 56 days since the last Kalibr cruise missile launch. On the night of November 21-22, Ukraine shot down 14 of 14 Iranian-sourced Shahed-136 kamikaze drones launched by Russia without incident.³⁵

³⁵ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13766>

Over the past ten weeks, Ukrainian air defenses have had a 79% success rate in intercepting Shahed-136s.³⁶

Germany announced a new military aid package for Ukraine that includes 20 Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), two HX81 semi-trucks and trailers, five Bronco ATTC Warthog medical all-terrain vehicles, two medivac vehicles, 2,300 unspecified artillery rounds, and 2,428 encrypted field telephones.³⁷

Canada reasserted that it would provide \$987 million (USD) in military aid to Ukraine from 2023 to 2026.³⁸

Lithuania pledged to send another 3 million rounds for small arms, remote mines, and winter equipment.³⁹

Switzerland authorized the sale of 25 Leopard 2A4 tanks to German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall. The main battle tanks can be transferred or resold to any NATO or

³⁶ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/48748

³⁷ <https://t.me/UaNazhyvo/53619>

³⁸ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/48727

³⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/124406>

European Union nation but cannot be sold or transferred to Ukraine.⁴⁰

A coalition of 20 nations that Germany and France will lead was announced at that meeting, which will work to address the arms needs of Ukraine. It was unclear if the United States was part of the new group.⁴¹

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Rustem Umerov, attended the 17th meeting of the Ramstein working group. Over 50 nations participated in the meeting hosted by the United States and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. "Russia definitely does not plan to stop on its own. The only language Moscow can understand is force. And we have learned this language well," said Umerov, addressing the delegates.

Czech President Petr Pavel told the commanders of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic that the supply of weapons to Ukraine remains obstructed, and Ukraine was not provided enough to be successful over the summer. Western support was not sufficient and quick enough, and the time spent on preparations allowed Russia to prepare

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/124382>

⁴¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/124445>

for the offensive "very well." Pavel added that the supply of armament needed for Ukraine to achieve success is still being blocked and is insufficient. He added that Ukrainian soldiers are not only understandably tired but also more and more disappointed with the Western support. He warned that far fatigue "may cause increasing pressure to end the conflict with some sort of an agreement."⁴²

The table for equipment losses was **updated on November 20, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

⁴² <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/21/7429733/>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to November 20, 2023.

13,160 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,725 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2307	310	7.44:1	↑
Medium Duty Tanks	165	378	0.44:1	↑
Armored fighting Vehicles	1065	336	3.17:1	↑
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	3049	783	3.89:1	↑
Armored Personnel Carriers	371	368	1.01:1	—
MRAPs	49	179	0.27:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	226	394	0.57:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	258	18	14.33:1	↑
Engineering Vehicles	363	99	3.67:1	↓
Towed Artillery	333	168	1.98:1	—
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	602	247	2.44:1	↓
MLRS	308	50	6.16:1	↑
SAMs	195	130	1.50:1	↑
Mobile Radars	49	84	0.58:1	↑
EW/ECW	63	4	15.75:1	↑
Winged Aircraft	95	78	1.22:1	—
Helicopters	139	36	3.86:1	↑
Naval Vessels and Submarines	19	27	0.70:1	↑

RUSSIAN MOBIKS, MOBILIZATION, AND MIR

The VKS accepted the delivery of a new Su-34 multirole fighter aircraft in the low single digits.⁴³ This is the third group of new Su-34s delivered to the VKS in 2023.

Private Military Channel (PMC) Wagner Group Telegram channel RSOTM blasted Russian officials for not supporting disabled Wagnerites.⁴⁴ A former prisoner who joined the PMC for a pardon lost his legs and had to make his own prosthetics. PMC Wagner claims that Russian officials have not provided any additional assistance, forcing him to crawl to the store and back to his home.

Former Wagnerite Vladimir Borisenko was shot dead in Rostov. Borisenko and one of his business associates were sentenced to prison after a murder conviction and joined PMC Wagner last year. His associate, Ruslan Jafarov, was killed near Bakhmut in February 2023, but Borisenko was able to fulfill his contract before the Prigozhin Insurrection. He was shot four times, dying instantly.

⁴³ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/48718

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/rsotmdivision/12150>

Nikolai Ogolobyak, who made global headlines for a series of grizzly murders in 2008 that included ritualistic murder and cannibalism, received a pardon from Russian President Vladimir Putin after fulfilling his military contract in Ukraine. Ogolobyak was wounded in October and permanently disabled, returning home to his father on November 2.


On the subject of PMC Wagner Group, it is official: the remnants of the company have officially been absorbed by the Rosgvardia, and the Russian Ministry of Defense is establishing a system that will enable their members to get their veteran identification documents.⁴⁵

Russian journalist and 2024 Presidential candidate Ekaterina Duntsova was detained by the Moscow prosecutor's office four days after announcing her candidacy. She was questioned about her view on the ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine. Previously, Ekaterina has called for an end to the war and the release of internal political prisoners.

⁴⁵ <https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1727599768531050755>

WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Russian forces are accused of torturing 27-year-old former Ukrainian serviceman Ruslan Rusnak to death. Rusnak was accused of being a spotter for a Ukrainian drone strike on November 13 on Russian positions. He was taken into custody on November 20 and died during interrogation by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The hospital in the Ukrainian settlement of Selydove was hit by at least one Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missile used for a ground attack,  [heavily damaging the facility](#).⁴⁶ Three people were killed in the attack, and eight more were wounded.^{47 48 49}

The line of trucks trying to enter Ukraine from Poland is now 53 kilometers long, and far-right protest organizer Rafal Mekler has vowed to close a fourth border crossing and keep them closed through February 1, 2024.⁵⁰ The International Committee of the Red Cross reported

⁴⁶ <https://t.me/suspilnenews/26218>

⁴⁷ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/22/7429918/>

⁴⁸ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/21/7429666/>

⁴⁹ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/48588

⁵⁰ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/48734

yesterday that dozens of trucks carrying humanitarian aid, including perishables, were being held at the border.

GEOPOLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Despite the announcement that all remaining border crossings between Russia and Finland would be closed on November 21 -22, one crossing at Raya-Joosepi will remain open until November 25 – 26. Raya-Joosepi is the most remote crossing between the two nations.

Journalists with Fontanka reported that Russian handlers are charging 2,000 to 3,000 Euros to immigrants from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Morocco to provide them transit to Russia and then to the Finnish-Russian border. Immigrants aren't allowed to cross the border on foot, so they have to buy a bicycle using their own money, with some dropped off as far as 30 kilometers away to avoid detection and then told what direction to travel.⁵¹ The handlers are called muharibs. Fontanka added that there is no direct evidence that the Russian government is deliberately pushing undocumented immigrants to the Finnish border. The

⁵¹ <https://t.me/astrapress/42720>

Ministry of Internal Affairs, for the most part, disregards the illegal migration.

United States President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping did not attend the meeting of G20 nations, where Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke for the first time since 2021. Putin, who has an open warrant for arrest issued by the International Criminal Court, attended the meeting virtually and didn't say anything new or revelatory.⁵²

The Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement after Armenia said to take them off the agenda of the ongoing CSTO Summit in Minsk, that "Armenia clearly demonstrates its intention to reorient its foreign policy."

RUMORS

Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or

⁵² https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/7234

stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.

- Has the shipment of previously committed artillery rounds to Ukraine dropped by 30% since the Israel-Hamas War started?
- Is the Minister of Defense of Ukraine considering firing two more commanders?
- Will Iran provide Russian with short-range ballistic missiles?
- Will Russia do another round of mobilization after the national elections in March 2024?


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠ Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report: We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


🛡 Rybar: We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


⚠ War Gonzo: We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.