



Malcontent News Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

7/01/23 23:59* PST

Malcontent News is an independent group of journalists and researchers in the United States, Canada, Ukraine, Israel, Georgia, and the United Kingdom. We are part of Badon Hill Group, LLC, and operate independently from all entities.

We are funded through Patreon, grants, and donations and aided by volunteers. For media inquiries, you can contact <u>social@malcontentnews.com</u>. For news tips, you can contact our newsroom at <u>tips@malcontentment.com</u>.

<u>Patreons at the Bronze level or higher</u> can access the annotated Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report (SITREP). Patreons at the Silver level or higher get a monthly Q&A viz Zoom Meeting with our Chief Content Officer or other senior staff.

This update is copyright © 2023 by Badon Hill Group LLC, all rights reserved. No parts of original content can be reused without express written permission. Authors and Analysts: David H. Obelcz, Adam Irving, Jeff Davis, Katie Livingstone, Oskar Hallgrimsson, Ryan Evans, Michael Hering, and Ana Ras, Spanish Editor in Chief

The reader accepts that the information contained in the Malcontent News Situation Report will not be used for travel, navigation, or personal security assessment. The reader agrees to get real-time information from official channels provided by national, oblast, raion, hromada, city, or local officials and follow their security recommendations.



SUMMARY – DAY 492	3
DAILY ASSESSMENT	4
TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP	7
UKRAINE WEATHER	8
SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY	9
RUSSIAN FRONT	9
KHARKIV	10
DONBAS REGION	11
LUHANSK	11
NORTHEAST DONETSK	16
SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK	21
ZAPORIZHIA	26
BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION .	29
WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE	30
NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE	32
THEATERWIDE	34
RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES	36
RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION, MOBIKS, AND MIR	37
WAR CRIMES Error! Bookmark not def	ined.
GEOPOLITICS Error! Bookmark not def	ined.
ECONOMIC	38



SUMMARY – DAY 492

It has been 3,412 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 127 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

The restrictions that Twitter owner Elon Musk placed on the number of tweets viewed by a user in a day did not impact our ability to review open-source intelligence, as we largely moved to other sources months ago, have our own contacts within Ukraine, and leverage more than open source intelligence to prepare our reports. It has reduced the number of videos and pictures we are linking to in this report, and we will be working on a "Plan B." for our readers.

The Independence Day holiday for the United States is July 4. There will be a condensed bullet report on July 2 and 4 and no report on July 3. Your editor-in-chief will be soaking up the sun at Mount Rainier on July 3.

 Ukrainian forces have made additional tactical gains near Klishchiivka



- Reports that Ukrainian forces were pushed out from the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River at Dachi are untrue
- Russian forces reduced the number of attacks as they appear to be in a short theaterwide operational pause
- Ukrainian air defenses were 100% in a small missile and drone attack
- The Russian Ministry of Defense continues to dismantle Yevgeny Prigozhin's former empire
- We break editorial rules to share with you a truly bizarre video of Russian POWs
- The Russian Dozor satellite network has been partially restored after hackers disabled the entire system
- Russia's economy is under increasing strain

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. Despite the reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense and state media, evidence is growing that Russian forces conducting defensive operations are suffering catastrophic losses in multiple areas of operation.



- 2. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.
- 3. The loss of the Chongar Bridge between occupied Kherson and Crimea and additional attacks on the ground line of communication to Melitopol have created supply and logistics issues for Russian forces, and repairs are behind schedule.
- 4. The Kremlin is expanding its work to completely dismantle Private Military Company Wagner, including Concord Holdings, with no signs of PMC Wagner mercenaries moving to Belarus.
- 5. We maintain the current Ukrainian military activity is subordinate offensives and shaping operations, and the main operation has not started.
- 6. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces. The dissolution of the private military company structure within the Russian Federation will not fix these fundamental problems.
- 7. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community will impact Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.




8. Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.

Jump to the Action Report.



TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP




About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted <u>like this</u>, it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

Russia-Ukraine War Report Map




UKRAINE WEATHER



We've changed the daily image for the ECMWF Euro ensemble weather forecast model to show the <u>CAPE Index</u>, which measures the potential energy in the atmosphere capable of producing thunderstorms. Pop-up thunderstorms and showers are possible in Odesa and occupied Crimea, with a remote chance of showers in southern Ukraine on Sunday. High temperatures will be from 25° to 37° Celcius, getting steadily hotter through the forecast period of July 7. Low temperatures will be from 16° to 26°. The full moon will be on July 3.



SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY




July 7, 2023, GFS forecast predicts soil saturation will range from 15% to 55% to 40 centimeters deep across the theater of war within Ukraine.

The soil saturation model does not consider flooding in the Dnipro River basin. Soil saturation is between 25% to 75% in southern and eastern Ukraine, with the wettest conditions in Luhansk and northeastern Kharkiv. Soil moisture continues to decline through July 7.



KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict


Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure

There wasn't any significant activity.



DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections



Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents

Free Luhansk: Operational Command East (OKE) spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported Russian forces carried out 77 fire missions, and the Russian Airforce and army aviation (VKS) executed 12 airstrikes from Dvorichna to Bilohorivka [Luhansk]. There were only four clashes between Russian and Ukrainian forces.¹




¹ https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/11763



Savtove Operational Area

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported a Russian attack on <u>Novoselivske</u> was repulsed.²



Kreminna Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces attacked in the direction of <u>Nevske</u>, from <u>Dibrova</u>, and in the <u>Serebryanskyy Woods</u>.³ ⁴ Ukrainian source DeepState

² General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - AM Facebook Report

³ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report

⁴ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - PM Facebook Report



reported that fighting in the Serebryanskyy Woods was localized and positional, backed by artillery. None of the attacks were successful.⁵


Near Dibrova, a Russian mobik from Tomsk was captured by Ukrainian forces. Mikhail Osipenko was mobilized on June 12 into the Russian 35th Brigade and deployed to Ukraine on June 23. Osipenko is not in a penal unit and is 62 years old.⁶

ASSESSMENT: We have not reported on the ongoing stealth mobilization in Russia, adding between 10,000 to 20,000 troops a month of increasingly lower quality and poorly trained and equipped. Tomsk is the largest city in Siberia, and the mobilization of men at the upper age band permitted by the current Russian law is alarming.

⁵ https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16971

⁶ https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35351





Lysychansk Operational Area

The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near <u>Bilohorivka</u>.⁷

⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/28000 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties





Bakhmut Operational Area


Northwest and north of Bakhmut, Russian forces attempted to advance on <u>Bohdanivka</u> again without success.^{8 9} Otherwise, there were only reports of harassing attacks south of <u>Rozdolivka</u> in the Soledar area of operation as Russian and Ukrainian forces appear to have entered a brief operational pause to consolidate their new positions. Fighting for control of <u>Berkhivka</u> and <u>Yahdine</u> continued,

⁸ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report

⁹ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - PM Facebook Report



with significant chatter that Ukrainian forces had reentered Berkhivka, but we could not verify the reports.¹⁰




GSAFU reported that a Russian attack in the vicinity of Khromove was unsuccessful. Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces had been pushed out of Bakhmut, while RMOD reported that Ukraine was on the offensive.

¹⁰ https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16971

¹¹ Gen<u>eral Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report</u>



ASSESSMENT: We maintain that Ukrainian forces control 2.5% of Bakhmut in three pockets.



Klishchiivka Operational Direction

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Klishchiivka, and we can verify that there has been an advance through a tree line east of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal toward the southern tip of the settlement, with Wkrainian tanks now operating east of the canal. Ukrainian forces now have four bridgeheads across the


¹² https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16975



canal: northwest of Klishchiivka, west of Klishchiivka, west of Andriivka, and at Kurdyumivka. Ukrainian forces are now 1,000 to 1,200 meters from Klishchiivka at two points, with reports that Russian company commanders were leaving the forward operating base in the settlement for more secure locations.



SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,



destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



Avdiivka Operational Area


There were no verifiable territorial changes. Fighting continued on the edge of <u>Vesele</u>, southwest, and east of <u>Avdiivka</u>, between <u>Vodyane and Sjeverne</u>, and in <u>Pervomaiske</u>. ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵

¹³ https://t.me/mod_russia/28000 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹⁴ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - AM Facebook Report

¹⁵ https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16971






Marinka Operational Area

Fighting continued in Marinka, with Russian forces supported by the VKS, with no change in the situation. 16 17

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report
 General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report





Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces attacked near Novodonetske and made marginal gains north of the settlement. RMOD claimed Ukraine attacked in the direction of Staromaiorske, while GSAFU reported that a Russian counterattack in the direction of Rivnopil was

¹⁸ https://t.me/wargonzo/13592




unsuccessful. 19 20 Russian sources reported fighting continued west of Pryyutne. 21 22

https://t.me/mod_russia/28000 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]
 General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report
 https://t.me/rybar/49231

²² https://t.me/wargonzo/13592



ZAPORIZHIA




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



Free Zaporizhia

Russian forces carried out 58 fire missions targeting 18 settlements along the line of conflict in Zaporizhia.²³



Orikhiv Operational Area

Fighting continued on the northern edge of <u>Robotyne</u> with no change in the situation.²⁴ ²⁵ Russian sources reported there was continued fighting east of <u>Zherbyanky</u>.²⁶

²³ https://t.me/zoda gov ua/19996

²⁴ https://t.me/rybar/49231

²⁵ https://t.me/wargonzo/13592

²⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/28000 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



Occupied Zaporizhia

Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi reported that Ukrainian forces executed 1,201 fire missions in Zaporizhia and Kherson on July $1.^{27}\,$

In Berdyansk, water service has been knocked out across most of the city without explanation.²⁸

Russia started operating a mobile crematorium in Berdyansk, where they are reportedly disposing of their war dead without keeping records. Those cremated are listed as missing in action, so the Kremlin does not have to pay survivor's benefits.²⁹

As a follow-up on the report of the Russian units that rioted In occupied Dorozhnyanka and left their positions, Russian reports appear to verify the incident occurred on June 17 with unit members in custody and threatened with treason charges.

²⁷ https://t.me/zaborzp/47960

²⁸ https://t.me/zaborzp/47930

²⁹ https://t.me/brdnews/13234



Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

There was no update on the situation.

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Operational Command South (OKS) did not report on the total composition of Black Sea Fleet vessels but did report that one frigate and two Kilo-class submarines capable of launching up to 16 Kalibr cruise missiles are on patrol.³⁰

Occupied Crimea

Massive traffic jams formed on the westbound approach to the Crimean Bridge of up to ten kilometers long due to dramatically heightened border security between Russia and occupied Crimea. Cars are being searched, as are occupants, including children. Wait times to cross the bridge have swung between three and ten hours.³³ ³⁴

³⁰ https://t.me/operativnoZSU/103732

³¹ https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35361

³² https://t.me/Nazars look/15085

³³ https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35365

³⁴ https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35362



Illegitimate former Deputy Russian Prosecutor of occupied Crimea, Andrey Fomin, drowned during a swim in the Volga River during an annual swim in Cheboksary. Fomin was halfway across the river when we floundered for unknown reasons.³⁵

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Free Kherson


Kherson Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA), Alexander Prokudin, reported that Russian forces carried out 86 fire missions, firing 475 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad rockets fired by multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS), drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs.³⁶

³⁵ https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35331

³⁶ https://t.me/khersonskaODA/7571



Twenty-seven munitions hit the city of Kherson, with five people wounded, including three children.



Reports that Ukrainian forces had been pushed out from the Antonovskyy Bridge and <u>Dachi</u> were untrue.³⁷ The Russian social media space is obsessed with the military activity on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River, despite only a company of Ukrainian troops spread across a wide area. Russian assaults are being targeted by artillery, rockets fired by MLRS, and the use of NATO 155 mm RAAM shells that scatter antitank mines in the rear areas,

³⁷ https://t.me/romanov_92/39891



resulting in losses of armored vehicles. Complaints renewed about a lack of artillery support and requests to the Russian VKS for airstrikes going ignored. The Russian information space appears to view the situation near Oleshky as a larger threat than reality.

In occupied Kherson, Russian troops, including naval infantry units, issued an "urgent appeal" for boats capable of carrying six to eight fighters with an engine of at least 100 horsepower. The units requesting assistance indicated they were willing to pay for vessels and did not want rubber rafts.³⁸

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

³⁸ https://t.me/dva_majors/19971



Kyiv

Russian forces launched eight Shahed-136 kamikaze drones toward Kyiv, downing all eight. Debris fell on a group of homes, wounding one person.³⁹

Sumy

Russian forces carried out 25 fire missions, firing 140 artillery rounds, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades. Nine hromadas were targeted, damaging power lines in Esman and farm equipment in Mirpoil.

³⁹ https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/2/7409479/



RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

There was no significant activity.

THEATERWIDE

In addition to the eight Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, three Kalibr cruise missiles launched by the Black Sea fleet were shot down. Ukrainian air defenses were 100% successful.⁴⁰

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence suspended Ruslan Ryhovanov from the post of acting head of the Department

⁴⁰ https://t.me/our_odessa/49460



of Resource Supply due to the discovery of potential misconduct in his past. Ryhovanov was appointed acting director of the Department of Resource Provision on June 28. An internal investigation is underway into allegations that he contributed to damage at the Holosiivskyi National Nature Park. Additionally, it was discovered he had regularly participated in a TV show produced by Russian propagandists in Moscow.⁴¹

The table for equipment losses has been updated using data through June 25, 2023, and includes the losses suffered during the insurrection in Russia on June 23 and 24.

_

⁴¹ https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/1/7409425/



RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the <u>Oryx Database</u> from February 24, 2022, to June 25, 2023. 10,819
Russian (including <u>Chef's Rebellion</u>) vs. 3,737 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	1923	221	8.70:1	Û
Medium Duty Tanks	138	330	0.42:1	_
Armored fighting Vehicles	892	291	3.07:1	Û
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2444	584	4.18:1	Û
Armored Personnel Carriers	317	279	1.14:1	_
MRAPs	43	100	0.43:1	û
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	192	328	0.59:1	_
Command and Communications Vehicles	244	15	16.27:1	Û
Engineering Vehicles	313	69	4.54:1	Û
Towed Artillery	245	129	1.90:1	仓
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	428	171	2.50:1	_
MLRS	215	46	4.67:1	仓
SAMs	119	113	1.05:1	仓
Mobile Radars	35	64	0.55:1	<u></u>
EW/ECW	41	4	10.25:1	Û
Winged Aircraft	84	68	1.24:1	<u> </u>
Helicopters	103	31	3.32:1	仓
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	



RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION, MOBIKS, AND MIR

Ukraine released a video of Russian POWs being transported to detention wearing women's clothing. One is wearing a red blouse with a plunging neckline, while another is wearing a pink and black sweater that was in style in 1990. The one in the center is wearing a vest and apologizes for wounding one of the Ukrainian soldiers. It is unclear if they were given the clothes to wear or were captured wearing civilian clothes. We saw it, and now you have to see it.

In St. Petersburg, the PMC Wagner logo was removed from the building where they had their headquarters.⁴²

Concord Holdings, the billion-dollar company that provided institutional food to the Russian Ministry of Defense, has folded after its contract was canceled on June 30. Thousands were laid off without notice or pay, and PMC Wagner leaders ordered all records to be destroyed. Reportedly, Prigozhin hoped to sell the company to a new owner before the Kremlin canceled their contract.

⁴² https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35350



Hackers affiliated with PMC Wagner disabled the Dozor satellite communications network, used by state enterprises in power distribution, oil fields, Russian military units in the Northern District, the Federal Security Service (FSB), and shipping.⁴³ The entire network was down for 24 hours and had been partially restored on July 1. The hacker group released hundreds of pages of records to Dozor, including documentation showing it is affiliated with the FSB.

Cybersecurity experts focusing on Russian operatives don't believe that PMC Wagner is behind the cyberattack, stating that Wagner didn't have these capabilities.

While traffic and connections have been partially restored, it is projected it will take weeks to restore the entire network due to many customers operating out of remote locations.

ECONOMIC

The MAKS-2023 International Aviation and Space Salon in Zhukovsky Airport in Moscow, Russia, has been canceled

⁴³ https://cyberscoop.com/russian-satellite-hack-wagner-group/



and moved to 2024. Russian officials gave no reason. The show's main aim was to demonstrate the achievements of Russian technology and forge partnerships with international companies and nations in aviation.

Sea exports related to the Black Sea Grain Initiative have been suspended and are unlikely to restart.⁴⁴ The Ukrainian Ministry of Reconstruction reported that 29 ships that are supposed to export 1.4 million tons of food are blocked in the territorial waters of Türkiye due to Russia's refusal to inspect the vessels. Another million tons of food is being loaded on 13 ships; the last vessels registered as part of the three-nation agreement supported by the United Nations.

The Russia-Ukraine War is currently costing Moscow an estimated \$1 billion a day, which is unsustainable as the economy starts to crack due to sanctions, a labor shortage, the plunging rouble, and inflation likely two to three times higher than the official published rate. For perspective, in 2021, the Russian Ministry of Defense had an approximately \$64 billion budget. In 2023, the actual figure for spending on and off the books could be 570% higher.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ https://t.me/our_odessa/49438

⁴⁵ https://t.me/Crimeanwind/35321



Notes on Sourcing Information

Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.

Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report: We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.

Rybar: We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.

War Gonzo: We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for *unique claims* about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.



Readovka: We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

Igor "Girkin" Strelkov: We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

Andrei Morozov: Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media: We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or unique Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination: We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.



Leonid Pasechnik: We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia: We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense: We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

Denis Pushilin: We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

Ramzan Kadyrov: The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

DeepState: We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or



misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

Institute for the Study of War: We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

Ivan Fedorov: We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

Vitaly Kim: When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for real-time reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

Oleksiy Arestovych: We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.