

**MALCONTENT NEWS  
RUSSIA-UKRAINE  
SITUATION REPORT**

September 25, 2023





# Malcontent News

## Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

### 9/25/23 23:59\* PST

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## **SUMMARY – DAY 578**

It has been 3,499 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 214 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

Due to the significant amount of analysis required for today's report, there will not be a summary.

## **DAILY ASSESSMENT**

We assess the following:


1. Our assessment that the soft response by Ukraine's allies after Russian aggression on Ukraine's border would further embolden Moscow to take increasing risks was accurate, with Russia attacking the Orlovka-Isaccea border checkpoint between Ukraine and Romania. We maintain that Russia will continue to escalate until NATO and allied nations take a stronger stance, or Russia causes a significant international incident, risking a military response.

2. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, and proxy forces.
3. We assess the inability of Russian military leaders to stop the ongoing Ukrainian offensive and retake the battlefield initiative has put significant pressure on Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, who has been in charge of all Russian forces in Ukraine since January 2023.
4. Ukraine continues to hold the initiative theaterwide, and the number of combat ineffective and combat destroyed Russian units is growing, eroding Russian combat potential in numerous areas of operation.
5. Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to accept the realities within the theater of war.
6. At the direction of President Vladimir Putin, the Russian government is in the largest purge of dissident voices and perceived internal enemies since the Soviet era, including the leaders, mercenaries, and employees of PMC Wagner, objective state media journalists and war bloggers, far-right nationalists

- who want the Kremlin to take more aggressive action in Ukraine, and human rights activists.
7. There remains a possibility of partisan violence within Russia after the killings of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin. President Putin's stature, both inside and outside of Russia, remains in a weakened state.
  8. The perceived slow progress of the Ukrainian summer-fall offensive, questions about the capabilities of Ukrainian military commanders at the battalion and brigade level, and ongoing anticorruption measures highlighting the problems within the Ukrainian government are unfairly straining Western support.
  9. Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition delivery dates, and these continued delays are negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
  10. We maintain that Russia will attempt to destroy Ukraine's energy infrastructure over the fall and winter.
  11. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.



# TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP




**About the maps:** Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

## [Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)



# KHARKIV



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict


**Ukrainian Objective:** Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure

There weren't any verifiable events in this region.



# DONBAS REGION


## LUHANSK





**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, and capture the rest of the oblast

**Ukrainian Objective:** Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents

## Kreminna Operational Area

The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) claimed that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the [Serebryanskyy Woods](#) near Dibrova.<sup>1</sup> We explained in an earlier report that RMOD's idea of an "offensive" could be as small as a sabotage and reconnaissance squad (DRG). A geoconfirmed video showed the first-person view (FPV) from a Ukrainian kamikaze drone that navigated through the trees near Dibrova to a Russian forward operating base, flew under the camouflage netting, and  [through the entrance of the dugout occupied by troops](#).<sup>2</sup> A surveillance drone showed the forward operating base was destroyed.

## Occupied Luhansk

Three Storm Shadow cruise missiles  [hit a large ammunition depot](#) in Sorokyne, 7.5 kilometers from the Russian border and 135 kilometers from the line of conflict.<sup>3 4 5</sup> The ammunition was kept at the Yunist Plant. There were  [no indications that air defenses were active](#),

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<sup>1</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/30794](https://t.me/mod_russia/30794) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>2</sup> <https://twitter.com/PStyleOne1/status/1706034159049683262>

<sup>3</sup> <https://twitter.com/SmartUACat/status/1706247444718031203>

<sup>4</sup> <https://t.me/informnapalm/19020>

<sup>5</sup> <https://t.me/informnapalm/19016>

and shortly after the attack,  [rockets and anti-aircraft missiles started to cook off.](#)<sup>6 7</sup>



NASA Fire Information for Resource Management Systems (FIRMS) showed widespread thermal anomalies in northern Sorokyne and indicated the site burned for nine to 21 hours.<sup>8</sup> There were indications that rockets and missiles that cooked off struck south of Molodohvardiisk and Sukhodilsk.


<sup>6</sup> <https://twitter.com/SmartUACat/status/1706247453974917147>

<sup>7</sup> <https://twitter.com/SmartUACat/status/1706247444718031203>

<sup>8</sup> [NASA FIRMS](#) [United States Government Website]




# NORTHEAST DONETSK




**Russian Objective:** Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region

**Ukrainian Objective:** Defend Siversk, collapse the Russian flanks north of Bakhmut, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, liberate the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, advance to the administrative border of Luhansk, and minimize civilian casualties



## Klishchiivka Operational Area

Mutual fighting was reported north of [Klischiiivka](#), with no significant change to the situation.<sup>9 10</sup>

Ukrainian drones, mortar units, and artillery have made logistics using the T-513 Highway ground line of communication difficult. An FPV drone  [destroyed a Russian truck just before it entered the highway at Mykolaivka](#).<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12317>


<sup>10</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/15262>

<sup>11</sup> <https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1706355700065001584>

**ASSESSMENT:** An overused term by many analysts is “established fire control.” The United States Department of Defense defines fire control as “The control of all operations in connection with the application of fire on a target.” Simply put, it is the command and supervision of artillery fire. Ukrainian forces hold fire control of the T-513 Highway, but that does not mean the highway is unusable. Ukrainian forces are effectively disrupting and interdicting Russian supply and troop movements, and as they continue to advance, the road will become increasingly difficult to use.




# SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive until the winter and maximize casualties

**Ukrainian Objective:** Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



## Marinka Operational Area

Mutual fighting was reported in and near [Marinka](#) by Russian and Ukrainian sources. Russian forces have repeatedly shelled northern Marinka for over a week, indicating that Ukrainian troops have made marginal gains. Based on the intelligence we've observed, a map adjustment was made.<sup>12 13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12317>

<sup>13</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/15262>

## Vuledar Operational Area

Russian forces launched an attack east of [Novomykhailivka](#) and continued a 19-month tradition of failure.<sup>14</sup>

## Occupied Donetsk

Russian engineering reports at the start of the year that the Rostov-on-Don to Donbas water pipeline project would lose most of its water due to leaks in the system were accurate.<sup>15</sup> The promise of regular water service to the Donetsk metro area was not achieved, even as the pipeline reached capacity. The illegitimate Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Communal Services in the so-called Donetsk People's Republic reported that two-thirds of the water leaks through the city pipes, which have never been replaced despite repeated promises by Russian occupiers.


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<sup>14</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12317>

<sup>15</sup> <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/103592>




# ZAPORIZHZHIA



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, prepare to launch a fall-winter offensive to capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

**Ukrainian Objective:** Expand the breakthrough at the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



## Orikhiv Operational Area

The operational tempo slowed, indicating that Ukrainian forces have entered another operational pause to consolidate recent gains. Fighting continued along the entire axis from west of [Robotyne](#), the outskirts of [Novoprokopivka](#), along the Surovikin Line following the 160-meter and 140-meter heights, to [Verbove](#).<sup>16 17 18</sup>

Ukrainian forces have likely pushed deeper into Verbove, but operational security is tight. We did expand the gray

<sup>16</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12317>

<sup>17</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/30794](https://t.me/mod_russia/30794) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>18</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/15262>

area into Verbove and moved the line of conflict to the 170-meter heights east of Novoprokopivka.

## **Occupied Zaporizhzhia**

The bodies of two Russian soldiers who were shot in the head were found in Luhivka, east of Tokmak.<sup>19</sup> A Russian soldier claimed he didn't see the incident but a pickup truck speeding away after the gunfire.

## **Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant**

There were no updates on the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

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<sup>19</sup> <https://t.me/uniannet/112487>




## BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

### Black Sea

Operational Command South (OKS) reported there are two Russian Black Sea Fleet vessels on patrol. The pair of Kilo-class submarines can launch up to eight Kalibr cruise missiles.<sup>20</sup>

### Occupied Crimea

Air raid sirens  [waited for hours in Sevastopol](#), sending residents into the streets looking for shelter. At the time of publication, there were no reports of damage.<sup>21</sup> Residents took to social media to complain about locked bomb shelters for the second day in a row. Russian officials claimed a missile was shot down near Belbek Military Airfield near Sevastopol.<sup>22</sup>

Russian state media reported that most aircraft and helicopters at Dzhankoi, where additional explosions were


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<sup>20</sup> [https://t.me/smolij\\_ukraine/43161](https://t.me/smolij_ukraine/43161)


<sup>21</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116241>



<sup>22</sup> <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/09/26/7421398/>

reported, took to the air to prevent being hit on the ground.<sup>23</sup>

The September 23 Storm Shadow  [missile strike on Suharnaya Balka](#) was successful. The missile hit a Russian logistics center near an ammunition depot. One Russian soldier was killed and two wounded.<sup>24</sup>

## Odesa

Shahed-136 kamikaze drones struck the border checkpoint between Orlivka, Ukraine, and Isaccea, Romania. The  [checkpoint building on the Ukrainian side of the river](#) was heavily damaged, along with 30 trucks. Two truck drivers were injured, with one in hospital.

The attack occurred as a  [Romanian-flagged ferry departed](#).<sup>25</sup> Video of the strike was also  [recorded from the Romanian side of the Danube](#), and there are unconfirmed reports of Russian drone debris landing in Romania territory.<sup>26</sup>


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<sup>23</sup> [https://t.me/smolii\\_ukraine/43221](https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/43221)

<sup>24</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116196>


<sup>25</sup> <https://twitter.com/revishvilig/status/1706520523931365607>

<sup>26</sup> <https://twitter.com/kowalskydonetsk/status/1706530547357438364>

The  [international crossing has been temporarily closed](#), and commercial trucks have been redirected to other checkpoints.<sup>27</sup> A bus with 22 civilians waiting for the next ferry avoided being hit, but the passengers are currently stuck on the Ukrainian side of the Danube.<sup>28</sup>

Relief that no one was killed on the night of September 24 – 25 by missile strikes on Odesa faded after two people working at a grain warehouse were reported missing hours after the attack. A search of the rubble located both of their bodies.<sup>29 30 31</sup>

## Mykolaiv

Debris from a Shahed-136 kamikaze drone that was shot down landed on a barn in the Bashtan district, setting the building on fire. There were no injuries,  [but the structure was a total loss](#).<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116279>

<sup>28</sup> [https://t.me/smolii\\_ukraine/43286](https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/43286)

<sup>29</sup> [https://t.me/smolii\\_ukraine/43167](https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/43167)

<sup>30</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116156>

<sup>31</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116161>


<sup>32</sup> [https://t.me/smolii\\_ukraine/43289](https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/43289)



# KHERSON



**Russian Objective:** Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

**Ukrainian Objective:** Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



**Kherson Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA) Alexander Prokudin said Russia carried out 93 fire missions and 17 airstrikes, firing 491 munitions, rockets, and bombs**

on free Kherson.<sup>33 34</sup> The attacks targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure, killing six people and wounding ten. Residential areas, schools, an administrative building, a college dormitory, a pharmacy, a food processing plant, and a grocery store were hit. Area leaders announced mandatory evacuations in several communities due to the intensity of Russian attacks.<sup>35</sup>

Three people were killed in Beryslav when Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) dropped four bombs on the city, destroying an administration building and residential housing.<sup>36 37</sup> Shelling of the   [Dnipro District of Kherson](#) left three dead and two wounded.<sup>38</sup>

On the night of September 25 – 26, a Russian Kh-59 guided missile struck Kysilivka, destroying 18 homes and wounding at least four people.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> <https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/1425>

<sup>34</sup> <https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/1420>

<sup>35</sup> <https://t.me/suspilnenews/24539>

<sup>36</sup> [https://t.me/smolii\\_ukraine/43164](https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/43164)

<sup>37</sup> [https://t.me/smolii\\_ukraine/43188](https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/43188)

<sup>38</sup> [https://t.me/kherson\\_non\\_fake/10340](https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/10340)

<sup>39</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116279>

## WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

### Dnipropetrovsk

A ballistic missile struck a business in Kryvyi Rih. There was no other information available.<sup>40</sup>

### Cherkasy

Cherkasy Oblast OVA Ihor Taburets reported the Ukrainian air force shot down four Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, but at least one broke through air defenses and hit "an infrastructure facility."<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> <https://t.me/vilkul/4317>

<sup>41</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116277>



## NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity in this region.

## RUSSIAN FRONT

**Russian Objective:** Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

**Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective:** Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

## Kursk

Russian sources claim that the Ukrainian drone that struck near Halino Military Airfield outside of Kursk was brought down by electronic warfare and was designed to be tamper-resistant. It was reported that the commander of the 14th Aviation Regiment, a deputy commander, a Federal Security Service (FSB) counterintelligence agent, and enlisted personnel were killed when they started to examine the UAV. We cannot independently verify the claim.<sup>42</sup> <sup>43</sup> Russian sources warned earlier this month that Ukrainian drones were booby-trapped and should only be approached by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) engineers.

## Orenburg

The Ministry of Emergency Situations reported a fire broke out at an oil depot in the Orenburg region, which involved 500 square meters of the facility. It took two hours to extinguish, and a cause was not reported.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> <https://t.me/astrapress/38749>

<sup>43</sup> [https://t.me/smolii\\_ukraine/43166](https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/43166)

<sup>44</sup> <https://twitter.com/NewsUkrainian24/status/1706244232615236008>

## BELARUSIAN FRONT

The self-declared President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, banned private ownership of drones. Citizens are now prohibited from importing, storing, selling, manufacturing, and using UAVs. Residents of Belarus have six months to sell or store any drones they currently own to a government-approved organization.<sup>45</sup>

## THEATERWIDE

Russian launched a large drone attack on the night of September 25 – 26, including 38 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. The Ukrainian Air Force intercepted 26 UAVs.<sup>46</sup>

It is reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin has given Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu until October to reverse the ongoing Ukrainian offensive.<sup>47</sup> Numerous Russian channels reported that Chief of Staff Gerasimov has personally taken control of the Russian defense of Zaporizhzhia.

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<sup>45</sup> <https://t.me/uniannet/112502>

<sup>46</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116271>

<sup>47</sup> [https://t.me/ukrarmed\\_forces/6438](https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/6438)



**ASSESSMENT:** We had assessed in January 2023, when Gerasimov was made responsible for all Russian forces in Ukraine, that continued battlefield failures would create a problem for the Kremlin. While President Putin may have made a “do this, or else” declaration, it is unclear what “or else” would look like. We find it highly unlikely that Shoigu or Gerasimov would be dismissed or forced to resign. It is also unclear who could be a competent replacement.

Fuel shortages in the occupied territories continue to expand, with new reports of Russian military vehicles running out of fuel. The impact on Russian logistics is minimal for now, but gasoline and diesel fuel reserves are at critical levels in the occupied territories.<sup>48</sup>

The head of Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, said he believes Ukraine’s energy infrastructure would survive Russian attacks over the winter. “I think that we will definitely get through the winter. There may be difficulties associated with shelling, but the energy system will not fall apart. The energy system will work. We will cope.”<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> [https://t.me/atesh\\_ua/1951](https://t.me/atesh_ua/1951)

<sup>49</sup> <https://t.me/uniannet/112490>

Kudrytskyi said that work was done over the summer to harden power facilities and that linemen and other workers have good experience making rapid repairs after attacks.

Energoatom reported that maintenance work on Ukraine's nuclear power plants was completed, with all reactors operating at full power. The facilities still under Ukrainian control are generating a combined 6,400 megawatts.<sup>50</sup>

Debris from an S-300 anti-aircraft missile, presumably from Ukraine, was found in Moldova, in a remote area of the unrecognized republic of Transnistria.<sup>51</sup> The debris landed in a garden in the village of Kitskany with no explosion and no injuries.

Ukraine revealed the  [Marichka uncrewed subsurface vessel](#) (USSV). The 6-meter-long drone has a range of 1,000 kilometers and can carry out surveillance and attack missions, including striking ships below the waterline like a torpedo.<sup>52 53</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> [https://t.me/smolij\\_ukraine/43200](https://t.me/smolij_ukraine/43200)

<sup>51</sup> [https://t.me/couch\\_IU/43424](https://t.me/couch_IU/43424)

<sup>52</sup> <https://t.me/The3rdForceUA/20045>

<sup>53</sup> <https://t.me/uniannet/112523>

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that the first batch of United States-provided Abrams M1A1 main battle tanks have arrived in Ukraine.<sup>54</sup>

Polish President Andrzej Duda said Poland would continue transferring weapons to Ukraine, sending its older military equipment as it's replaced with new ones.<sup>55</sup>

The table for equipment losses was **updated on September 24, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

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<sup>54</sup> [https://t.me/ukrarmed\\_forces/6440](https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/6440)

<sup>55</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116176>

## RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to September 24, 2023.

12,286 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,486 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
<b>Main Battle Tanks</b>	2182	289	7.55:1	↓
<b>Medium Duty Tanks</b>	150	366	0.41:1	—
<b>Armored fighting Vehicles</b>	982	327	3.00:1	—
<b>Infantry Fighting Vehicles</b>	2797	755	3.70:1	↓
<b>Armored Personnel Carriers</b>	354	344	1.02:1	↓
<b>MRAPs</b>	48	161	0.30:1	—
<b>Infantry Mobility Vehicles</b>	210	373	0.56:1	—
<b>Command and Communications Vehicles</b>	251	17	14.76:1	—
<b>Engineering Vehicles</b>	343	84	4.08:1	↓
<b>Towed Artillery</b>	308	160	1.93:1	↑
<b>Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars</b>	536	220	2.44:1	—
<b>MLRS</b>	275	50	5.50:1	↑
<b>SAMs</b>	181	129	1.40:1	—
<b>Mobile Radars</b>	45	78	0.58:1	—
<b>EW/ECW</b>	54	4	13.50:1	—
<b>Winged Aircraft</b>	92	72	1.28:1	—
<b>Helicopters</b>	112	35	3.20:1	—
<b>Naval Vessels and Submarines</b>	17	27	0.63:1	—




## RUMORS


Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.


- Did Russia destroy two Mig-29s and three Su-25s at Kryvyi Rih with new long-range Lancet kamikaze drones?
- Have more than 260,000 Russian soldiers died in Ukraine since February 24, 2022?
- North Korean ammunition is coming to Russia?
- Will Ukraine get Taurus cruise missiles?
- Will Russia announce a surge in mobilization with the fall conscription?
- Were two Russian generals seriously wounded and one admiral killed in Sevastopol?


## Notes on Sourcing Information


**Malcontent News** uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or



misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.