History friends and patrons all! Our first episode of the EXCLUSIVE series 1956 is out now! To give you a taster of what’s to come, this first episode and its follow up are absolutely FREE for all listeners, but episode 3 onwards will require you guys to sign up for the bargain price of just $5 a month to join in the party. By paying $5 a month, you’ll not only secure your place as a valued history friend, you’ll also guarantee that you get the best of WDF, the earliest access and of course, access to future exclusive series like the Age of Bismarck! Above all, you’ll be helping to ensure that I can continue to do this as part of my living, and you’ll be making history thrive in the process.

Above all you should notice, as per some previous announcements, that this podcast series is moving to a new address! 1956 will have its own RSS feed and its own home within the WDF podcast group, soon to be joined by many more, as you’ll soon see! This way, 1956 can serve as a constant advertisement for the benefits of becoming a Diplomat, but it also means that we don’t clog up the feed with any 1956 episodes. My OCD senses are pleased, but your history senses should be well pleased too! Remember that all Patrons can even help out further by giving a review in 1956’s new home if you are enjoying the series. Now then, you may be wondering – what does 1956 have to offer? What exactly is in the box?

Well, if you want to learn more about what followed after the Korean War – as a story and as a year of significance, 1956 has few equals, and we open our narrative with the event which set up all subsequent events – the death of Josef Stalin on 5th March 1953. As far as deaths of prominent characters go, the death of Stalin from a succession of strokes at the age of 73 sticks out particularly – a man who allowed his paranoia get the better of him, out of fear of his own vulnerability and out of lust for power, died without being the victim of any underhanded scheme. As we’ll see, he also died without naming an official successor, throwing into chaos those men who had stuck around long enough to accumulate some power for themselves.

In this episode we’ll meet these figures – the so-called ‘collective leadership’ of the Soviet Union, which included such heavy hitters as Molotov, Malenkov, Lavrenti Beria, Anastas Mikoyan and a sometimes crude, always blunt figure by the name of Nikita Khrushchev. The story of what would come after Stalin is a gripping and fascinating snapshot of life at the top of the Soviet greasy pole. It prepares us for the eventful months which are to come, by investigating exactly what it was that compelled these men to undo some of what Stalin had made, while still holding onto the terrifying edifice which held half of the continent of Europe in rapture. I hope you’ll join me – and a huge thanksss for all your support so far!

Hello and welcome history friends patrons all to the first episode of our Patreon exclusive series, 1956. Running side by side the whopper Korean War series, 1956 will give all true history nerds a chance to see what happened once the dust settled after the KW, and the Soviet hierarchy was forced to respond to Josef Stalin’s death. In this episode indeed we pick up from that moment in history on 5th March 1953, when Stalin departed from the stage and left a gaping hole in the Soviet leadership that he had dominated for three decades. Without any further ado then, I think we should just get into it. I will now take you all to the evening of 5th March 1953…

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Josef Stalin had been dead for six hours and ten minutes before the Kremlin flag was lowered and the radio announced that the Dictator was no more. In an age of split-second announcements of death, there is something strange in this delay. No less strange were the official communiques on his last illness, which noted the week before that: "The best medical personnel has been called in to treat Comrade Stalin…The treatment is under the direction of the Minister of Health…The treatment is under the continuous supervision of the Central Committee and the Soviet Government..."[[1]](#footnote-1) As the historian Bertram D. Wolfe noted only months after the event: ‘Nine doctors watching each other; the Minister of Health watching the Doctors; the Central Committee and the Government watching the Minister.’[[2]](#footnote-2) Early on the morning of March 6, with all the morning papers missing from the streets, the radio announced that the Soviet leader had died at 9:50PM the night before. Along with this note of time of death was a telling communique, repeated every hour, which included a call to maintain:

…the steel-like unity and monolithic unity of the ranks of the Party…to guard the unity of the Party as the apple of the eye…to educate all Communists and working people in high political vigilance, intolerance and firmness in the struggle against internal and external enemies.

‘The most important task of the Party and the Government’, the communique continued, ‘is to ensure uninterrupted and correct leadership of the entire life of the country which demands the greatest unity of leadership and the prevention of any kind of disorder and panic.’[[3]](#footnote-3) The appeals for a call to ‘steel-like unity and monolithic unity’, and to increased ‘vigilance and intolerance in the struggle with internal and external enemies’, continued to reappear in editorials and articles over the week that followed.[[4]](#footnote-4) In Stalin’s state funeral, accompanied by all of the nauseating, resplendent pontifications which only that figure could command, even though he was no longer alive, the urges for unity, strength, and resistance to any notions of disorder or panic were repeated, most notably in the several eulogies performed by the Soviet Union’s top brass.

Only in a polity like the Soviet Union could the death of a leader create an atmosphere of serious alertness and such consistent warnings. What disorder, what panic, did Moscow expect to occur? Was it really possible that the Soviet Union could come crumbling down in a fit of revolution simply because its most famous leader of recent times had died? Stalin’s successors, in a sense, were waiting to find out the answer to a very important question: was the Soviet Union stronger than Stalin’s will? In no other country in the world, even those recently established in the 1950s, would the death of a ruler be greeted with such a reaction.

This is of course because the Soviet Union was quite unlike every other country in the world. The so-called Soviet Government was not a government run by the Soviet councils, and these same Soviet councils had long since ceased electing any deputies to their company. The Soviet citizens did not have a say in their ‘democratic dictatorship’; and that was precisely the problem, in addition to several others, that Stalin left behind to those that would attempt to succeed him. He had monopolised everything, in every conceivable way, for so long, that the original organs of the state given life in the revolution no longer operated. The dictator had controlled the Politburo, which had controlled the Central Committee, which had controlled the Party, which had then run the sprawling Soviet state. With the top figure gone, the pressing problem was one of a power vacuum, and a situation familiar to all empires that lose an emperor who neglected to appoint a successor.

While the ironclad authority of the Soviet Union may appear unquestionable to us in light of how long that state lasted, in 1953 we should bear in mind that reference to ‘disorder and panic’, or to maintaining the unity and determination of the Party were not directed at would-be civil dissidents or foreign powers. So at the death of the Dictator, there are no parties to establish a legal succession by electoral contest. There is no Soviet constitutional provision for a successor to the post of self-appointed political genius. There is no party which any longer decides anything, debates anything, selects anybody. There is not even a provision for a dictator, much less for a successor, in the Constitution or in a Party statute. There is no moral code, either, to restrain the aspirants to the succession from framing each other up and killing each other off. In so far as they follow the precedents bequeathed to them, and in so far as they follow the real inner laws of the total state, that is precisely what they will have to do. It is to one another and to their deeply established personal fears that they are speaking when they call to an awed populace for "steel like unity and monolithic unity of party and of leadership." It is from their own hearts that the words escaped concerning "disorder and panic."[[5]](#footnote-5)

Thanks to Stalin’s legacy, a power struggle for the top position in the Kremlin was inevitable; it was a question of when, and how, rather than if. In addition, for foreign observers, it was also a question of *who?* Who indeed could possibly fill the murderous shoes of Stalin, and who could possible come close to wielding the kind of power brandished by Stalin’s Soviet sword? To bring the question further, after Stalin’s horrific purges and a second round of terror between 1948-53 had reached its apex just on the point of his death, one could be forgiven for asking, with a sense of despair, who was really left to rule in Stalin’s stead?[[6]](#footnote-6) Any successor would not only have to fill Stalin’s shoes, they would also have to fix the immense problems Stalin had left behind, in addition to the top heavy leadership system they inherited. When Stalin’s died, he didn’t just leave behind many hundreds of thousands of orphans and millions of victims, he also left behind a cult of personality unparalleled at the time of his death, which a certain protégé of his in North Korea would come to emulate.

Stalin’s cult and the way in which he sustained it only added to the succession problem. The Soviet Chairman created a cult of his person that was the more extravagant because all who knew him knew his personal limitations. He was keenly sensitive to his inferiority as a theoretician and a popular leader. He knew that the men around him were his equals, in some way his superiors. This drove him to kill off all of Lenin's associates, to liquidate otherwise loyal communists on several levels, and in the process kill off as many potential "successors," as he could find, in the process choosing to surround himself with only lesser men, courtiers, sycophants, faction lieutenants and executants of his will. He exacted a cult of his person even from those he was about to destroy, and from the entire nation even as he tormented it. If Lenin's prestige was unable to bind his closest associates, who loved and revered him, to carry out his Will after he was dead, how much less likely is the en forced, repugnant, humiliating Stalin cult to bring his associates or his party to execute his Will?[[7]](#footnote-7)

It wasn’t that there was a need to replicate the cult, and to replace Stalin with one of the sharks vying for his seat. Indeed, precisely because a cult of personality did not belong in the communist, socialist workers utopia which the Soviet Union claimed to be, the problem of succession was exacerbated. Not merely a cult of personality, but even the notion of a single, all-powerful dictator fits badly into the Marxist framework of thought which assigns the history-making role to the classes or, in the Leninist version, to the party as a whole. It is not surprising, then, that Soviet political and constitutional theory consistently shied away from the question of what happens when a personal dictator, the unique "Vozhd' of the Party and the people," disappears from the lonely summit of Soviet power. The subterfuge employed from time to time by Soviet writers was to dismiss the problem of succession by piously insisting that leadership of the party has always been "collegial" or "collective," residing in the regularly re-elected Central Committee (or the Politburo) and hence self-perpetuating.[[8]](#footnote-8)

The farce that there’s no need to discuss the succession to Stalin’s position actually, because Stalin was just the Party’s face and represented its collective will, was just one example of the countless falsehoods peddled after Stalin’s death…but not for long. Even while it was apparent that problems plagued the Soviet Union and that a great deal of these problems had been of Stalin’s own making, those figures that swirled around the vortex of backbiting and competition had signed off on several of these measures in their own time. While one could argue that this obedience to Stalin’s orders came out of fear for their own lives, this doesn’t excuse those figures who were responsible in their tenure of office for increasing the misery of the citizens in their care, on the expectation that such initiatives would result in promotion or favour from the moustachioed dictator.

Indeed, those that had survived Stalin’s tenure in office had largely done so because they had fallen in line with their master’s record of cruelty and needless devastation, and in some cases surpassed his record. And of course there were others that survived in the circle of figures after Stalin’s death solely because they had thrown a comrade under the bus on the way up. But even then, survival was the best things that the varied members of this circle could hope for, both in the political and literal sense. Even while each of the men in the aftermath had survived, none of them, with perhaps one exception we’ll get into later, had been permitted to establish anything remotely close to a power or support base before Stalin had died. Since all were on equal footing, it stood to reason that all would be equally bloodied in the struggle that followed. All were equally weak, because that was how Stalin had wanted it during his lifetime, sparing no thought for what would happen to the Soviet Union after his death, if indeed he thought or cared much for what would happen when he was gone.

As Stalin’s peers could testify, the Chairman was jealous, resentful, envious, capricious and by nature. No one dared to beg him to prepare for death or to consider a successor; none of Stalin’s subordinates could possibly dare to try on the crown in his presence. It is unwise even in a democracy to announce too early in your term of office that you do not intend to run again. Men of your own party begin to abandon you for the bandwagon of your anticipated successor, while influence, power and leadership slip from your hands. But in a dictatorship, which tolerates only a single power centre, it would be fatal to let anyone else openly wear the crown. A rival power centre would begin to polarize, and the whole totalitarian regime would be called in question. The Dictator’s benefactor and heir would become a danger to the Dictator, especially if the latter began this appointment process through some kind of unnatural abdication or renunciation of his own total power. Because Stalin feared his peers or his sins catching up to him, he did all he could to eliminate even the faintest trickle of opposition. When no such trickles existed, he shot blindly into the dark in an effort to create some.

As soon as anyone around him began to shine, however faintly, by the light of his own deeds, Stalin was swift to remove him from the stage. Sometimes the removal by the law of fear and-terror led to purge. At other times, it led to mere ostracism, or a shift to a minor provincial post, as in the cases of Marshals Timoshenko and Zhukov. Sometimes, if rumours grew that some one man was the "heir apparent;" then, mysteriously, an assassin's bullet or a sudden illness, brought the heir to his end. The problem was put eloquently by Bertram Wolfe when he noted that:

The cult of his person grew until it filled the horizon and overarched the sky. Those around him, many of them very capable in their own right, were systematically reduced to dwarfs around a giant. Each fresh extravagance exacted from them in this cult of the master-of-everything, each blasphemous phrase in the litany of worship of a living god, diminished further the stature of the men around him, and made harder the process of building up a new charismatic leader after his death.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Stalin killed off virtually all the "Men of October" during the blood purges of 1934 to 1938. To put it another way, of the 139 members and candidates of the Party's Central Committee who were elected at the Seventeenth Party Congress (in 1934) 98 persons, 70% of their number, were arrested and shot, mostly during that infamous pre-war purge of 1937-38.[[10]](#footnote-10) The atmosphere of terror neither ended nor began with such a purge, as we know.[[11]](#footnote-11) In 1947, on the thirtieth anniversary of the *coup d'etat* of November 7th 1917 which brought the Bolsheviks to power in Russia, only 438 Old Bolsheviks who had joined the Party prior to the seizure of power were still alive and in good enough standing to sign a letter of thanks to Comrade Stalin for what he had done to the Party. A quick glance at the variety of sources that examine the aftermath of Stalin’s death underline that this type of system, which was characterised by empty displays of loyalty like these, did not merely contribute towards a ruinous succession crisis after Stalin’s death – they made such a power struggle inevitable.[[12]](#footnote-12)

But again, even if the power struggle was solved – even if a kind of committee of the old Soviet guard shared power, which is what happened to some degree, then there still remained the issue of Stalin’s troubling domestic and foreign legacy to consider. In the former, this could be summarised in one word – gulag, and the latter could in the same way be summarised as Korea, or more broadly as Cold War. Those that Stalin hadn't seen fit to waste bullets on had been plunged into the often frozen, always terrible experience of the gulag system, a system which Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, writing in his stunning, explosive expose of that order called a Gulag Archipelago in 1973. Solzhenitsyn, as a former resident of the gulag, caused such a controversy because the book, written in France, underlined for the first time in such vivid, uncompromising detail exactly how horrific and terrible the excesses of Stalin’s regime were.

Today, Solzhenitsyn is compulsory reading for Russian students on the school curriculum, and has been updated and added to several times by its author and supplementary historians since.[[13]](#footnote-13) In addition, since the archives dealing with the gulags have only been declassified for two decades following the fall of the USSR, there is much we still do not know and therefore have to learn about the role of this system in the Soviet Union, much less the difficulties, both practical and ideological, which faced those that attempted in the aftermath of Stalin’s death to deconstruct the gulag system without deconstructing the Soviet rule of law. Finding a balance was therefore crucial in domestic affairs, but in foreign policy Stalin’s shadow extended all across the world.

The Cold War developed as it did thanks to Stalin’s extensive insecurities and incorrect beliefs about the way the world worked. Above all, it is possible to argue that the CW developed in the first place because Stalin was not willing to trust the West, least of all the capitalist Americans, to respect Soviet interests. In addition, when attempting to unpack Stalin’s creation of the CW, it is possible to see it as a response to that key question after the war – now what? If it is true that all states need an enemy to fear, to mobilise against and to remain on their toes in anticipation of a strike from that direction, then Stalin’s empire could be moved and moulded based on the threat or rhetorical ammunition that a conflict with the West would provide. Justifying his actions in crises or incidents, blaming or criticising his countrymen for things they did not do, and signing off on their death warrant based on an ideological lie, was behaviour followed by Stalin domestically.

See for example when, after making an enemy out of Yugoslavia’s Josip Tito, Stalin charged all domestic enemies with a adhering to the dangerous, treacherous, Titoist deviation. See also how much political and practical use Stalin made out of the lingering threat of fascism, of the pervasive influence of capitalism or of the looming danger posed by imperialism. Stalin and his state organs were masters at manipulating events to serve their ends, and these ends were also in pursuit of some kind of power. The swollen Soviet armed forces, the vast amounts spent on the nuclear weapons program, the tyranny and repression which was ratcheted up on the populations, the demands for higher and larger production quotas – all could be justified by the dangerous circumstances in which these people lived. To view the CW as inevitable after 1945 is to underrate the genuine desire for peace and prosperity on both sides of the still developing iron curtain in several levels of government. Above all though, seeing the CW as inevitable underrates the significant, driving influence that Stalin had over shaping and directing the Soviet Union’s foreign policy towards friction and conflict with the forces of the West.[[14]](#footnote-14)

We’ll see in the KW series what happened to the whole peace process of the conflict when Stalin died, a fact which speaks volumes to the extent of the personal influence which the Kremlin leader had on first instigating and then manipulating that war into being. For now though, it suffices to note that Stalin’s death presented the succession circle with several problems. For all of his horrible faults, Stalin had been able to balance the inherent contradictions of his rule together, largely because nobody would dare challenge such contradictions. However, once he was gone and those contradictions needed to be fixed, the dilemma was exactly how far one could go. Did taking apart the gulag system for example mean that the Soviet Union could no longer inflict its own barbaric brand of justice on those it deemed disloyal or dangerous? Certainly there were many innocents in these camps, but it was also possible that there were many insidious elements as well. If these individuals were released, where would the amnesty end? If the gulag was not there in the background, would citizens still be willing to fall in line with the Party doctrine? Amongst the circle of successors, different answers to these questions swirled around, as all looked to the upcoming Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956.

It was at this Congress that, among other things, the so-called Secret Speech would be delivered by Nikita Khrushchev, and Stalin would be targeted, his myth destroyed and his cult criticised for the first time. That is a scene for a later episode, but to put things in perspective, in the midsummer of 1953 there was some ways to either before Stalin would be criticised in such a manner, or before the person of Khrushchev would be in a position to speak as the sole leading voice of the Party. In other words, it’s time to give a bit of background in this episode and in the next one to demonstrate how it was that a person like Nikita managed to reach the top of the greasy pole. One of his strongest assets, as it happens, was that his rivals consistently underestimated him.

There were several stops offs on the way to the announcement within communist circles of de-Stalinisation. The Soviet government, such as it was, did not wait until the Secret Speech of February 1956 to begin dismantling Stalin’s legacy. From March till the middle of June 1953 one domestic reform followed upon another in close succession. The Stalin cult was virtually abolished. A campaign of 'enlightenment' was in progress, designed to make it impossible to replace that cult with that of any other Leader. The administration was being overhauled and shaken from its Byzantine totalitarian rigidity. A fairly comprehensive amnesty was decreed. The inquisitorial methods of the political police were bluntly condemned and the rule of law was proclaimed. There was a strong and repeated emphasis on the constitutional rights of the citizen. Newspapers asked for the abolition of censorship and official control. (The *Literary Gazette* for instance, frankly demanded that the Soviet theatre manage its own affairs without outside interference, a demand which nobody would have dared to raise during the Stalin years, and which obviously set an infectious example to others.)

Free expression of views was encouraged; holder of unorthodox views was no longer labelled an enemy, a traitor or a foreign agent. High officials were demoted merely that they abused their power and acted unconstitutionally; no fascist, or Titoist or counter-revolutionary intent was attributed to them. These ideas spread from the centre and outwards, and saw the dismissal of the Russifiers from high office in Georgia and other outlying Union Republics. ‘Russification’ as a policy of centralising the Soviet Union around the Soviet Russian culture of revolution was emphatically disavowed. Together with the cessation of anti-Semitic incitement, these moves promised a new and hopeful beginning in the treatment of the smaller nationalities. Last but not least, the government ordered a revision of the targets of the current economic plans. Consumer industries were to raise their output. A higher standard of living and contentment of the masses were obviously regarded as vital preconditions for the success of the new policy. There were even whispers that the Soviet military expenditure was to be reduced.[[15]](#footnote-15)

Under Stalin, Western and American entry into the Soviet Union had been banned, but this was relaxed as well. Stalin had ordered that no more radios be produced in 1954, but upon his death this was ignored, and access to limited Western radio stations permitted. Radios were produced in the millions, and Soviet citizens in their millions were able to listen to *Time For Jazz* and other such American made programs, as their cities welcomed in thousands of curious foreigners. In addition, the ban on any Soviet citizens from leaving the country was also relaxed, and Soviet citizens with foreign wives or husbands were entitled to leave the country for good if they wished. In the background to the domestic and social impact of de-Stalinisation following the February 1956, the edicts of the Soviet successors before that date and their impact on culture, tourism and the perceptions of these Soviet citizens have to be underlined. Khrushchev did not simply call an end to Stalinism – this process had already begun in several ways in the three years since Stalin’s death.

The order of the day was to ‘smother foreign guests in our embrace’. However, by opening up their country to more foreigners and by hosting several socialist festivals in Moscow for example, the Soviet citizen was able to see for himself that the propaganda regarding the Western individual did not match the reality. As one memoir of the era put it:

Americans were depicted in two ways – either as poor, unemployed, gaunt, unshaven people in dregs or as big-bellied bourgeois in tuxedo and tall hat, with a fat cigar in the mouth. And there was a third category – hopeless negroes, all of them victims of the Ku Klux Klan.[[16]](#footnote-16)

Just as its propaganda line was being called into question, so too was the issue of Germany. Since spring 1949 West Germany, led by Konrad Adenauer, had led his party and welcomed eagerly the influx of American goods and monies. Yet there was something else Adenauer welcomed as well – the arrival of East German refugees in their hundreds of thousands. Between 1952 and 1953, over 220k East Germans had left the region to settle in the more prosperous, less restrictive West. Among their number were several thousand members of the East Germany Communist Youth Parties, and some actual serving members of Walter Ulbricht’s incumbent East German government, who never returned again.[[17]](#footnote-17)

Ulbricht indeed was facing something of a crisis by early summer 1953, and his is a figure which we’ll spend more time investigating in future episodes. He represented to the Soviet circle a kind of unfortunate blend of loyalty mixed with a lack of tact, a bull-headedness and a blandness which did not endear him to the East German people. In the atmosphere of the so-called Thaw in the post-Stalin world, it is unsurprising that East German citizens took it upon themselves to protest at the situation in their country, at the lack of freedoms, and at Walter Ulbricht’s crummy leadership. Ulbricht urged Moscow to signal its support for him, yet the issue was tricky as the Soviets were in the process of meeting the British for talks. So long as Churchill was trying his hand at peacemaker, Ulbricht would have to ensure that the East German image presented to the world was one of calm, but in this, Ulbricht was hopelessly out of his depth.

On 16th June, student protests at several Universities in Germany reached their apex in Berlin, and Ulbricht considered fleeing the country, before Soviet tanks and soldiers stormed East Berlin and restored order to the fractured government. By 20th June things had apparently calmed down, and Ulbricht was gushing in his thanks to his Soviet overlords for their necessarily forceful response. The East German revolts were the first true test of Soviet mettle after Stalin’s death, and they represented an answer to that question of exactly how far Moscow would go in its quest to reform its clamouring societies. It wasn’t as simple a case as the Soviets being scared into pursuing a more hardline policy. However, the circle of men which emerged from the experience in Berlin were notable in one significant sense – their numbers had shrank.

Lavrenti Beria, the Soviet Minister for Internal Affairs – in other words the chief of the secret police and a man pegged to hold a considerable level of influence in the post-Stalin world – was suddenly absent. It was later confirmed that Beria had been arrested, and by the end of 1953 he would be dead. So it was that even in the midst of a thaw, the icy approach to potential threats was exercised in the same manner as Stalin had done. With Beria gone, those that remained could speak those same meaningless words which had been used following Stalin’s death – to maintain the steely unity of the Party, and to watch for panic and disorder. Behind these empty phrases though the true feelings were clear; better him than me, and more tellingly – one down, only a few more to go. Next time, we’ll resume our story of this power struggle among the successors, as Stalin’s ghost haunts the proceedings, and domestic and foreign policies overlap. Until then though, my name is Zack and you have been listening to our first episode of 1956 my lovely history friends and patrons. Thanks for listening and I’ll be seeing you all soon.

1. Cited in Bertram D. Wolfe, ‘The Struggle for the Soviet Succession’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Jul., 1953), pp. 548-565; p. 548. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Ibid*, p. 548. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Cited in *Ibid*, p. 548. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *Ibid*, pp. 548-549. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See *Ibid*, pp. 552-553. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Robert F. Byrnes, ‘The Climax of Stalinism, 1950-1953’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 317, The Satellites in Eastern Europe (May, 1958), pp. 8-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See Bertram D. Wolfe, ‘The Struggle for the Soviet Succession’, p. 555. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, ‘The Problem of Succession in the Soviet Political System: The Case of Khrushchev’, *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* / Revue canadienned' Economique et de Science politique, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Nov., 1960), pp. 575-591; p. 576. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Bertram D. Wolfe, ‘The Struggle for the Soviet Succession’, p. 556. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. William Henry Chamberlin, ‘The Stalin Era and Stalin's Heirs’, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Oct., 1956), pp. 237-244; p. 238. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Stephen F. Cohen, ‘Stalin's Terror As Social History’, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Oct., 1986), pp. 375-384. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See Myron Rush, ‘The Khrushchev Succession Problem’, *World Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jan., 1962), pp. 259-282; p. 259. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See especially Golfo Alexopoulos, ‘Amnesty 1945: The Revolving Door of Stalin's Gulag’, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Summer, 2005), pp. 274-306; Anne Applebaum, *Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camps* (London, 2012); Golfo Alexopolous, *Illness and Inhumanity in Stalin's Gulag* (Yale, 2017). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Vojtech Mastny, ‘Stalin and the Militarization of the Cold War’, *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter, 1984-1985), pp. 109-129; pp. 109-112; Donald S. Carlisle, ‘Stalin's Postwar Foreign Policy and the National Liberation Movement’, *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jul., 1965), pp. 334-363. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. See Isaac Deutscher, ‘The Beria Affair’, *International Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Autumn, 1953), pp. 227-239; pp. 227-228. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Cited in Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev* (North Carolina, 2007), pp. 174-175. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. See *Ibid*, p. 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)