Episode 4

Hello and welcome lovely patrons all to episode 4 of \_\_\_\_. Last time we covered the spring and summer of 1841, and we saw how Alexander McLeod endured his NY imprisonment while British and American statesmen worked to find some form of compromise. Lord Melbourne’s Whig government, and Palmerston, who served as the FS, were concerned with acquiring McLeod’s freedom, but they also had to keep their eyes on the French, and stand firm in the face of growing discontent at home. Was Palmerston to blame for McLeod’s fate, since he had ignored the *Caroline* controversy? This view was gaining purchase, but of more importance was the looming shift in government away from Melbourne’s Whigs, and into the hands of Sir Robert Peel’s conservatives. Possessing a keen determination to preserve peace, improve trade, reduce expenditure and somehow reach a satisfactory settlement in America, both Peel and his FS Aberdeen would have their work cut out for them when they entered power in late August 1841. Without any further ado then, it’s time to resume our story from that critical point, as we trace McLeod’s fate, and ask how it could all be done.

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I trust I shall find myself none the poorer for being out of office, and certainly as yet I have been much the better for it in health, and much the freer and more amused in mind. I suppose that like a horse about his stable, though now glad to have got out, I shall soon wish to get back again to my office, but that wish has not yet arisen; and I should as far as regards myself very much regret any change which should bring me back to my former labours for a year and a half to come.[[1]](#footnote-1)

This was how Palmerston described his feelings at the change in government to a friend in late November 1841. We get the sense of Palmerston’s exhaustion, his longing for a break, and his lack of any real desire to return to office for the sake of it, at least not for a year and a half. The former FS need not have worried though; the Whigs, with Palmerston among them, would not return to power until the summer of 1846, and by then, much of the controversies with America would have passed on. Interestingly though, Palmerston was prepared to take up his position as a leading opposition figure, and he intended to operate on the principle of ‘finding fault with everything [Peel’s] government does which shall savour of ignorance, prejudice, bigotry, folly; and composed as that government is, we shall be at no loss for opportunities for opposition.’ As for those opposition figures themselves, Sir Robert Peel, the Earl of Aberdeen and the aging Wellington foremost among them, Palmerston had little positive to say:

I do not think that the decrepitude of the Duke of Wellington, or the submissive habits of mind of Aberdeen, will add much to the stability of the government. Peel…has fine organs in his skill, and would have been a very great man indeed, if the organ of caution had not been so excessively developed.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Palmerston was right to detect a sense of caution among his political rivals. In the last episode, I suggested that Aberdeen’s first-hand experience of the Napoleonic Wars while on site in Vienna may well have marred his outlook on life, engendering a sense of caution and a desire to avoid war which Palmerston, having never witnessed what warfare did to men, simply lacked. Added to this was Peel’s views of Britain’s financial situation, which did not make for encouraging reading. In short, Britain, and much of the world, was in the midst of an economic depression, and where Britain would normally trade its way out of such crises by increasing its exports and improving its balance sheet, thanks to the confrontations with the US, trade with one of Britain’s most important partners had become stagnant, and then declined.

The solution, for Peel, was plain – a reduction in tensions and improvement in relations would naturally lead to an increase in trade, which would improve British economic prospects, and potentially encourage France to follow suit. For this to happen, of course, the McLeod matter would have to be resolved, and Peel was well-aware that this had to be done without any sacrifice of what was interpreted as British national honour. Otherwise, opposition figures – Palmerston foremost among them – would claim that the Tories had sacrificed the national honour for the sake of peace, an incredibly effective and rousing line of attack, which any long-term administration sought to avoid. In fact, the sense that the national honour had been sacrificed could even collapse Peel’s Cabinet, something which the PM was mindful of, as the Duke of Wellington would lead the walkout, since the two had not seen eye to eye for some time.

It would thus be the Earl of Aberdeen’s task to balance these concerns in his foreign policy; he would have to pursue a policy towards America, France and the rest with a certain degree of risk, pushing as far as he could to obtain resolution without leaving himself open to the charge of dishonour. Aberdeen understood that he would be the fall guy if the worst should happen, and for the next few years, we will see him grapple with that awkward ethic of national honour, while arguably putting the more tangible financial and strategic interests first.[[3]](#footnote-3) Without going too deeply into academic history of foreign policy, it is worth noting that foreign policy was itself not merely dependent on individuals. It was also affected by the ideology of the government then in power, be it Whig or Tory. I’ve thrown around these designations a good bit already, but to clarify, Whigs defined themselves as the protectors of Parliamentary sovereignty, and traced their political lineage back to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, where they opposed King James II’s policies, and strove to replace him with a less absolutist figurehead. The Whigs would in time merge with the more liberally minded statesmen, as well as Peelites, to create the Liberal Party in 1859. This same Liberal Party defined British politics until the end of the FWW, when it was usurped by the Labour Party.

But who were those Peelites I just mentioned, and what did this have to do with the Tories, or Conservatives? You may remember I said that Peel’s government would collapse in 1846. This collapse was almost wholly due to a key question – should Britain embrace the concepts of free trade, or should it retain its protectionist system which subsidised British production and goods with high tariffs? Those that believed free trade was the best course – led, as it happened, by Sir Robert Peel – became known as Peelites, while those that disagreed and wished to maintain the old system were Protectionists. What is important to understand is that the Peelites were in the minority, and they effectively split the Tory party by their ideological disagreements.

The political journey of the Peelites from a faction within the Tories, to entering opposition against them, to eventually merging with the Whigs to form the Liberal Party, is a fascinating one – at least in my view – because it led to scenarios where apparently firm Tories ended up entirely switching sides, and serving alongside former rivals. Foremost among these was William Gladstone, who began his career as the most conservative of all High Tories, only to transform himself into the most famous Liberal PM Britain ever had. The defection of the Peelites made Gladstone’s story possible; it also weakened the Tories, who would not return to power with a majority until Benjamin Disraeli’s triumph in 1874. So, with that hopefully cleared up, we can ask the question, what was the difference between the Whig conception of foreign policy, and the Tory version of it?

First, we should consider the Whig approach to foreign policy, which was naturally coloured by the most popular Whig statesmen, Lord Palmerston. In the opinion of Adrian Brettle, Palmerston believed that Britain was domestically secure, and that the main threat to her institutions came from abroad. Brettle wrote that Palmerston…

…combated this by a projection of broad-church Protestant religious, moral and commercial interests around the world, with an assertion of a masculine national honour. So Palmerston was able to demonstrate that the House of Commons ‘has now in its keeping not only the interests, property and the lives of many of its countrymen but that it has also in its keeping the honour, welfare and reputation…of this great empire.’[[4]](#footnote-4)

Palmerston understood this probably better than anyone, but he also knew it was a popular policy within the country. The more popular Palmerston was, the less able the opposition was to turn him out of office, and the stronger an image Palmerston presented to the wider world. Hence the term Palmerstonian, a policy approach which jealously guarded British honour abroad, intervened to support liberal governments across the world, and generally enjoyed a more active role in world affairs. Conservatives, as Adrian Brettle noted, ‘also had a foreign policy ideology,’ which maintained that ‘Conservative foreign policy had to be conducted above parties and factions, as Britain would only be respected as a power if she possessed a consistent posture abroad that reﬂected domestic harmony.’[[5]](#footnote-5) Conservatives would also maintain a sense of pragmatism which spurned interventionism as a general rule, and which was maintained by a cabal of country gentlemen who perhaps had more interest in domestic politics and the security of their own positions. This also explains why Peel’s defection, and the free trade ethos in general, was so painful for them, and a strong dislike of Peel ensured that Peelites and Tories could never truly reconcile so long as Peel was alive.

Although we should bear these broad differences in mind, the Tory desire for a cautious foreign policy entailing minimal commitments could not last in an increasingly imperialist and nationalistic nineteenth century. Disraeli’s success in recognising this, and applying a great deal of Palmerston’s own fondness for national honour and prestige, effectively transformed the Conservative Party in 1874, enabling it acquire office with a majority that is arguably only comparable to BJ’s electoral success in 2019. If you listened to BGTW, you might remember Lord Derby as FS flying the flag for traditional conservatism, and feeling appalled at Disraeli’s desire for prestige at the expense of the conservative’s founding principles. You might even remember me saying that Disraeli transformed the Tory party as it was then known, increasing its appeal to the electorate, and arguably serving as the inheritor to Palmerstonianism, while his rival Gladstone took the Liberal Party in another direction, favouring a more moralistic foreign policy that endured its own successes and trials. This is all to say that while political parties – loose though they often were – boasted a traditional ideology when it came to foreign policy, Britain’s political landscape was ultimately transformed by individuals, be they Palmerston, Peel, or Disraeli.[[6]](#footnote-6)

With this survey of British parties, perhaps Palmerston’s comments on the new government’s caution is easier to understand. Almost immediately, FS Aberdeen pursued the McLeod stand-off with a new vigour, likely believing that if it could be solved, Anglo-American trade would relieve much of the pressure on the British economy. Thus, where Palmerston had been satisfied with the traditional avenues of diplomacy, sending letters back and forth between the web of diplomats and ambassadors in London and Washington, Aberdeen envisioned the creation of a diplomatic mission which would travel to the US, and negotiate in person with American officials to resolve the crisis in face-to-face meetings. This tactic of sending a mission was not unfamiliar to Palmerston, but the former FS had avoided doing it because it would place additional pressure upon him to resolve the crisis. It would also bring negotiations increasingly into the public view, and potentially jeopardise his popularity if negotiations went south, or if Britain was perceived to have given too much to the Americans. Just as Palmerston came under fire for his failures to salve American pride, so too would the new Tory government face censure if it failed to resolve McLeod’s situation satisfactorily.

In the meantime, British newspapers offered their verdict on the crisis. Reflecting on the fall of the Whig government, the *Evening Mail* acknowledged ‘the mere disrepute which this affair brings upon Whig statesmanship is comparatively of little consequence; a far more important consideration is, the very serious extent to which it compromises the honour of the British nation.’ Indeed, it was asserted that ‘every hour of [McLeod’s] detention is a deliberate insult to the British realm’, and that while ‘The Americans have given us everything our own way…they will not give us Mr McLeod’, a position the *Mail* viewed as nothing less than ‘unbearable impertinence, derogatory in the highest degree to our national honour and character.’ Palmerston may have been satisfied with the legal complexity of the case as the excuse for American tardiness, ‘but assuredly it can be satisfactory to nobody else.’ That the state of New York could threaten Britain with such ‘an atrocious grievance’ was intolerable, and that state’s ability to ‘overbear and thwart the central Government’ of Washington was ‘a disability which…must be effectually removed before this country and America can ever be restored to honourable and satisfactory relations.’ It was to ‘the great indignity and disparagement of Great Britain’ that redress had not been granted thanks to ‘an awkward technical anomaly in their republican constitution.’

From this, the *Evening Mail* discerned that nothing had been done ‘to satisfy the honour of thus country, but, on the contrary, everything to defile and defy it.’ It was urged that if the Americans would not overcome these awkward technicalities to grant Britain redress, then ‘we solemnly protest, that the insulted honour of Great Britain must forthwith redress itself by adopting the last resource’ – that is, war. Although Palmerstons was to some extent responsible, the *Mail* concluded that ‘Americans are alone responsible for the prompt and vigorous demonstrations which the vindication of British honour would seem to render inevitable.’[[7]](#footnote-7) *The Scotsman*, carried in the *Morning Chronicle*, poured cold water on these tensions. While noting on *The Times’* tendency to see dishonour merely in McLeod’s detention, it was noted that ‘the honour of a great nation is more apt to be compromised by assuming the character of a bully, than by a cool and dignified demeanour.’ And it reminded readers that McLeod’s trial went against the wishes of the American Government, blaming his trial on a ‘defect’ in America’s constitution which enabled New York to take its independent line.[[8]](#footnote-8)

While *The Times* recognised ‘the pacific tone of some of their leading newspapers, acting in harmony with most of their principal statesmen,’ still it was noted that ‘the national spleen exhibited against Great Britain by the State authorities and populace of New York’ appeared ‘absolutely frantic.’ Although when it came to McLeod ‘Not a hair on his head will be injured’, those agitators ‘speak of Great Britain in a tone of contemptuous defiance.’ And ‘whatever the fate of McLeod, the day of reckoning with Great Britain remains,’ because ‘Her Majesty’s Crown and dignity have sustained an aggravated assault in the person of McLeod. Reparation, in some shape or another, cannot be dispensed with.’ *The Times* was clear that ‘War we do not desire. Nay, short of sacrifice of national honour, we would adopt almost any alternative to avoid it.’[[9]](#footnote-9)

However, the tone appeared to soften a few days later, where *The Times* distinguished between the government at Washington and the officials of New York to a greater extent than before, declaring ‘our injured countrymen’ to be ‘perfectly safe in the hands of the upright Federal Government, with whom alone Great Britain is concerned for the maintenance of her national honour.’ Rather than a war between the United States and Britain, *The Times* instead predicted one between ‘the Washington Cabinet and the insubordinate authorities of New York.’ Where President Tyler declared that ‘no consideration on earth can induce them to sanction the sacrifice of Mr McLeod’, *The Times* asserted ‘this solemn declaration is quite enough for us.’ New Yorkers were themselves said to now be alive to the nature of the McLeod ‘farce’, and the general excitement of its bloodthirsty public appeared to have died down. Indeed, after declaring that ‘In truth, we have marvellously little respect for the New Yorkers’, *The Times* then dared Utica courthouse to find McLeod guilty.[[10]](#footnote-10)

This change in tone may have been the result of the change in government – a government which was more pleasing to *The Times* – and the desire to reduce the pressure on Peel’s administration to force a result in America. Still, the *Morning Chronicle* observed that McLeod’s fate remained a subject of great excitement for Americans, with New York’s trains running twice daily to keep citizens updated with the trial’s latest developments. Nonetheless, by late September 1841, the *Chronicle* discerned a growing expectation in America that McLeod would not be charged.[[11]](#footnote-11) Unwilling to depend on it, Aberdeen had communicated to Ambassador Fox that he was to leave Washington in the event McLeod was executed.[[12]](#footnote-12) However, Wilbur Jones noted that President Tyler signalled his refusal to accept Fox’s passports if the worst did happen, in the hope that a delay could be affected which would cool tensions.[[13]](#footnote-13) Finally, New York’s Governor William Seward indicated his own intention to pardon McLeod even if the latter were sentenced to death.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Even as McLeod’s fate hung in the balance, Aberdeen worked from an early stage to develop plans for a diplomatic mission which could be sent to Washington. There was certainly a risk that this approach would provoke criticism at home, yet Aberdeen believed he had little choice, since time was of the essence, and the moderate SOS Daniel Webster would not be in office for much longer. Importantly, Aberdeen had an unfavourable view of Henry Fox, Britain’s ambassador to Washington, and in early September 1841 Aberdeen claimed that the ‘great necessity’ for the diplomatic mission was a consequence of ‘our having a Minister at Washington, who although not without ability, did nothing. He passed his time in bed, and was so detested by every member of the US Government that they had no communication with him, except as it was absolutely indispensable.’[[15]](#footnote-15) But who could Aberdeen select to lead such a sensitive mission? Historians have debated his decision-making since, but we know that Aberdeen determined in the end to send Alexander Baring, a prominent member of the Baring banking family, and a former President of the Board of Trade and Master of the Mint. History knows Baring better as Lord Ashburton, and that’s how I will refer to him from now on.

Lord Ashburton was an accomplished financier and businessman, and has used his family’s connections to rise in politics, but he could hardly be called a diplomat. Ashburton’s status as something of a diplomatic novice was balanced out somewhat by his familiarity with the US, having spent much of his early life there, and even marrying to daughter of a US Senator.[[16]](#footnote-16) With these connections, Aberdeen likely intended Ashburton to enjoy a positive reception – more positive than Ambassador Fox, who he believed was despised – and he perhaps believed that Ashburton would understand his orders in the context of Britain’s depressed economic position. But what were these orders? Before we answer that, we must first return to poor McLeod, who by September 1841 had enjoyed NY’s hospitality for a full year without much having changed.

Considering the stakes involved, one could argue that Alexander McLeod had never been so important. Were he sentenced and executed by a NY court; it was known that Britain would interpret this act as an act of war. John Tyler’s administration became increasingly concerned for McLeod’s fate, though it seemed that the greatest threat to McLeod came not from NY’s legal processes, but from the rage he inspired among NY’s people. So great was the threat that McLeod might be murdered, either while en route to another courthouse, or in his cell, that NY governor William Seward ensured a guard of thirty soldiers stood outside McLeod’s cell at all times. An artillery company was on standby in the event that McLeod needed to be escorted to the Canadian border in the event he was acquitted, and Seward ordered NY’s militia on standby, should a riot follow a dissatisfying conclusion to the ordeal.[[17]](#footnote-17)

This brings us to the trial itself. After several false starts, transferrals between different county jails, and no end of appeals from various factions urging the man be let go, McLeod faced New York justice at long last on Monday, 4 October 1841. It helps to remind ourselves of McLeod’s legal position by this point. Above all, McLeod had been indicted in February, accused of the murder of Amos Durfee, an American who died during the destruction of the *Caroline*. Now, nearly four years later, and despite possessing a fair alibi, McLeod was held responsible for this crime thanks to the sworn testimony of several witnesses, or so it seemed. The court in Utica read out the formidable indictment against McLeod, which is worth recounting here:

Alexander McLeod .... not having the fear of God before his eyes, but moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil…with a certain gun of the value of five dollars, then and there loaded and charged with gunpowder and one leaden bullet…then and there feloniously and wilfully, and of his malice aforethought and with a premeditated design to effect the death of the said Amos Durfee, did shoot and discharge, and the said Alexander McLeod with the leaden bullet aforesaid, out of the gun aforesaid, then and there by the force of the gunpowder and shot sent forth as aforesaid, the said Amos Durfee in and upon the back of the head of him…did strike, penetrate and wound, giving to the said Amos Durfee…one mortal wound…the said Amos Durfee, then and there…did languish, and languishing, did die.[[18]](#footnote-18)

In total, sixteen charges were levelled against McLeod, so it is little wonder that reporters for Canadian and British newspapers on the scene worried about a conviction. They also worried about the bias of the court, where McLeod would be treated as a scapegoat for the bitterness of the *Caroline*, and whether justly or not, would be made to pay for the offence. Many of the witnesses presented a suspiciously similar story – that they heard McLeod boasting in a public house how he had killed a ‘damned Yankee’ during the *Caroline* affray. This tale, in fact, seems like the strongest piece of evidence they had, as McLeod’s own boasts had led directly to his imprisonment. Yet – and I know this is something of an anti-climax – they need not have worried. The judge appointed to oversee the trial conducted the affair with unexpected fairness and impartiality, and after a week, the evidence against McLeod was scrutinised, his alibi holding, and the charges were thrown out. By 14 October, McLeod was back in Canada, receiving something of a hero’s welcome, and the affair appeared, finally, at an end.[[19]](#footnote-19) As Milledge Bonham Jr wrote, in the conclusion of his article upon the subject:

So ended the story of Alexander McLeod. For more than a year he was a bone of contention. His name was as familiar in Canada, Great Britain, the United States and Paris as were the names of the leading statesmen, actresses and heroes. In the public prints, in the gatherings of gossips, in the law courts, in the legislatures, his name stimulated heated discussion. Today his name is almost unknown, save to the specialist in American history.[[20]](#footnote-20)

So, McLeod’s fate had not caused a third Anglo-American War, and the hysteria which had surrounded his person for the past year fizzled out, in a kind of damp squib. However, while news of his acquittal reached Britain in November 1841, and Anglo-American statesmen likely breathed a sigh of relief,[[21]](#footnote-21) Wilbur Jones makes the point that ‘The denouement of the McLeod crisis merely lifted the lid from a box filled with problems and points of conflict between Britain and the US, most of which had been virtually ignored by Palmerston.’[[22]](#footnote-22) In fact, McLeod’s experience had confirmed the need for a new treaty between the two states, which would help avoid crises like these in the future. By far the most pressing issue, though, was the vague and disputed status of the American-Canadian border, particularly in the States of Maine, Massachusetts and NY. With these issues in mind, and with McLeod’s freedom improving relations somewhat, we can now return to Lord Ashburton and his planned mission to Washington.

Ashburton was initially furnished with a freedom of action, as Aberdeen seems to have anticipated he could achieve more without frequent correspondence interfering with informal negotiations. This suggests that Aberdeen was not personally invested in Ashburton’s mission, to the extent that he did not care much about the US-Canadian boundary, regarding the territory as worthless; he advocated the abolition of slavery, but only when it did not impinge on Anglo-American relations; an extradition treaty could avoid a controversy like McLeod’s in the future, but it was little more than a desirable convenience. Thus, Aberdeen’s major aim was to arrive at a compromise over matters he cared little personally about, but which would appear conciliatory to the Americans, without raising the ire of statesmen at home.[[23]](#footnote-23) Over time, these sentiments and Ashburton’s orders changed somewhat, to the frustration of the latter, but Ashburton was charged above all with formulating a new Anglo-American treaty which would ease tensions and boost British trade.

British newspapers were certainly aware that McLeod’s acquittal did not represent the end of the story. In early November 1841, *The Globe* observed that it was ‘no less desirable for the assertion of national honour than it is necessary for the promotion of commercial prosperity in both countries, that the still pending differences between Britain and America be brought to a speedy issue.’ *The Globe* declared that ‘It is not consistent with national honour that the claims of either nation upon the other should continue unsettled’, while acknowledging that ‘at any moment these disputed questions may be revived, and be converted into a casus belli between the two governments.’[[24]](#footnote-24) At the same time, the *Morning Chronicle* observed that ‘Of the occasions of difference between the United States and Great Britain, two are proper subjects of negotiation.’ The first was ‘the boundary question; involving both the national point of honour and certain private interests’, adding that ‘It seems impossible to dispose of the point of honour except by the arbitration of a third power.’ The second point was the more general issue of America’s frontier with Canada, which remained porous, and subject to complication so long as the ‘defect’ existed in America’s constitution, which enabled her component States to take an individual line.[[25]](#footnote-25)

There was thus an element of pressure and some expectation that Ashburton was the man for the job, and that he would help usher in a new era of peaceful Anglo-American relations, without sacrificing British honour through excessive concessions. Rebecca Matzke presented this as a period of crisis between the two countries, and brought forward persuasive evidence to the effect that British naval superiority had made a strong impression in Washington. Consistent British military manoeuvres at sea, or in the sending of reinforcements to Canada, may well have convinced Tyler’s administration of the futility in pushing Britain too far. And certainly, as we have seen, Washington would not have been pleased with McLeod’s execution. Whether this was from a general American aversion to spending money on a needless war with Britain, or because Tyler feared what British naval power could do to America’s exposed cities, is a matter I’m sure American listeners would hotly debate.[[26]](#footnote-26)

But, American vulnerability to British attack notwithstanding, it could hardly be argued that Ashburton set off with the goal of sticking it to the Americans, or seizing upon weaknesses to expand British spheres of influence in North America. His goals were modest, since it was American honour that the *Caroline* had roused, and McLeod was safe and sound in Canada. Aberdeen did become more involved in the negotiations as they progressed, but at no point would British vessels arrive outside the American seaboard, to coerce Americans into making the right choice. The cordial relationship between Ashburton and SOS Webster would be the key, and in the next episode, we will follow Ashburton’s journey to Washington, and consider how he fared in an atmosphere of hope, albeit tainted by a sense of mutual suspicion.

What did Ashburton achieve, how did affect Aberdeen’s political position, and what impact did the Webster-Ashburton Treaty have on Anglo-American relations? Considering the fear of undue concessions which might communicate British weakness, could it be said that the fact that the Americans were back by 1844, asking for further concessions in the disputed Oregon territory, vindicate Palmerston’s warnings that Washington had become too big and brazen, and needed to be taken down a peg? If he’d had his way, what would Old Pam have done differently, and would his policy have borne better fruit? All these questions and more will be addressed in the next episode, but until then, thanks for supporting the show, I have been your humble host, and this has been episode 4. Thanks for listening, and I’ll be seeing you all soon.

1. Cited in Brown, *Palmerston*, 243. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Ibid*, 243-244. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Jones, *American Problem*, 16-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Brettle, ‘The Enduring Importance of Foreign Policy Dominance in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Politics’, in Mulligan, W. and Simms, B. *The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660–2000* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *Ibid*, 155. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. *Ibid*, 155-156. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. *Evening Mail*, 1 September 1841, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *The Scotsman*, in *Morning Chronicle*, 26 October 1841, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *The Times*, 12 October 1841, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *The Times*, 26 October 1841, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *Morning Chronicle*, 18 October 1841, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Milledge L. Bonham Jr. ‘ALEXANDER McLeod: BONE OF CONTENTION’, pp. 198-199. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Jones, *American Problem*, p. 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Milledge L. Bonham Jr. ‘ALEXANDER McLeod: BONE OF CONTENTION’, p. 199. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Jones, *American Problem*, 17-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. R. Y. Jennings, ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases’, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Jan., 1938), pp. 82-99; 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Milledge L. Bonham Jr, ‘Alexander McLeod, Bone of Contention’, 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Cited in *Ibid*, 209-210. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Ibid*, 210-217. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *Ibid*, 217. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Matzke, ‘Britain Gets Its Way’, p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Jones, *American Problem*, 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. *Ibid*, 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. *Globe*, 2 November 1841, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. *Colonial Gazette*, in *Morning Chronicle*, 4 November 1841, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. See especially, Matzke, ‘Britain Gets its Way’, 28-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)