



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

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Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 612

It has been 3,535 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 248 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

Summary:

- There are map updates
- Ukrainian forces made marginal gains near Kupyansk
- Fighting continued near Raihorodka
- Russia made its daily report of fighting near Dibrova
- There were no reports of fighting north of Bakhmut
- Mutual fighting continued in the Klishchiivka AO
- Ukrainian forces continue to hold their defensive lines in the Avdiivka AO
- Russian forces are attempting to advance on Novomykhailivka from northern Marinka
- Fighting continued throughout the Orikhiv AO with no change in the situation
- Russian Colonel-General Oleg Makarevich was relieved of command of the Dnipro Group due to the Ukrainian offensive at Kherson

- Colonel-General Mikhail Teplinsky was named the new commander of the Dnipro Group
- Ukrainian forces have partial control of Krynyk on the left bank of the Konka River
- Russian forces in Kherson report that troop and vehicle movements are nearly impossible during the day due to Ukrainian drones
- Russian ground troops on the left bank report that the requests to the VKS for close air support are being denied because they are under orders to attack civilians and civilian infrastructure on the right bank of the Dnipro River
- Russian air defense shot down Ukrainian drones or missiles over Rostov-on-Don, Russia
- Ukrainian drones struck the Afip Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai, Russia
- An oil storage depot in the Russian Republic of Komi exploded
- Ukrainian air defense goes five for five against Shahed-136 kamikaze drones
- Russia has expanded another factory for missile production
- Russian troops are using a new Lancet kamikaze drone, which reportedly has inertial guidance and AI capabilities

- Russia claims they are starting serial production of a BMP-3 with a smaller version of the 125 mm main gun turret from the T-14 Armada tank
- Russian occupiers couldn't suppress the news of a massacre in occupied Volnovakha, where Chechen troops are accused of executing a family of nine
- Ukrainian officials said that at the end of 2024, they will not renew their contract with Gazprom for the transit of Russian natural gas to Europe
- Hungary and Slovakia have 14 months to sort out new supplies of natural gas

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:


1. Russian commanders have put mission objectives over all other considerations, and they are committed to capturing the Avdiivka salient regardless of the cost.
2. We maintain there is a growing possibility of Ukraine attempting a larger-sized wet crossing near Kherson.
3. The soft response by Ukraine's allies after Russian aggression on Ukraine's border will eventually lead to a significant incident that could result in military intervention.
4. We maintain our assessment that the commitment made by Ukraine's allies to provide the same level of military aid in 2024 as provided in 2023 is negative news due to Russia bypassing ineffective sanctions, increasing defense production, and receiving significant support from Iran and North Korea.
5. Russia is stockpiling missiles and drones for large-scale attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure as the weather continues to degrade, and the extended pause from large attacks is likely due to the historically warm and dry October throughout Ukraine.
6. We further assess that the sharp drop in missile and drone strikes in Ukraine is meant to keep the Russia-

Ukraine War out of the news cycle as global interest is fixated on the Israel-Hamas War.

- 7. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.**




TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



In the Kupyansk AO, Russian state media signaled that Ukrainian forces are increasingly on the offensive. Fighting continued south of [Synkivka](#), where Ukrainian forces made marginal gains and west of [Lyman Pershyi](#).^{1 2 3} East of Kupyansk, fighting continued east of [Ivanivka](#), where the situation remains stable.⁴

Most Russian milbloggers have stopped coverage of the fighting in the region despite three weeks of significant

¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13268>

² <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17946>

³ https://t.me/mod_russia/31924 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13268>

offensive operations. Russian state media agency Russia Today (RT) ran a story highlighting a new variant of the T-80 main battle tank, stating that Russian forces are “holding back the enemy” near Kupyansk versus portraying that there is, or was, an ongoing Russian offensive.⁵

⁵ <https://t.me/brussinf/6689>


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, and capture the rest of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kremynna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents



In the Svatove AO, Ukrainian forces continued tactical offensive operations west of [Raihorodka](#).^{6 7}


In the Kreminna AO, the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) made its daily claim of positional fighting in the area of [Dibrova](#) and added the [Serebrianskyi Woods](#).⁸

⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/31924 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁷ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17946>

⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/31924 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut AO, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk, collapse the Russian flanks north of Bakhmut, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, liberate the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, advance to the administrative border of Luhansk, and minimize civilian casualties

There were no reports of fighting in the Soledar and Bakhmut AOs by any reliable or semi-reliable source.




In the Klishchiivka AO, mutual fighting continued north and east of [Klishchiivka](#) and east of [Andriivka](#) with no change in the situation, with no mention of the situation in the AO from any of the semi-reliable Russian sources we track.^{9 10}

⁹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17946>

¹⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13268>

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK




Russian Objective: Capture the remainder of the Donetsk Oblast by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics

14 15 16 Despite the stability of the line of conflict, which is now in its fourth day, one Ukrainian soldier noted, "Everything is just the beginning."

Errors and Omissions: Yesterday, we reported on the pensioner and her cat, Masha, who is refusing to leave her heavily damaged Avdiivka apartment. We have since learned we misreported her name, which is Raisa. We thank you for your understanding as we cut through the fog of war.




14 <https://t.me/wargonzo/16089>

15 <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17946>

16 <https://t.me/odshbr46/1351>

Fighting continued in the no man's land between Vodyane and [Sieverne](#), with a claim of marginal Russian gains northeast of [Vodyane](#).^{17 18} We did adjust the war map west and east of Vodyane, shrinking the Russian advance toward Pervomaiske from last week and moving the line further east to the quarry. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported that Russian attacks continued near [Pervomaiske](#) with no change in the situation.¹⁹



¹⁷ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17946>

¹⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16089>

¹⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13268>

In the Marinka AO, Russian forces launched a tactical assault north of Marinka in the direction of [Krasnohorivka](#), attempting to move through the remaining tree lines.²⁰ Intense positional fighting continued, supported by the VKS, continued in [Marinka](#) with no change in the situation.^{21 22}

In the Vuhledar AO, Russian forces continued their tactical assaults south of [Novomykhailivka](#) without success.^{23 24 25}

In the Staromlynivka AO, fighting is limited to harassing attacks, with Ukrainian forces containing the movement of Russian troops near [Novodonetske](#), [Urozhaine](#), and [Staromaiorske](#).²⁶

²⁰ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17946>

²¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13268>

²² <https://t.me/wargonzo/16089>


²³ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13268>

²⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/31924 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

²⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16089>


²⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/31924 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

ZAPORIZHZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, prepare to launch a fall-winter offensive to capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Expand the breakthrough at the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



The line of conflict (LOC) remains stable in the Orikhiv AO. Mutual fighting continued on the western edge of [Verbove](#), the northern edge of [Novoprokopivka](#), and west of [Robotyne](#), with no change in the situation.^{27 28 29} Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued tactical assaults near [Kopani](#) and [Nesteryanka](#), with no changes in territorial control.^{30 31}

²⁷ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17946>

²⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16089>

²⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13268>

³⁰ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17946>

³¹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/16089>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION


There wasn't any significant activity.

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KHERSON

Russian Objective: Prevent further Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



In Kherson, the establishment of the Ukrainian bridgehead on the left bank of the Konka River claimed its first big

victim. Russian Colonel-General Oleg Makarevich was relieved of command of the Dnipro Grouping due to the Ukrainian offensive and was replaced by Colonel-General Mikhail Teplinsky.³² Teplinsky is the commanding general of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) and has been used as a fixer to stop Ukrainian offensives. It is unclear if Makarevich has been temporarily demoted or permanently removed from command.

Ukrainian forces continue to hold parts of [Krynyk](#) and, based on the change in Russian command, are also maintaining their positions near [Poima](#), [Pishchanivka](#), and [Pidstepne](#).³³

Russian sources report that Ukrainian casualties are increasing but expressed numerous complaints about the overall situation. Russian milblogger Romanov Light, who is in Kherson, said Russian troops were only lightly engaged at Krynyk, and due to Ukrainian drone operators, it was near impossible to move during the day. "The enemy does not have a numerical superiority but is actively, one might say, covering its amphibious landings with fire from various artillery, including 80 mm and 120 mm mortars, tanks, 155 mm artillery, including cluster munitions. On

³² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/120981>

³³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17946>

our side, as usual, it's a mess, and [we're ordered] 'go there, do something.' One gets the feeling that the group's command is absolutely incompetent."³⁴

A Russian drone operator complained that Ukraine was using electronic warfare to effectively jam the signals from many of their drones, which can't fly above "30 to 40 meters."³⁵

Another milblogger reported that requests for close air support were denied, with mission planners saying they were told, "...our task is to work on the other [*right bank – Ed.*] side," adding, "Why hit [barns] and some [grain] elevators right now if you can strike to suppress those who are on the islands and are launching [drones] non-stop?"³⁶

Neither GSAFU nor RMOD have acknowledged the ongoing fighting.

³⁴ https://t.me/romanov_92/42005

³⁵ https://t.me/ok_spn/27309

³⁶ https://t.me/romanov_92/42005

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity in this area.

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

In the **Rostov region**, air defenses were active in Rostov-on-Don,  [intercepting at least one Ukrainian drone or missile](#).^{37 38}



In **Krasnodar Krai**, at least one Ukrainian drone  [struck the Afip oil refinery](#).³⁹ Russian state media claimed there was only minor damage despite  [videos on social media showing a large fire](#).⁴⁰

³⁷ https://t.me/shot_shot/58754

³⁸ <https://t.me/uniannet/115873>

³⁹ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/46354

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/120979>

In the Republic of Komi, an explosion rocked a tank farm in the settlement of Usinsk. The  [tank that caught on fire](#) was reportedly under maintenance, but emergency services couldn't get the fire under control.⁴¹ The tank collapsed,  [igniting a full tank next to it.](#)⁴²

THEATERWIDE

On the night of October 28 – 29, Ukrainian air defenses shot down the five Shahed-136 kamikaze drones launched at Ukraine.

The British newspaper, The Times, aligned with our assessment from October 8 that Russia would use the Israel-Hamas War and uncertainty about the future of military aid for Ukraine to its advantage. "These are difficult weeks for Kyiv...With American weapons and Western attention suddenly turning to the Middle East, Russia threw more men and equipment into fierce offensives in the northeastern Donbas, towards Kupyansk, in the southeastern Donbas, in Avdiivka, and in

⁴¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/120958>

⁴² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/120973>

Zaporizhzhia, to the north from Tokmak to stop the advance of Ukrainian troops to the south."⁴³

United States Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-LA) signaled on the Sunday news talk circuit that Congress will not take up the issue of additional military aid for Ukraine next week, with time running out before a looming November 17 government shutdown.

The table for equipment losses was **updated on October 28, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

⁴³ <https://t.me/uniannet/115866>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to October 28, 2023. 12,871 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,666 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2279	307	7.42:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	158	375	0.42:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	1024	333	3.07:1	↑
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2957	780	3.79:1	↑
Armored Personnel Carriers	368	360	1.02:1	—
MRAPs	49	175	0.28:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	223	388	0.57:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	254	18	14.11:1	↓
Engineering Vehicles	355	92	3.85:1	↓
Towed Artillery	328	165	1.99:1	↓
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	585	236	2.48:1	—
MLRS	299	50	5.98:1	—
SAMs	189	130	1.45:1	—
Mobile Radars	46	82	0.56:1	↓
EW/ECW	58	4	14.50:1	↑
Winged Aircraft	94	77	1.22:1	—
Helicopters	139	37	3.77:1	↑
Naval Vessels and Submarines	17	27	0.63:1	—

MOBIKS, MOBILIZATION, AND MIR

Satellite images show that Russia has expanded the Chelyabinsk Forge-and-Press Plant to manufacture missiles, expanding the facility and increasing the workforce from 10,000 to 17,000.⁴⁴

Russia is field testing an upgraded version of the Lancet kamikaze drone called Izdelie-53. The new drone has redundant inertial guidance, making it even more difficult to jam, and employs artificial intelligence to scan for its target. The new drone first appeared on October 21, but not in significant numbers.⁴⁵

Russia claimed that it will start production of a BMP-3 variant that has a reduced-sized turret from the T-14 Armada main battle tank.⁴⁶ Moscow claims it will enter production in "large quantities" in 2024. The T-14 Armada was introduced almost ten years ago and has yet to enter serial production. The Ministry of Defense brought the tank to Ukraine twice, with it failing field testing both times, never seeing the line of conflict. It was unclear if the "reduced sized" turret would include the SA82-1M 125 mm

⁴⁴ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/46365

⁴⁵ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/6959

⁴⁶ https://t.me/couch_iu/45648

smoothbore main gun designed for the T-14. If Russia does start production of the new gun, it would indicate Moscow found a way to break sanctions to receive the alloys and machining required to make modern barrels.

WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Multiple Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that in occupied Volnovakha, Chechen Kadyrovites executed a family of nine.^{47 48 49 50} The bodies, which included two children, were found in two homes on October 28. The family had gathered on October 27 to celebrate the birthday of Natalya Gorkun. Several days earlier, her son-in-law, Andriy Kapkanets, had gotten in a confrontation with Chechen troops. Local residents on social media accused occupiers of attempting to cover up the murder, but the size and brutality made it impossible to keep out of local media. The oldest victim was 53, and the youngest was 4.

⁴⁷ https://t.me/Separ13_13/21105

⁴⁸ <https://t.me/bazabazon/22558>

⁴⁹ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/110942>

⁵⁰ https://t.me/Separ13_13/21105

Russian officials have only acknowledged that men in uniforms carried out the massacre, and they were continuing their investigation.

GEOPOLITICS AND ECONOMICS

The CEO of NaftogazUkraine, Oleksiy Chernyshov, said that he has no intention of continuing the transit of Russian natural gas after 2024 when the current contract with Gazprom expires. "The refusal to terminate the contract early is not due to the fear of lawsuits on the part of Gazprom but is connected with the impossibility of depriving some European partners of blue fuel on the eve of winter."⁵¹ The pipeline is one of the main sources of natural gas for Hungary and Slovakia, which have become vocal critics of continuing military aid to Ukraine. Hungary signed a 15-year contract with Gazprom in 2021 and currently plans to end its dependency on Russian natural gas in 2050. Slovakia rejected a 2022 offer to bypass the Brotherhood Pipeline and connect to the Yamal Pipeline from Poland.

⁵¹ https://t.me/smolij_ukraine/46394


RUMORS


Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.


- Is dictatorial president Vladimir Putin dead? Almost certainly not, but you keep asking – so.
- Have more than 295,000 Russian soldiers died in Ukraine since February 24, 2022?
- Were two Russian generals seriously wounded and one admiral killed in Sevastopol? We're still waiting to find out, but it appears unlikely.


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.