



# MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

September 12, 2023



# Malcontent News

## Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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## **SUMMARY – DAY 565**

It has been 3,485 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 200 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

- A Ukrainian missile attack on Sevastopol badly damaged the large landing ship Minsk and the Kilo-class submarine Rostov-on-Don, killing two and wounding 26
- Positional fighting continued in the Kharkiv and Luhansk regions
- Ukrainian forces are clearing Klishchiivka and Andriivka from pockets of resistance near and along the railroad grade
- Positional fighting was ongoing in the Avdiivka, Marinka, and Vuledar areas of operation (AO)
- Ukrainian forces are fighting south of Orikhiv from Verbove to Novoprokopivka and are making tactical gains
- A ballistic missile hit the city of Zaporizhzhia, but no other information is being released
- Ukrainian partisans launched three coordinated attacks within Enerhodar on a Russian checkpoint, the passport office, and a communications node

- Russian forces are building additional defense in Tokmak as civilians leave the area
- The Ukrainian ports of Reni and Izmail on the Danube River were attacked by up to three dozen Shahed-136 kamikaze drones
- The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Germany announced new military aid packages for Ukraine
- The Swedish government is reportedly considering transferring Saab JAS 39 Gripen multirole fighter planes to Ukraine
- Fresh rumors about Ukraine receiving ATACMS are swirling again

## **DAILY ASSESSMENT**

We assess the following:

1. Our concern about Ukraine's ability to turn tactical gains into operational success and strategic victories has been tempered by expanding success in the Orikhiv area of operation (AO), the breaking of the stalemate in the Klishchiivka AO, and the declining quality of Russian troops.
2. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, and proxy forces.
3. At the direction of President Vladimir Putin, the Russian government is in the largest purge of dissident voices and perceived internal enemies since the Soviet era, including the leaders, mercenaries, and employees of PMC Wagner, objective state media journalists and war bloggers, far-right nationalists who want the Kremlin to take more aggressive action in Ukraine, and human rights activists.
4. There remains a possibility of partisan violence within Russia after the killings of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin. President Putin's stature, both inside and outside of Russia, remains in a weakened state.

5. Russian forces made assessment five age like room temperature milk with a massive drone strike on Danube River ports. We maintain that the soft response by Ukraine's allies after Russian aggression on Ukraine's international border has further emboldened Moscow to take increasing risks of causing an international incident.
6. Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
7. The perceived slow progress of the Ukrainian summer-fall offensive, questions about the capabilities of Ukrainian military commanders at the battalion and brigade level, and ongoing anticorruption measures highlighting the problems within the Ukrainian government are unfairly straining Western support.
8. We maintain Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition delivery dates, and these continued delays are negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
9. We maintain that the growing number of combat ineffective and combat destroyed Russian units has

forced commanders to commit strategic reserves meant for a fall counteroffensive into defensive operations. Additionally, due to declining combat potential, Russian commanders are activating the reserves from the second and third echelons of the Prigozhin and Surovikin Lines.


10. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community is negatively impacting Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
11. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)






# TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



**About the maps:** Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


## [Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

# KHARKIV



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

**Ukrainian Objective:** Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure




## Dvorichna Operational Area

Fighting continued north of [Synkivka](#) with no change to the situation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17586>

# DONBAS REGION

## LUHANSK



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, and set conditions to capture the rest of the region

**Ukrainian Objective:** Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents


## **Svatove and Kreminna Operational Areas**

Fighting has become positional east of [Novojehorivka](#). Further south in the [Serebryansky Woods](#), positional fighting and artillery duels continued.<sup>2</sup>

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
<sup>2</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17586>

# NORTHEAST DONETSK



**Russian Objective:** Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region


**Ukrainian Objective:** Defend Siversk, collapse the Russian flanks north and south of Bakhmut, cut off the ground lines of communication into Bakhmut and Soledar and liberate both operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties



## Soledar and Bakhmut Operational Areas

Russian attempts to advance in the direction of [Orikhovo-Vasylivka](#) continued without success.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11927>



## Klishchiivka Operational Area

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported that Ukrainian positions in [Klishchiivka](#) were attacked by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS).<sup>4</sup> Within Klishchiivka, sporadic fighting continues on the northeastern edge of the administrative border.<sup>5</sup> A Russian milblogger reported that Ukrainian forces have superior numbers and better-trained forces and could likely sweep the area of operation (AO) with currently available resources.<sup>6</sup> *"The stabilization of the front line is due to the enemy's desire to maintain reserves while at the same time*

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<sup>4</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11927>


<sup>5</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17586>

<sup>6</sup> [https://t.me/multi\\_XAM/780](https://t.me/multi_XAM/780)



*pinning down our forces in an area of a possible counteroffensive that is unfavorable in operational and tactical terms."*

*"By maintaining such an impressive force here, the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not allow us to transfer some units to strengthen the southern flank, where the situation is still acute. Heavy fighting is going on. The enemy is throwing more and more reserves on the offensive. The forced rotation of units of the Russian Armed Forces, as well as the replacement of units of the 106th Airborne Assault Division with other units, did not contribute to strengthening our positions."*

A video showed Ukrainian forces  [freely operating in the center of Klishchiivka](#) by the abandoned church.<sup>7</sup>

Ukrainian forces remained on the offensive in the area of [Andriivka](#), and Russian forces attempted a counterattack from [Kurdyumivka](#).<sup>8</sup> <sup>9</sup> The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) claimed Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near [Mayorsk](#).<sup>10</sup> If there was an offensive, it was likely

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<sup>7</sup> <https://t.me/uniannet/111131>


<sup>8</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/30388](https://t.me/mod_russia/30388) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>9</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/14988>

<sup>10</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/30388](https://t.me/mod_russia/30388) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

between the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and the T-513 Highway in the direction of Ozarianivka.


## Occupied Donetsk

On September 11 in Luhanske, a Russian launch point for Zala and Lancet kamikaze drones  [was destroyed by Ukrainian artillery](#).<sup>11</sup> Ukrainian forces have started to target the launch points for Lancets in multiple AOs.

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<sup>11</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114161>

## SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and capture the remainder of the oblast

**Ukrainian Objective:** Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, set conditions for an offensive in the Volnovakha and Mariupol directions, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics

## **Avdiivka Marinka, and Vuhledar Operational Areas**

There were no changes to the line of conflict as intense positional fighting continued near [Avdiivka](#), in [Opytne](#), and south of [Pervomaiske](#).<sup>12 13 14 15</sup> Russian forces likely made marginal gains in western Opytne, and we made a small change to the war map.

Positional fighting and harassment continued in [Marinka](#), and Russian forces attempted to advance on [Novomykhailivka](#) without success.<sup>16 17</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114161>


<sup>13</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17586>

<sup>14</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/14988>

<sup>15</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/30388](https://t.me/mod_russia/30388) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>16</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114161>

<sup>17</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/14988>



## Staromlynivka Operational Area

A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued in [Novomaiorske](#) and [Novodonetske](#), and a Russian counterattack on [Staromaiorske](#) ended in failure.<sup>18</sup>

## Occupied Donetsk

Insurgents in Mariupol reported the first westbound Russian military convoy to pass through the city in almost a month. Trucks hauling 19 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs)

<sup>18</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/14988>




and armored personnel carriers (APCs) with troops and ammunition were moving toward Berdyansk.<sup>19</sup>

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
<sup>19</sup> <https://t.me/andriyshTime/13398>

# ZAPORIZHIA



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, prepare to launch a fall-winter offensive to capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

**Ukrainian Objective:** Break through the Surovikin Line and sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



## Orikhiv Operational Area

Fighting continued from [Verbove](#) to [Novoprokopivka](#) along and in the second echelon of the Surovikin Line.<sup>20 21 22 23</sup>

Russian hit Ukrainian positions in [Robotyne](#) with airstrikes. Advances are continuing, and the map updates are delayed to respect Ukrainian operational security. Russian forces

<sup>20</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17586>

<sup>21</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/30388](https://t.me/mod_russia/30388) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>22</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/14988>

<sup>23</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114161>



continued their attempts to advance north from [Nesterianka](#) without success.<sup>24</sup>

Zaporizhzhia Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA) Yuriy Malashko reported the city of Zaporizhzhia was hit by at least one Russian ballistic missile but did not provide any additional information.<sup>25</sup> "The enemy has viciously attacked us once again. It was a ballistic missile. We are working on determining the type of missile and establishing the location of the impact or the site of the hit."

### **Occupied Zaporizhzhia**


In Enerhodar, local insurgents reported that with support from the Main Defense Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (GUR), the Russian passport office was hit with a "special gift," causing an explosion and fire.<sup>26</sup> Simultaneously, a communication station in a 14-story building was "hit," although they did not specify whether it was with a drone or IED.

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<sup>24</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114161>

<sup>25</sup> [https://t.me/zoda\\_gov\\_ua/22345](https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/22345)

<sup>26</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114197>

Ukrainian forces  [launched another flag carried by helium balloons](#), hoping the winds would carry it toward occupied Tokmak.<sup>27</sup>

Insurgents reported that Russian forces are preparing to defend Tokmak as the Ukrainian advance creeps closer.<sup>28</sup>

"We are recording another increase in the number of units of the Russian army, as well as equipment, both in Tokmak itself and in the villages of the district...Antitank [Czech] hedgehogs and concrete pillboxes were installed on the main streets. The number of roadblocks in the city has increased."<sup>29</sup>

## Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

There were no updates on the situation at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

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<sup>27</sup> <https://t.me/uniannet/111127>

<sup>28</sup> <https://t.me/brdnews/13932>

<sup>29</sup> <https://t.me/brdnews/13932>

## BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION



### Black Sea

Operational Command South reported that 17 Russian Black Sea Fleet vessels were on patrol, including one frigate capable of launching eight Kalibr cruise missiles.<sup>30</sup>

### Romania

Romanian officials started building bomb shelters near the village of Plauru, directly across the Danube River from the Ukrainian port of Izmail.<sup>31</sup>

### Occupied Crimea

Ukraine launched at least four cruise missiles at Sevastopol with  [three confirmed strikes](#) and one confirmed interception by Russian air defenses. Two missiles  [struck a dry dock in the Sevmorzavod Ship Yards](#) in the south bay.<sup>32 33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114203>

<sup>31</sup> <https://t.me/uniannet/111161>

<sup>32</sup> <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/42104>

<sup>33</sup> <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/42086>

While we were analyzing available open-source intelligence and working with our in-house sources, the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) confirmed that the Ropucha-class large landing ship Minsk, BDK-43, and the Kilo-class diesel-electric attack submarine Rostov-on-Don were damaged in the attack.<sup>34</sup> In a stunning breach of operational security (OPSEC), the illegitimate governor of occupied Crimea, Mikhail Razvozhayev, posted a picture of himself on the phone with the LLS Minsk burning in the background, asking people not to post videos about the incident.<sup>35</sup>

RMOD claimed Ukraine launched ten cruise missiles, with seven intercepted without evidence. In our assessment, the damage is likely even worse to port infrastructure because the Kremlin was so quick to admit the strike and the loss of two vessels, including a Kilo-class submarine.

The Rostov-on-Don was a Project 636.3, an improved version of the Kilo-class submarine capable of launching Kalibr cruise missiles, and was commissioned in 2014. It is the first vessel capable of launching Kalibr missiles struck by Ukraine. Russian officials are reporting two people were

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<sup>34</sup> <https://x.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1701847386015072362>

<sup>35</sup> <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1701843329821061194>

killed and 26 wounded in the attack.<sup>36</sup> Because of the Montreux Convention, Russia cannot replenish its losses in the Black Sea. The loss of the Moskva and Rostov-on-Don are significant blows to fleet operations.

The last submarine damaged in a wartime attack was the Argentinian Navy Santa Fe, a United States World War II Balao-class GUPPY II submarine. On April 25, 1982, during the Falklands Islands War, it was heavily damaged by depth charges and an antiship missile. Dodging a torpedo, the captain was forced to surface and, staffed by machine gun fire, beached the submarine to save the crew.<sup>37</sup>

## Odesa

The Ukrainian ports of Izmail and Reni were attacked by Shahed-136 kamikaze drones,  [with strikes reported in both locations](#).<sup>38 39</sup> Seven civilians were wounded   [in a truck parking lot](#), with three in serious condition.<sup>40 41 42 43</sup> Port infrastructure and a grain hangar were destroyed.

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<sup>36</sup> [https://twitter.com/bayraktar\\_1love/status/1701860660194263198](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1701860660194263198)

<sup>37</sup> <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1701869247646122435>

<sup>38</sup> [https://t.me/our\\_odessa/53713](https://t.me/our_odessa/53713)

<sup>39</sup> <https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1701815390274253205>

<sup>40</sup> [https://t.me/our\\_odessa/53713](https://t.me/our_odessa/53713)

<sup>41</sup> [https://t.me/our\\_odessa/53719](https://t.me/our_odessa/53719)


<sup>42</sup> <https://t.me/uniannet/111195>

<sup>43</sup> <https://t.me/odeskaODA/2595>

# KHERSON

**Russian Objective:** Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

**Ukrainian Objective:** Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



There weren't any significant updates in this region.

## WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

There weren't any significant updates in this region.

## NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There weren't any significant updates in this region.

## **RUSSIAN FRONT**

**Russian Objective:** Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

**Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective:** Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

There weren't any significant updates in this region.

## **BELARUSIAN FRONT**

There weren't any significant updates in this region.

## **THEATERWIDE**



On September 12 – 13 night, Russia launched 44 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones at the Odesa and Sumy regions. Thirty-two were intercepted.<sup>44</sup>

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a law restricting all persons who were deemed unfit or eligible only for limited military service after February 23, 2022, from traveling internationally.<sup>45</sup> All exemptions are currently under assessment due to the exposure of widespread corruption within the military review boards.

OKS spokesperson, Captain Nataliya Humenyuk, said Russia was stockpiling its missile inventory during winter to target Ukraine's energy infrastructure.<sup>46</sup> Kh-22, Kh-47, Kh-59, Kh-101, and Kh-555 missile attacks have declined significantly since June 2023. Russia made a similar effort in the winter of 2023, building inventory from February to late April and then launching hundreds of missiles over seven weeks.

The state-owned aircraft manufacturer, Antonov, announced it was diversifying its business from building

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<sup>44</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114279>

<sup>45</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114225>

<sup>46</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114168>

cargo aircraft and is starting the design and production of uncrewed aerial vehicles.<sup>47</sup>

Denmark is preparing its twelfth military aid package for Ukraine, valued at \$830 million. The tranche will include main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, ammunition, and anti-aircraft systems.<sup>48</sup>

Germany is providing Ukraine with a mobile field hospital with 24 acute care and eight intensive care beds. The fully independent mobile hospital includes sterilization equipment, a diagnostic imaging suite, a laboratory, a pharmacy, and a room for administrative staff.<sup>49</sup> The facility also includes additional medical modules for outpatient care, housing, power and water supply, a water purification system, and waste processing facilities.

The United Kingdom is going to transfer \$2 million in sonar equipment. The four echo sounders can track submarines and other underwater vessels to protect commercial shipping traffic and Ukrainian coastal waters.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114174>

<sup>48</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114217>

<sup>49</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114201>

<sup>50</sup> <https://t.me/uniannet/111098>

Sweden is reportedly considering the feasibility of transferring Saab JAP 39 Gripen multirole fighter planes to Ukraine.<sup>51 52</sup> According to the publication Sveriges Radio Ekot, Sweden's air force will submit a report in November on the feasibility of sending the planes to Ukraine and how it could impact their national defense.

Yes, we are seeing the swirl of rumors about ATACMS – we don't report on rumors.

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said that Berlin would not provide Ukraine with Taurus cruise missiles, even if the United States provides ATACMS to Ukraine.<sup>53</sup>

The table for equipment losses was **updated on September 1, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

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<sup>51</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/114192>

<sup>52</sup> <https://t.me/uniannet/111124>

<sup>53</sup> [https://t.me/couch\\_IU/42297](https://t.me/couch_IU/42297)

## RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES


Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to September 1, 2023.


11,936 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,326 Ukrainian


Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
<b>Main Battle Tanks</b>	2132	271	7.87:1	—
<b>Medium Duty Tanks</b>	147	360	0.41:1	—
<b>Armored fighting Vehicles</b>	958	317	3.02:1	↓
<b>Infantry Fighting Vehicles</b>	2715	728	3.73:1	↓
<b>Armored Personnel Carriers</b>	346	330	1.05:1	—
<b>MRAPs</b>	47	153	0.31:1	—
<b>Infantry Mobility Vehicles</b>	204	365	0.56:1	—
<b>Command and Communications Vehicles</b>	249	16	15.56:1	↑
<b>Engineering Vehicles</b>	340	79	4.30:1	↓
<b>Towed Artillery</b>	292	157	1.86:1	↓
<b>Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars</b>	509	212	2.40:1	↓
<b>MLRS</b>	257	50	5.14:1	↑
<b>SAMs</b>	165	129	1.28:1	—
<b>Mobile Radars</b>	45	75	0.60:1	—
<b>EW/ECW</b>	53	4	13.25:1	↑
<b>Winged Aircraft</b>	89	71	1.25:1	—
<b>Helicopters</b>	111	34	3.26:1	↓
<b>Naval Vessels</b>	13	27	0.48:1	—


## Notes on Sourcing Information


**Malcontent News** uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.