Hello and welcome history friends patrons all to the 27th episode of the PHM. Last time we examined the final steps towards war made by the relevant powers, and we also waved goodbye once and for all the last man standing from the GNW, Augustus II of Poland. Today we continue this story by focusing the microcope on the Poles themselves – how did they react to the death of their King and what did they plan to do next? All the while, the Austro-Russian block loomed large in the Commonwealth’s consciousness, and the French intrigues piled up still higher. Without any further ado then, let’s get down to it. I will now take you to Warsaw in February 1733…

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

To the extent that he could be called the leader of the decentralised morass of states which made up the Commonwealth, Theodore Potocky, the Primate of Poland, was that leader in the wake of Augustus II’s death. It was up to him to organise and schedule a meeting with his higher peers, since the Commonwealth was effectively in flux until they arranged a new election and elected a new King. Without the King the entire structure of government within the Commonwealth virtually ground to a halt. While an administration headed by the primate, some clergy and the most important aristocrats did maintain the day-to-day functions of the Republic, the gaping hole left by the King, regardless of his flaws, was plain for all to see. It was long known that the death of a king and the election which traditionally followed it left the Commonwealth in a state of stagnation, but it was the vulnerability resulting from such stagnation that kept its people awake at night. Observing such facts, in the early 1660s King John Casimir had attempted to fix these faults in the machine by having a successor elected while he still lived. The problem with this was that the nobles and magnates who were to do the electing became suspicious and jealous of their privileges. They did not trust Casimir’s intentions, and believed that he had more nefarious, absolutist ambitions in mind.

In fact Casimir’s insistence on electing a king during his reign caused such a racket that Jerzy Lubomirski, a prominent Hetman from the east, launched a rebellion against Casimir’s authority, with terrible consequences. Lubomirski had other reasons for rebelling of course, but Casimir’s push for an untraditional election pushed him and his allies over the edge. This lesson had been taught harshly, and when Lubomirski essentially won this revolt, he enforced a term on Casimir which stated that, never again could Casimir or any other king elect a successor in his lifetime or reign. Such a stipulation represented the defeat of common sense, and it is possible to hold this, as well as Lubomirski’s revolt in general, as an example of the Commonwealth nobility, not for the first time, shooting themselves or rather their homeland in the foot. By failing to reform one of the most disruptive and archaic elements of their constitution, the Commonwealth was doomed to paralysis and vulnerability every time a king died. By protecting their own privileges, the nobility granted an ideal opportunity for foreign powers to take advantage of the interim period, and thus the interference in Polish electons skyrocketed after Jan Sobieski’s death in 1696.

However aware or critical of this elective institution Primate Theodore Potocky was, he accepted that he had a job to do. The sooner a new king was elected, the sooner the Commonwealth would go back to ‘normal’. A week after Augustus II’s death, a colloqio of the most important electors was called in Warsaw, wherein it was determined that a Convocation Sejm would be called from 27th April 1733. At this point the Commonwealth would gather together in all its noble splendour, and debate the major issues facing it at the time. The key questions of foreign interests, of native concerns, and of course the relevant candidates would all be raised. It was not necessarily designed to elect a new King then and there, but such occurrences were not unheard of. Much depended upon the sense of urgency that was felt between February and the end of April, and whether a particularly suitable candidate presented himself. In light of this, we must consider the deep seated fear that Austria and Russia had for this Convocation Sejm, which essentially prevented the use of the liberum veto, and was designed to be more orderly than the traditional Sejms.

In St Petersburg, it was feared that a French sponsored candidate like Stanislaus Lechynski would be instantly elected at the Convocation Sejm. Stanislaus was unacceptable to the Russians for obvious reasons, not least because Stan had once been the puppet of the Swedes, and any harkening back to that era could rouse new passions from Stockholm. Like Austria though, the Russians believed Stanislaus was unacceptable because he would be too independently minded. Simply because he would not be a pliable, weak willed King, Austria, Russia and Prussia had even signed a treaty in late December 1732 promising not to approve the election to the Polish throne of Stanislaus. Stan was mentioned by name in that treaty, and the three signees pledged themselves to intervene in the Commonwealth if he suddenly appeared. In the Austrian case, much concern abounded over the future of the Commonwealth and its threat to Vienna if a French ally was sponsored, supported, and secured on the Polish throne. If this happened, not only would the Habsburgs be outflanked, but it was unlikely that the French would have been in a position to order Stan around or, more precisely, it was unlikely that Stan’s son in law Louis XV of France would tell his father in law what to do.

Through such deductions it was easy to imagine Stanislaus entering the Commonwealth and ruling Poland as an independent, reform-minded king determined to better the position of his homeland. In the simple game of imperial self-interest did the three eastern powers thus rule against Stan – they wanted to continue the good thing they had going in Poland, and also wished to prevent any expansion of the French influence there. They were thus keenly watching the events of the Convocation Sejm, in case it emerged that the nobles assembled in late April chose to elect Stanislaus by acclamation. An election by acclamation normally only came about if the candidate was particularly popular or desirable to the Commonwealth as a whole, since it involved the nobles sitting in Warsaw to essentially voice their approval of a candidate without referring back to the regional assemblies from which they had been sent. The Commonwealth’s democratic institutions, such as they were, were remarkably convoluted and complicated, and we’ve bumped into them many times before, as indeed Poland’s scheming neighbours certainly had. Each of the regional assemblies or *sejmiki* sent out their own noble representative to the Sejm in Warsaw, at seasonal intervals but also when matters of national importance arose, such as an election. The representatives of the *sejmiki* were then involved in the debate, and were given time to inform the *sejmikis* from which they hailed about what was going down.

This process could be simple, but problems arose when actors deliberately procrastinated, or when foreign powers involved themselves in the affairs of the *sejmiki*. By pressuring a regional assembly of a few hundred nobles through, for example, garrisoning a regiment nearby, one could have a profound impact on what went down in the Sejm. All the pressured *sejmiki* had to do was inform its rep of its position, and the afflicted rep would the make use of the liberum veto in the Warsaw Sejm, halting all proceedings. Through such means, as well as several others, were the Russians, Austrians and Prussians able to manipulate the Commonwealth’s constitutional processes, but with Convocation Sejms they ran into something of a problem, because the liberum veto could not be used, and so their local pressuring of the *sejmiki* was far less effective. This was why the eastern powers watched the proceedings of spring 1733 unfold with unease. Since they could not bring their traditional pressures to bear, the most obvious option remained – bribery.

As was customary, nobles in the Commonwealth had, since before the election of Augustus II in 1697, made themselves open to foreign ‘petitions’, if it was desired that they vote a certain way. The reason why this didn’t necessarily matter was because the practice of accepting bribes was not as widespread as it would later become. Unfortunately, by 1733, it seemed as though pretty much everyone had a price, even the Primate Theodore Potocky. It was just as well that such men did have a price, because otherwise the French ambassador present in the Sejm in spring 1733 would never have had a way in. The Italian former soldier, the marquis de Monti, was the man charged with representing Louis XV’s interests in Warsaw, as well as Dresden when the king had retired to Saxony. Monti had followed the court back to Warsaw in late 1732 when Augustus II was near the end of his life, but ever since his appointment to the dual court in 1729, he had been aware that French plans were grand for this Commonwealth. Monti’s instructions from 1729 had been to make contact with the Primate Theodore Potocky, since he would be in charge once Augustus II died. Monti was to plan for what would happen once the throne became vacant, but he was also to investigate alongside the Swedish ambassador whether certain nobles would be open to ‘persuasion’ or not. He had to build a picture of the eastern border magnates who had been intimidated or bought out by Russian money, and of the wealthier central magnates who tended to be independent.

Aside from the all-powerful magnates, several of whom owned thousands of acres and possessed vested business interests as far afield as South America, the smaller fish in the Commonwealth’s nobility should be sifted through to see who was likely to be sent from their *sejmikis* at the time of election, and whether an acclamation Sejm as the eastern powers feared would have determined to elect Stanislaus as King. Monti was also tasked with, on top of that exhaustive list, of assessing how popular Stanislaus was, and who supported him. It was suspected that the Primate did approve of Stanislaus’ candidacy, but it was quite another for the Primate of Poland, or indeed Louis XV, to come out in direct and public support of their man. Many actors in Poland, predictably enough, were anxious to see which way the wind was blowing before they committed to anything, lest they end up on the losing side. Monti was able to note on the chaos which was created following the death of Augustus II on 1st February 1733, saying:

The confusion is going to be very great in the kingdom, especially during a time of the Diet, and the animosity among the families goes beyond any description. Everyone wants to be the general; everyone will seek to detach troops from the army and everything will be in disorder. Already the primate, hungry for money, said that he was astonished that the ambassador of France had not spoken to him since the ministers of other powers here had already made proposals to him.[[1]](#footnote-1)

For his part, Monti did not believe in spring 1733 that Stanislaus would be accepted by acclamation, since so many disparate influences were running rampant in the Commonwealth by this stage. Monti would have steered clear of his English colleague, George Woodward, since he had been told beforehand not to trust anyone or reveal to any of his ambassadorial peers the nature of his orders. Yet Monti pleaded back to Paris that he needed clearer orders once Augustus II had died. Not only that, but he also needed large sums of money from Louis XV if he was to keep up and outspend his eastern rivals. Several of the wealthier magnates owned such vast portions or land and were so fabulously rich that Monti grew disheartened and began to wonder if indeed France could afford the Stanislaus venture at all, or if he was merely being used as a pawn for alternative Bourbon interests. Incidentally, these were the same concerns and suspicions which would later dominate Stanislaus’ mind, but for the moment Monti committed himself to his task. Had he talked to Woodward, his English counterpart in Warsaw, he would have found that his orders from London and the concerns Woodward had were mirror images of his own. ‘It is impossible to make any judgement how the Poles are inclined as to an election’, Woodward complained, ‘for all the wise people keep their thoughts very private and will have good reasons before they declare themselves.’[[2]](#footnote-2)

Woodward reported a few days later in mid-February that it seemed like most of the nation would be for Stanislaus, but that these thoughts would have to be encouraged by large sums of money, as was customary. Woodward’s reports didn’t make much of an impression in London, where the situation was viewed gloomily most of the time, and where Britain was enduring a standoff with the majority of Europe in any case, having fallen out with France and Austria by 1732. Woodward was given strict instructions to ensure that the Pretender, James III, did not emerge in the discussions as a potential candidate. James III, the son by James II wife who had essentially caused the Glorious Revolution in 1688, was a constant bugbear on the British consciousness, and it was feared in London as much as it was suspected in Paris that the Hanoverian dynasty was on borrowed time if the exiled Stuarts could gain enough support. Notably in James III’s case, he had married Marie Clementina Sobieski, a granddaughter of that famous Polish King, which London feared would recommend this great pretender to the Polish throne.

If a surprising number of eyes were watching the Polish election, nowhere was this watching more intense than in Russia. It was in St Petersburg that the French ambassador there was able to note the extent to which the Polish question utterly dominated the Russian ministry of Empress Anna. As these powers stirred, tensions and unease were also rising in the Commonwealth itself. Skirmishes broke out between the different factions in Sandomir, where the Confederation of Sandomierz had been born, and at Grodno, the town in Lithuania where several Swedish schemes for the Commonwealth had once played out. If the citizens of the Commonwealth were in tune with the memory of their nation’s past, they were also insistent that its institutions and processes be respected; this in spite of the fact that by 1733, as we unfortunately have now grasped, the PLC was no longer in effective control of its own destiny. John L Sutton in his book on the conflict mused whether it was the very realisation of their own national paralysis in the face of such rampant foreign interference that compelled them to emphasis the judicial character of their actions. They could use the excuses of historical traditions and constitutional processes to hide their nation’s own shortcomings, and effectively bury their heads in the sand.

On 16th March 1733, Louis XV of France issued his guarantee for a free and fair election in Poland, followed on 14th April by a memo sent by the HR Emperor to the Primate Potocky, wherein Charles VI reminded the Primate that during the past year when Poland’s liberties had been in peril, both the primate and his peers had asked the Emperor for aid in defending it. Effectively posing the question ‘am I not merciful?’ to the beleaguered Primate, Charles VI then reasons that he was also in favour of free elections in Poland, but added almost as an afterthought that he was in agreement with his allies, who just so happened to have soldiers on the border with the Commonwealth. This last two sentences explaining the Emperor’s position with respect to his allies conveniently obscured the fact that Habsburg Austria as much as Russia and Prussia had schemed to ensure that no powerful or independent candidate would be elected to the Polish throne. It was these allies, whom Charles VI portrayed as binding the Habsburg family almost in spite of itself, that Vienna had engaged and negotiated with eagerly in the last few years, always with the same common goal in mind – keep the PLC weak, and maintain the influence over its Kings that the three eastern powers had enjoyed from the 1720s.

By this point the Primate was in no position to respond, since his attentions were seized by the Diet of Convocation which convened as anticipated on 27th April. Not until a month later on 23rd May was the process completed, by which time the verdict reached was a surprising as it was apparently defiant of foreign opinion. On 23rd May 1733, the Sejm resolved itself to elect a Pole, one who had no territories or interests outside of Poland, and to use all the force at the Commonwealth’s disposal to oppose the election of a foreign prince. The Primate followed this declaration up by announcing that a new King would be elected in September of 1733. This startled the eastern powers into action, and seemed to suggest that Stanislaus would be ideally suited to make a play for the throne. By excluding any foreign prince with outside territories, the Poles seemed to deliberately reference Augustus II’s son, who would of course have been the Elector of Saxony just like his father. Since by spring the eastern powers had largely settled upon Augustus to be the new King of Poland, this flew in the face of their plans. What were the nobles of the Commonwealth doing by declaring their defiance to the world? Did they plan to actively resist the machinations of the two most interests parties – the French and Austro-Russians?

On 13th June 1733 the Primate of Poland responded to the HR Emperor’s earlier warning by noting that ‘The Republic should not imagine that it had anything to fear on the part of its neighbours; it does not believe it has offended any’.[[3]](#footnote-3) The Primate even went as far as telling the Emperor that his reign would be all the more glorious if he kept the liberties of the Commonwealth and the peace of Europe intact. To do so, it was understood, meant allowing the Poles to make their own decision, and by the early summer of 1733 it was strongly suspected that Stanislaus would fit the bill perfectly, which of course pleased the French and irked the eastern powers. The Emperor replied on 13th July, still refraining from mentioning Stanislaus by name, but making clear his own concern through his tone. He warned of those powers who sought to sew disorder in the Commonwealth while operating under the pretext of valid protocols. This was of course ironic, since the Emperor and his eastern allies planned on using the pretext of protecting the Commonwealth’s liberties and institutions to intervene and forcibly get what they wanted.

Aware perhaps of the Emperor’s hypocrisy, the Primate continued to represent the Commonwealth abroad, and wrote to several other nations, including the Ottoman Empire. In the event that the eastern powers attempted to force anything, an Ottoman counterweight would surely be useful. Writing to Ali Pasha, the GV in Constantinople in early July 1733, Primate Potocky received the desired reply that the Turks would never consent to see the liberties of the Commonwealth supressed – in other words, if war occurred for some silly reason, the Ottomans would happily weigh in as well on the common pretext of protecting Poland’s liberties and constitution. These notes were important, because it was from the Tsarina Anna that the Primate received the most straightforward and blunt reply. Noting that violence had been rampant during the days of the Convocation Sejm in April to May of that year, Anna commented that Stanislaus was banned from receiving the crown of Poland by law. Even though she emphasised the freedom of the election, she made it plain that since Stanislaus was an enemy of Poland, and since the Primate and several others in the Commonwealth had taken an oath in 1709 banishing Stanislaus from the crown forever, any effort by the Poles to place Stan on the throne would be construed as an effort to break the Russo-Polish alliance, and Russia would thus be forced to used her army to sustain and preserve the laws and liberties of the Commonwealth.

Here was then the starkest declaration of the Russian, and by proxy the eastern powers’ intentions. There was no question of what would happen if Stanislaus was elected – Russia would intervene, and she would use the network of bribed or intimidated nobles to get what she wanted, once her armies were on site to do the rest. There was also no question of how the Commonwealth would respond to this act – she could not possibly expect to combat the strength of Russia at this point, especially with its forces exceeding 200k men on her border regions. By contrast, the Commonwealth had ruled itself into a corner by passing several laws, including the infamous one during the Silent Sejm, where it was forbidden for the Commonwealth to field an army above 25k men. Such a force was barely large enough for garrison duty, and the Russians planned to keep it that way for their own interests. It was thus a bit rich for the Tsarina to complain of violence and unruliness in the Commonwealth when tempers flared – the Republic’s armed forces were only a riot away from being overwhelmed. The common Russian practice throughout the century was to exaggerate the violent aspects of the Commonwealth, and portray it as anarchic in order to justify, eventually, the partitions, but at this point, even while ideas of partition between Russia and Prussia were bandied about, the major interest remained bringing in an acceptable candidate, which by summer 1733 meant Augustus junior.

In the future, evidence of armed actions in the Commonwealth would be used to demonstrate that anarchy had consumed the Commonwealth, and that the Poles – through infighting, general turmoil and the unwieldy nature of their stately apparatus – were unable to govern themselves, so for the sake of the European peace and stability foreign powers would have to step in to quell the violence and absorb the troubled portions of the Commonwealth, and eventually all of the Commonwealth, into their own realms. In 1733, evidence of violence was used to prove that the Commonwealth’s liberties were under threat, so in order to protect them foreign powers had to intervene and occupy portions of the land. In short, the Russians and their eastern allies were masters of manipulation, and since the Commonwealth was out of the sphere of influence of France, out of the sphere of interest in Britain and out of the price range of anyone else, they all came to have free reign as western interests receded. It became easier to buy into the line that the Russians were giving rather than ask whether an expensive war for the sake of Poland with no material gain for the defender of the Republic’s free traditions would be worth it. This was a problem, incidentally, that the west struggled with right up to the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939.

In a common theme of the period, the eastern powers could dish it out but they couldn’t take it. The aid to the Russian FM complained regularly of the reams of evidence that came to him regarding the immense amounts of French money exchanging hands in Poland, in the name of course of greasing the wheels for Stan’s election. In addition, when it was revealed that the French had spent 3mn livres in Poland by the end of April, right in time for the Convocation Sejm which the Russians so feared, the aid complained to his master in St Petersburg that such acts contradicted the French claim of standing up for the liberties and constitution of Poland. Apparently unable to see the plank in his own eye, it was claimed that such interference in the Commonwealth contradicted Louis XV’s statement in mid-March whereby the French king declared his intention to preserve the integrity and freedom of the Polish election. With the Habsburgs in no position to outbid the French, and with the Russians in no position to match the French monies, it became an accepted fact over the summer of 1733 that since they couldn’t outbid the French, it was highly likely that they would have to outmatch them on the field. The sizeable slush fund which ambassador Monti made use of in Warsaw effectively guaranteed that widespread support would be there for Stan if indeed he did make it into the country. This in turn guaranteed that the eastern powers would be outflanked if he did manage to appear, since the paid off Commonwealth nobles would enthusiastically support Stanislaus as per the terms of their accepted bribes. Little thought seemed to be given to the idea that the Poles actually wanted to elect a native Pole and be done with foreign interference.

It was beginning to become apparent by early September 1733 that the Primate was in favour of Stanislaus becoming King, particularly amidst the rumours that he had left France in a ship destined to Gdansk in the Baltic. Incidentally, in another incredible tale of the era, a fake Stanislaus was packed aboard a ship destined for Gdansk, and it was only when the French captain and his charge pulled into port that he learned that this passenger was not a would-be Polish King, but some random German nobleman. The action had been taken thanks to the uncertainty over Britain’s position and whether she would intervene on the Baltic Sea in favour of Austria. Yet, this decoy was also necessary in case the Russians attempted to seize Stanislaus on board his ship. Since it was expected that any French move to install Stan on the throne would come from the Baltic Sea, Louis XV was informed that such a decoy was necessary, and he packed his father in law off to Warsaw in a specially built carriage designed to conceal the occupants on board. Stanislaus travelled incognito across the continent for three weeks, before eventually emerging before crowds of his countrymen on 10th September, by which time the election Sejm had been in session for over a fortnight.

Cardinal Fleury is often portrayed by historians as apathetic about the whole Polish scheme, and nowhere is his apathy more apparent than in his behaviour immediately after Stanislaus had left France for Warsaw. Fleury wrote to the King of Sardinia of all people, a shaky Bourbon ally in the coming conflict, and made plain the total secrecy of the scheme. The King of Sardinia never revealed whether he spilled the beans to other people or whether the letter was intercepted, but either way, the cat was out of the bag a week later, and a week before Stanislaus did emerge in Warsaw, it was learned by the eastern powers that he was on the move. This gave them a week to prepare a response, but not much else. It remained to be seen exactly how the Commonwealth would react when Stan appeared out of the blue during the Sejm’s proceedings. For his part, Stanislaus’ enthusiasm and loud exaltations died down when he discovered he would be travelling alone to Poland; this infers that he expected to march across the continent at the head of a French army, and it was the first indication he had that all was not quite as it seemed.

Contrary to the consensus, Stan was not elected unanimously by all assembled at the Sejm. Several notables did oppose his, but the pressure was piled on those undecided votes amidst the undeniable presence and aura of the former King, who had travelled across Europe to serve his people as King. After several appeals to the nobles, Stanislaus was elected King of Poland by acclamation, in a bid to speed up the process. We may well see the act as one of defiance, even if all assembled were not willing to go along with Stan, those that did so knew they had disobeyed the direct wishes of the Tsarina, and of the Emperor. It remained to be seen what the responses of these powers would be, but the Primate, who had now come out in favour of King Stan, soothed their concerns by insisting that:

The republic has only to invoke the assistance of heaven by a unanimous decision and I assure you that it will not permit a hair of our heads to be harmed. It is not the first time that threats have been made to the homeland but thanks to the grace of God, they have never been carried out.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Such defiance and pride was all well and good, but the Primate seemed to forget that the major reason why no such potentate had directly interfered in the Commonwealth’s proceedings was because all previous elections had taken place in a very different era and under very different circumstances. There was no question of Russia invading the Commonwealth in the name of Augustus II’s election in 1697; such a suggestion would have been far out of the bounds of European imagination. By the time the Primate issued this statement on 10th September 1733 though, the Russian armies had already begun their invasion of Lithuania, and what was more, the roused nobles went home after the election, leaving no force under any kind of leadership to defend the Commonwealth’s decision. What was even worse, those nobles dissatisfied with Stanislaus, and perhaps seeing the writing on the wall where Russian interests were concerned, elected to cross to the other side of the River Vistula in Warsaw and form a Confederation. Still worse than that development, they called in the support of Russia to defend the liberties and independence of the Commonwealth and its nobility.

Was this act a cynical admission that the Russians were en route either way to combat Stan’s election, or was it just the piece of justification that the Tsarina needed? I will leave it to you guys to judge, but either way the Russian colossus had begun to whir into life even before Stan had been confirmed as King, and the attending Russian ambassador had already spilt much ink about the condemnable violence against foreign ministers, and of the illegal and unconstitutional means by which Stan assumed his crown. In short, Russia had already furnished its long list of reasons before the hapless eastern nobles of the Commonwealth called on Russian support and provided the Tsarina with the icing on the cake. Now she could use not merely vague constitutional arguments to justify her invasion, but the valid fact that elements of that same Commonwealth had pleaded with her Empire to protect them from the illegal reign. What is remarkable is that Anna was perfectly willing to invade on the flimsiest of pretexts even before this heaven-sent note arrived.

As cynical as the pro-Russian nobles may seem then, they were no more cynical than the Empress of Russia, who insisted from the moment the nobility of the Commonwealth had met in spring 1733 that force would be used where bribery and manipulation failed. Evidently, the Commonwealth had simply become too important to Russian security and interests to allow it to slip through her fingers, and now her Empress was willing to fight for the Russian position in Poland, even without allies, if such an act proved necessary. As the Russian armies approached and King Stanislaus patted himself on the back for a few fleeting days, it was clear that a new era of the Commonwealth’s existence was underway.

It remained to be seen how France would act. Would its King pledge French armies to fight, for the first time in recorded history, against those armies of Russia, in the name of his father in law’s position? Much was made to Stanislaus of the preceding months and the intense diplomatic activities which had been pursued by the French in St Petersburg – would such activities, even at the last minute, prevent the Russians from invading the Commonwealth after all? All of these were questions that the new King of Poland and his uneasy allies would surely have pondered as September 1733 wore on. Next time, we will see exactly what happened next in this incredible story, and what kind of diplomatic groundwork France had attempted to lay in Russia before Stanislaus Lechynski had come to the Polish throne. I hope you’ll join me then, but for now this has been the PHM, thanks for listening history friends and patrons all, my name is Zack and I’ll be seeing you all soon.

1. Cited in John L. Sutton, *War of the Polish Succession*, p. 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Cited in *Ibid*. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Cited in *Ibid*, p. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Cited in *Ibid*, p. 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)